Another Rejoinder to Stafford’s "Surrejoinder to Don Hartley: Q-Class Count Nouns, John 1:1c, and Other Related Matters."

A second issue to address before offering my comments, regards my delay in responding to Stafford. This is necessary since my second response and now this response, are at least six months postponed. The elapse is due to several factors only some of which might be mentioned. First, I have time limitations due to course requirements that continue through the summer and into the Fall. My first obligation, therefore, is to finish these as part of my primary responsibility. Second, although I consider the subject here extremely important, the dialogue is not on the level of what I expected. I have considered letting the facts of my study along with previous responses stand on their own without further comment--for together they quite adequately refute any subsequent dialogue, response or surrejoinder. Repetition is pedagogically necessary but tiresome in some respects. Third, the errors contained in Stafford's responses require a bit of comment as you will see and thus I tend to be pedantic with a didactic purpose--I want the reader to get what I'm saying. In addition to this, I like to take time to understand opposing positions, and to reason through them rationally even if the opposing argument doesn't quite meet the standards of a rational inquiry. This ensures, on my part, a fair assessment as well as a thorough response. But it also requires a chunk of time. Thus the delay.

Now why should I respond? First, I have done the study on the subject at hand and am quite familiar with the texts under discussion. To my knowledge, no one has performed as much research on the Colwell construction, in concert with mass nouns, than I have. Thus I feel obligated to at least offer a response here, although at times I can't help but suspect that my constant return to this subject might transform me into less than a well rounded Greek student! Second, to dispel some confusion that has erupted over the subject of mass and count nouns. Before entering the fray, I noticed a lot of loose talk about the so-called simplicity of mass and count nouns (on B-Greek list and other places) from the very individuals that gave little credence or evidence of familiarity with the subject. On some occasions, Christian apologists had no clue as to what the whole fuss was even about. Third, and this is probably the clincher, I found Christians on the net who were befuddled by the sudden interest in the whole subject of mass and count nouns and its relationship to John 1:1c. I perceived a lacunae while Christians who were in the thick of things could only be more confused rather than illuminated when discussing the subject with JWs. The situation was and still is that JWs and Stafford in particular, do not present the subject from the standpoint of linguistic science. Sadly, other factors form the grid through which all methods are poured and filtered. Finally, I thought it a good opportunity to appeal to critically minded individuals (JWs or otherwise) and reason from a sound methodology to the meaning of texts. After all, it is the ultimate meaning of the text that the study was forged to begin with. It is not the end which justifies the means, but the means that justify the end. I hope that this response elicits the critically minded to judge the study on its own terms, not simply the end to which it reaches. Thus the response.

Below I will focus on unraveling the comments made by Stafford in his surrejoinder, most of which I consider irrelevant and misleading. My comments will be marked HARTLEY-RESPONSE. Contrary to previous exchanges, I will not cite all antecedent exchanges, but only Stafford's surrejoinder, with minimal exception, in order to save space.

The introduction to Stafford's surrejoinder is closer to a confessional statement or a diatribe that caricatures rather than represents the doctrine of the Trinity, thus I will leave most of it alone. Instead I will cite only his final sentence which adequately illustrates this assessment. "You see, a Trinitarian has no problem with Jesus being in a 'personal' relationship (i.e., 'with') the 'Father,' but it is quite another matter come up (sic) with any understanding of THEOS in 1:1c that will allow Jesus to be 'with' the Trinity."

As cited in an earlier response, Stafford admits that O THEOS in John 1:1a refers to the Father not the Trinity (JWD, 220). It is also true that O THEOS refers to Jesus in John 20:28. The first case (John 1:1a) no more rules out the Word as THEOS any more than the latter (John 20:28) does the Father as THEOS. Neither of these cases argue against the doctrine of the Trinity. So why Stafford feigns as problematic a particular member of the Trinity being referred to as O THEOS comes across as disingenuous. John 1:1a doesn't say the Word was with the Trinity. It says He was with O THEOS (the Father) and that the Word is THEOS (the Son). It is precisely here where the import of my study becomes clear. The latter statement is in the Colwell construction and is a subset proposition that allows other members of THEOS to be inferred. This doesn't make the Father "a god" any more than it makes the Word "a god." If the Word was with "the Trinity" as Stafford supposes the view to teach, then there would be four members of the Trinity which is, of course, a contradiction in terms. Thus Stafford has succeeded in nothing more than creating a caricature of Trinitarianism fostered by his category mistakes and linguistic naiveté.

That is not it at all. The fact is Hartley is the one who characterized my forthcoming reply when he had not even read it! That is not an open-minded person, is it? Nowhere do I say anything implying that a disagreement with me is tantamount to reading your theology into the text. There are a number of legitimate possibilities in the realm of biblical theology, but Trinitarianism is not one of them.

When I made the above statement (to which Stafford refers), I had indeed read his reply which he had made, albeit to an individual on the internet. His comments were made in the public domain and if Stafford wished it to be private, he should have designated these comments via e-mail. Of course he calls his later but fuller reply a response that I was reportedly referring to when in actuality I was commenting on the statements made by Stafford to this individual on the NET. How could I be referring to a response that had not been written at the time? I initially responded to statements made by Stafford which cast half-witted remarks about the article on the Colwell construction. I labeled these initial comments his "response," as admittedly meager as his comments were--both substantially and materially. Stafford did subsequently provide a fuller response to which I did eventually address as well. If Stafford wants that to be his first official response, so be it.

In connection with this and my comments, I would like Stafford to define what open-mindedness entails. One might notice from his above statements his version of what constitutes "open-mindedness" excludes--namely, any possibility of arriving at a view in keeping with Trinitarianism. In stark contrast to this a priori refusal to even admit of the possibility of Trinitarianism as a legitimate option (never mind its high probability), I have never stated that Arianism (or Watchtower theology) was not a viable option, based on the semantic range of the singular count noun, to the text of John 1:1c. What I have maintained is that this view has an infinitesimally small probability of carrying the day statistically. Furthermore, context demands that the characteristics of THEOS remain the same throughout John 1:1 (1b, 1c) not altered and equivocated in order to reach a theologically motivated end--Watchtower theology. Thus infinitesimal statistics for I-Q, based on clear instances of the semantic nuance of singular count nouns in John's Gospel, combined with linguistic unliklihood of equivocating on THEOS, along with the discourse connection of the mass noun SARX (1:14) to THEOS (rendering both semantically identical Q-d/Q) all combine to render the JWs understanding of THEOS as nearly impossible to maintain with any credibility.

Returning to the issue of open-mindedness, Stafford (as shown above) rules out Trinitarianism from even the possibility rather than merely the improbability of being legitimate. And it is this unwillingness to consider other views