Background
In
1996 I wrote a thesis dealing with the Colwell construction and attempted to
ascertain, based on clear instances, the exact nuance of disputed texts in the
NT. Especially relevant was the most probable semantic nuance of the singular
count noun THEOS in John 1:1c. My methodology and the results are well known to
anyone who has either read the thesis, the article located on the Biblical
Studies Foundation website, or followed the subsequent discussions between
myself and Greg Stafford located on Dave Sherrill's website.
On 11/15/99 Greg sent me (along with Dave Sherrill) an e-mail disputing a clear
instance of a qualitative sense to a particular singular count noun in Luke's
Gospel. He questions both the rendering of the passage and the sense I give to
it claiming, among other things, that I misquote and mistranslate Luke 7:39,
ignore the indefinite pronoun (TIS, "who") and by doing so I
obfuscate "this point so that [I] can continue to promote a Q sense for
singular preverbal PNs, by omitting relevant portions of the text from [my]
translation." In his words this is "alarming, to say the least."
In
January I was subsequently sent an e-mail which clipped a discussion of his,
including an extended portion of his recent edition, concerning my lack of
response and supposed misquotation of Luke 7:39. Among the predictable ad
hominems he accuses me of several inaccuracies. Below I will deal first of
all with Stafford’s own inaccuracies concerning what I have actually said
and/or written on the subject and second, I will present a defense for
understanding the singular count noun in Luke 7:39 (HAMARTOLOS) as Q. I
maintain that this is not an unclear but rather clear instance of the Q (= Q-d)
sense. Stafford, as shall be revealed below, is staunchly opposed to this
rendering to any singular count noun because it damages his theological view of
THEOS in John 1:1c.
Stafford’s Incorrect Inferences
When
I refer to errors in Stafford's book, I am largely referring to how he treats
the Colwell construction and now my thesis. I will clearly demonstrate below
that he has completely misunderstood the nature of my statements, and because
of that basic misunderstanding, has gone to great lengths in attempting to
substantiate a conspiratorial purpose behind my findings. The nature of his
errors will be made quite plain below in this section. I will follow with
another section showing why I understand the passage in Luke as I do, and
attempt to illustrate why Stafford fails to comprehend the syntactical
structuring of the passage.
Let
me state what I think is the most salient failure on Stafford's part in this
particular matter. Simply put, he misses the syntactical function of the
OTI-clause in Luke 7:39 and consequently fails to understand my rendering of
this passage in the thesis. If he had simply attempted to comprehend this one
factor, the charges from his vantage would have evaporated very quickly.
Stafford's fuming is a good example of heat without much light and much ado
about nothing. Let me now lay out the presuppositional errors promulgated in
his correspondence and address them squarely.
False premise #1: I argue that all
singular count nouns are Q.
Stafford
writes, "There is absolutely no evidence to support the theory that
singular count nouns placed before a copulative verb convey ONLY the idea of
qualitativeness."
Now
I would like Stafford (or anyone else) to produce the data on this one! Where
do I ever write/convey/infer such a thing? This premise is flatly untrue and an
example of a careless reading and uncritical caricature of my position. I hold
that a singular count noun can exude several semantic nuances among which are I
(indefinite), D (definite), D-Q (definite-qualitative), I-Q
(indefinite-qualitative) and Q (qualitative). All of these semantic options are
found in the Colwell construction and equally true of its post-copulative
counter part. I have consistently maintained this position and have never
stated anywhere otherwise. Stafford knows this and thus one finds no
quotes from me accompany his charge. I have stated this fact so many times and
in so many ways as to be absolutely certain as to the nature of Stafford's
action here. He is simply lying. It is that simple.
False premise #2: I force singular
count nouns into the Q category to support Trinitarian notions in John 1:1.
Stafford
writes, "This [above] is a forced view that is predicated on salvaging an
unbiblical view of God and the Word in John 1:1."
Once
again, Stafford fails to understand the methodology of my endeavor as well as
its non-dogmatic nature. Nothing in my study is "forced" to fit
anything and Stafford has continually floundered in this regard to substantiate
that predictable but false claim of his. The fallacious nature of this premise
is based upon the previous false premise above, namely that I hold that all
singular count nouns in a pre-verbal anarthrous construction (Colwell
construction) are Q. He then goes further and indicates that (1) this is a
forced view (a view I don't even hold), and (2) based on Trinitarianism, which
he calls an "unbiblical view of God." Again, he fails to admit that
my study was based on linguistic science, not the dogma of the church--right or
wrong they are (and they are right on the nature of God). The study was conducted
from a lexical-grammatical-syntactical-semantical grid, is statistical,
independent of theology as a governing criterion, and in the end detrimental to
Watchtower theology. It is unfortunate that he has to reject what he
pejoratively calls "research" when that is exactly what it is. Again,
to understand JWs rendering of John1:1c as I-Q is not impossible, but is
statistically quite improbable. That is a statement from probabilistic science,
not dogmatic theology.
False premise #3: Harner taught a
qualitative sense but it can be understood legitimately as I-Q.
Stafford
writes, "Indeed, even if we accepted a qualitative-only sense for THEOS in
John 1:1c (and that is what the Society argues for in their Appendix in the
1984 Reference Bible, based on the studies of Harner and others [though the
sense in which they view the qualitativeness of THEOS is different from Harner,
of course]), then that would mean that the Word is "with God" (thus
he is not the God he is "with" [not simply "the person"]),
and is himself an owner of divine nature."
This
is a subject that captured my interests from the beginning and which treatment
earned the label the abuse of Harner's research. Anyone interested can
go back and re-read what I have said on this matter. It is clear that Harner's
article (1) never implied I-Q from Q--although he included (and created?) the
category of I-Q, (2) never implied (nor can it be inferred) partial
characteristics, qualities or essence to Q, and (3) never made the
determination as to the sense of THEOS in John 1:1 from theology. The problem
with Stafford's view is that he cannot sustain a linguistically viable solution
to understanding THEOS in John 1:1c as characteristically different than that
of John 1:1b. The differences lie in the personal referents (Father,
Word) and the nature of the propositions involved. Sadly, I don't think
Stafford has ever really understood this crucial point.
Now
his understanding of John 1:1b as a separate God than 1:1c ("thus he is
not the God he is 'with'"), is an example of reading his Watchtower
theology into the text, a failure to understand the nature of the article
before THEOS (1:1b) as a personal referent (which cannot be denied), and
case of falling victim to his own referential fallacy--THEOS when it refers to
YHWH can only be the Father. I have attempted to demonstrate this fallacy
several times and it is clear that he is unable or unwilling to acquiesce to
the most salient points on this matter (John 4:24 for example where O THEOS refers
to God the Father, yet understood by him to mean O THEOS = the Father only).
Stafford's arguments here and elsewhere are based squarely on his theology, an
ignoring of the grammar and linguistic information, as well as an exhibition of
a great deal of naiveté. The underlying cause is a logical inferential blunder
squarely attributed to his protectionism of WT theology.
Let
me illustrate the problem logically since I have already done so grammatically
in previous responses. The classical syllogism states, If A then B; A,
therefore B. The fallacy to this syllogism is, If A then B; B,
therefore, A. Lets give the typical illustration to this syllogism and then
apply this to Stafford's claim. A = It is raining; B = There are clouds in the
sky. If it is raining, then there are clouds in the sky. This is a
necessary and valid inference. The false inference (affirming of the
consequent) is stated, If there are clouds in the sky, then it is raining.
This is an unnecessary and invalid inference as well as empirically false on
many occasions (cloudy but rainless days). Now let me apply it to Stafford's
view of God. A = The referent is the Father; B = the nature of the referent is
YHWH. If the referent is the Father, then the nature of the referent is YHWH.
This is a necessary and valid conclusion. But the converse is not necessarily
true. If the nature of the referent is YHWH, then the referent is the Father.
This is the exact type of invalid reasoning that Stafford commits with
impunity--it is his theological a priori about the nature of God that
compels him to commit such logical blunders and make such infelicitous
accusations against me.
Simply
put, when O THEOS refers to the Father this does not mean that O THEOS is the
Father only. Secondly, when THEOS refers to the Logos (John 1:1c) it is
linguistically proven and logically implied that the Logos is THEOS in the same
way the Father (1:1b) is. Linguistics (my study) and logic are unequivocally
contrary to Stafford's position (Watchtower theology).
Incidentally,
Stafford makes the same unsound inference when he refers to Hebrews 1:8 and
asks, "How will Trinitarians get a qualitative-only sense out of its use .
. ?" Hebrews 1:8 reads, "Thy throne O God is forever and ever
. . . ." Here he fails to understand that it is God the Father (O
THEOS, Heb. 1:1) talking to the Son as O THEOS (nom. for voc.). Thus the
referent of O THEOS here is the Son and essentially can be rendered "God the
Son." Thus it is YHWH the Father talking to YHWH the Son. Only an arm
chair linguist could squeeze anything other than this sense and resultant
meaning as even remotely probable--and I'm also referring equally to the
article in the nominative used for the vocative (O THEOS). Even here, a
specific referent to THEOS does not invalidate other members being inferred.
Thus there is an elliptical yet implied appositional phrase following
the use of O THEOS here for the Son as with the Father in John 1:1b. Stafford
misses clear cases like these, where context demands such, and blindly follows
his irrational a priori as demonstrated earlier. Worse yet, he bids
others to follow him in this nefarious venture.
Fallacy #4: Trinitarians are forced
to view THEOS in John 1:1c as Q simply based on their theology.
Stafford
writes, "while Trinitarians for years misled each other and the scholarly
community about the meaning of THEOS (considering it a definite noun per
Colwell's thesis), they are now doing everything in their power to force a
qualitative-only sense onto a singular count noun used of a personalistic
subject (the Word), because they now see that that view (the qualitative-only
view) is the only one they can possibly attempt to associate with the assumed
truth of Trinitarianism, which cannot survive a definite or indefinite semantic
for THEOS in John 1:1, or elsewhere."
First,
let me clear the air on Trinitarians supposedly misleading each other on the
"meaning" of THEOS. The position of Colwell on John 1:1c (sense is
D), is not to be equated with misleading others in regard to the meaning
of THEOS. Colwell and others had a meaning of THEOS that was correct,
but the sense of the noun they attributed to it (D) was incorrect. It
appears obvious that this sense contradicted their meaning of
THEOS, yet both were maintained simultaneously by both Colwell and his
followers--and that is the problem. The sense attributed to THEOS turns the
statement into a convertible proposition resulting in the inference that the
Father = the Word. I and others have pointed this fallacy out on numerous
occasions. But Stafford, because he misunderstands linguistic science, confuses
the meaning of the term with the semantic sense applied to it by
either D or Q (as well as the referent involved), simply pulls out his
well-worn accusations rather than deals with the facts. Furthermore, he seems
utterly unable to understand the resulting proposition these different senses
demand.
Second,
although I would understand the D sense as incompatible with Trinitarianism
(never mind the statistical pool against it), the I-Q sense could be used quite
well with the Trinitarian notion intact--although it too is statistically
improbable in John. If one keeps in mind that THEOS (1:1c) has the same
qualities as O THEOS (1:1b), then the Word is a God in the same sense as the
Father is a God. The indefinite sense is simply a marker of their joint
membership in the same class with the same attributes (THEOS). They would be
distinct personally but united essentially. This does create problems for it
implies two Gods, an illogical and unbiblical point of view. This rendition is
at least linguistically defensible (THEOS doesn't change meanings in the
passage but only referents), but would inevitably force one to reckon with the
nature of the one God (YHWH). Thus, contrary to Stafford's insistence above,
linguistically the I-Q is not as problematic, but logically it would be forced
into the Trinitarian scheme due to more precise language elsewhere. In other
words, since there is only one God, these indefinite senses would only be
indefinite with reference to something other than being. They would have to be
personal distinctions rather than ontologically distinct distinctions.
In
concluding this section I have denied, in contradiction to Stafford's
assertions, that (1) I hold all singular count nouns are Q, (2) I force
singular count nouns into the Q category to support Trinitarian notions in John
1:1, (3) Harner taught a qualitative sense but it can be understood
legitimately as I-Q, and that (4) Trinitarians are forced to view THEOS in John
1:1c as Q simply based on their theology. These accusations continue undeterred
by the evidence I have marshaled forth in previous replies, but each one
remains categorically untrue. I expect that these unfounded and unproven caricatures
will continue to flow from Stafford's keyboard, but I remain optimistic in the
ability of the critically minded to distinguish between fantasy and the facts.
A Re-examination of Luke 7:39
This
section deals with my initial comments in the thesis regarding Luke 7:39, the
consequent misunderstanding of Stafford, and provides a validation of my
initial rendering. It will be obvious from my thesis that I considered the
nuance of the noun HAMARTOLOS an open and shut case. I omitted a detailed
discussion of it only to have Stafford give his spurious rendition of how I
arrived at the conclusion. Below, the pertinent passage in my thesis will be
quoted and a few observations will be made before Stafford's comments are
reproduced and critiqued as well.
Thesis Vs. JWD
Of the
clearly qualitative occurrences include Luke 7:39b which reads, OTI HAMARTOLOS
ESTIN. That she is sinful. That this last example is qualitative and not
indefinite is brought out further by the preceding clause, If he were a
prophet (i.e., exercising prophetic abilities) he would have known what
kind of woman this was who touched him, that she is sinful. The kind of
woman she was is answered by the predicate construction, she was sinful
(Hartley, "Criteria for Determining Qualitative Nouns," pg. 62).
A
few observations are necessary and to which further validation will make plain.
First, the focus is on the phrase "OTI HAMARTOLOS ESTIN" as it
further explicates the adjective. Second, the passage is giving the sense of
this phrase only as it further explains the adjective what kind
[POTAPH] rather than who [TIS] or "who and what kind."
Third, the italics represent the sense rather than a strict translation of the
entire passage, so to accuse of mistranslating is beyond the intent of the
italics. Fourth, the translation (not given here) would actually read,
"Now the Pharisee who had invited him saw it, he said to himself, ‘If this
man were a prophet, he would have known who and what sort of woman this is who
is touching him, for [or that, or namely] she is
sinful." Fifth, it is obvious that I refer to the adjective in the thesis
as the explanation for the OTI-clause because I state that the predicate
construction answers the question as to the kind of woman she is, not
"who and what kind" of woman she is. The who she is is answered by
"who is touching me" not the OTI-clause.
Now
let me quote from Stafford and his book to note where he went wrong in assuming
he understood what was going on here. Below I list at least seven areas where
he errs in drawing improper conclusions from my statements. Stafford writes,
Another
example where Hartley's preferred view for PN-V texts overrides good judgement
(sic) is Luke 7:39. Here a Pharisee observes the treatment given to
Jesus by a woman whom he considers "a sinner" (hamartolos esitn).
Hartley believes that this example is "clearly qualitative." He
reasons: "That this last example is qualitative and not indefinite is
brought out further by the preceding clause, If he were a prophet (i.e.,
exercising prophetic abilities) he would have known what kind of woman this was
who touched him, that she is sinful. The kind of woman she was is answered by
the predicate construction, she was sinful" (Hartley, "Criteria for
Determining Qualitative Nouns," 62). But Hartley's conclusion is based
primarily on a misquotation of Luke 7:39, which he translates above, in
accordance with his misquotation. Though
Hartley's
translation only has the Pharisee reflecting on "what kind of woman"
she is, the text actually has the Pharisee thinking, "If this man were a
[or 'the'] prophet he would have known who [tis] and what kind of woman [kai
potape he gune] is touching him, that she is a sinner." Because Hartley
ignores the reference to who she is (there are no variants that omit tis) and
focuses only on what kind of woman she is, he can give the impression that his
switch from a noun ("a sinner") to an adjective ("sinful")
is justified per the context. Obviously, "sinful" does not answer the
question concerning who the woman is. Hartley's attempt to obfuscate this point
by omitting relevant portions of the text from his translation is alarming, to
say the least (JWD, 2nd ed. pp. 341-42).
Stafford's
errors are multiple. First, he accuses me of misquoting Luke 7:39 but that is
simply wrong-headed (see below). Second, I do not have the Pharisee thinking
solely on what kind of woman in the passage is. This is an incorrect
inference (one of several) on Stafford's part. Instead, I am focusing only on
what the latter phrase is further explicating, not denying that the
Pharisee is reflecting on both factors, i.e., who and what sort
of woman she is. The goof on Stafford's part is failing to understand what the
OTI-clause modifies here, not on what the Pharisee is thinking! In other words,
although the Pharisee thinks of who and what kind of woman she is, it is the
latter that occupies his attention at last with the final clause. Because the
OTI-clause modifies only the latter part, Stafford thinks that I deny the whole
of what is thought. Third, Stafford fails to understand that I was not ignoring
the indefinite pronoun TIS, but was instead pointing out the correct antecedent
to OTI which is the adjective not the pronoun. Fourth, he argues that I arrive at
my view based on an incorrect translation, when in fact I argue for the
rendering based on the proper functioning of the OTI-clause. Fifth, he assumes
that I turn a noun into an adjective rather than give a qualitative sense to a
noun--which he obviously denies here. Sixth, he assumes the question is who
she is rather than what kind of woman she is when the OTI phrase is
cited. Finally, I omitted no relevant portion of the text nor did I obfuscate
any point that the OTI-clause actually modified.
Defense of Qualitative Rendering
Now
permit me to fill in some of the grammatical gaps before I give the lexical and
syntactical validation for my rendering. The Pharisee couches his expression
(mental or otherwise is irrelevant) in a second class present contrary to
fact condition (EI + impf. ind. in
the protasis and AN + impf. ind. in the
apodosis). The semantic relation is one
of cause and effect—if he were a prophet [I-Q], then he would know
such and such. The reasoning of the Pharisee was that since Jesus does not
exhibit prophetic abilities, that is by not knowing about this woman’s
reputation and character, he must not be a prophet. So although the mental
process was by way of evidence-inference, the statement took the form of
cause and effect. It is difficult to determine what this represents
pragmatically since it is not verbally articulated. It could be intended to mock,
assert, rebuke, argue or even to lament. Most likely it is a mental
mockery or assertion denying Jesus’ identity.
The
translation “she is sinful” rather than “she is a sinner” is
reached through two primary factors--the first is lexical while the second is
syntactical: (1) The use of the adjective POTAPOS emphasizes quality not class,
and is modified by the noun HAMARTOLOS. BAGD state that the adjective refers to
"what sort or kind" and translates this verse as "who
and what kind of woman" she is (BAGD, 694-95). Compared with the
papyri the NT never uses the local sense but only answers "of what
sort?" M-M quote several sources among which is P Oxy XIV 167816
(iii/A.D), "Write me what sort (of purple) you wish me to bring"
(M-M, 530). Thus this qualitative sense demands the same from the noun
HAMARTOLOS in conformity to the principle of maximum redundancy. (2) The
syntactical functioning of the clauses operate so as the relative clause "who
is touching him" modifies TIS ("who") while the OTI-clause
"she is sinful" modifies POTAPH (what sort or kind). Thus the
first relative clause answers the who in the subject clause (both in a
predicate position to the subject H GUNH with implied verb ESTIN) while the
latter OTI-clause answers the what kind. So the clause "The woman
is who and what sort" functions as the object of the verb
EGINWSEN in the apodosis while "who is touching him" and "that she
is sinful" each modify their respective predicates TIS and POTAPH. This is
the syntactical structuring that Stafford misses entirely.
Thus
each clause (rel. pronoun/OTI-clause) functions appositionally to
separate predicates which in turn modify the subject H GUNH "the
woman." That is, they serve to further delineate/amplify aspects of
the predicate. Who is the woman? She is the one who is touching him.
What kind of woman is she? She is sinful. So when Stafford accuses me of
mistranslating the passage, or supposedly obfuscating a point by omitting TIS,
he illustrates his failure to recognize the underlying syntactical ordering of
the passage and inability to recognize the proper antecedents of two
grammatically disparate but semantically identical clauses. It is he who has
omitted relevant factors in the text not I. It is his failure to properly
analyze others with a dose of understanding combined with the deadly presuppositions
of the Watchtower that make for the explosive ad hominem attack as
represented in his treatment of my thesis.
Finally,
one must wonder why Stafford chose this passage for treatment in his second
edition. Did he think that it represented a case where a singular count noun
pre-copulative anarthrous PN was not Q but rather say I-Q? Even if this were
so, how would that discredit my view since I include plenty of these types of
nouns with that semantic tag? Or, was he instead attempting to discredit my
methodology by showing a clear case where he supposed I rushed to judgment on a
particular text only to promote a view that PNs in this construction could be
credited with this sense (Q = Q-d)? As shown above, he misrepresents my
position in this matter stating that I hold all singular count nouns in the
Colwell construction are Q, when I do not. Or was he simply trying to point out
a prejudice on my part by the alleged omission of TIS? Admittedly, there are
probably cases where I considered passages as a clear instance of a particular
sense that are indeed, after further study, not so clear after all. But this
text is certainly not one of them and Stafford has been unsuccessful in
providing any example where this possible scenario is in fact the case.
Conclusion
This
response has sought to dispel some of Stafford's false inferences and downright
inaccurate depictions of my view on the Colwell construction, singular count
nouns, and specifically Luke 7:39. It has also sought to validate the
insistence on my part of a clear instance of the Q sense to a singular count
noun from a lexical and syntactical position. In accordance with my initial
comments in my thesis, I reaffirm the sense given there and maintain that
HAMARTOLOS should be rendered (in accordance with its clausal function) as a
clear instance of the Q sense to a singular count noun in Luke emphasizing and further
modifying the kind of woman she is rather than who she is. Any
other rendition or syntactic ordering of the phrase is unlikely given the
additional feature of the pre-copulative anarthrous singular count PN, employed
as a deliberate confirmation of this adjectival and semantic redundancy.
Finally, in light of this validation, my comments in the thesis can be viewed
for what they are--an explanation of the OTI-clause as it expands upon the
adjective POTAPOS not TIS.
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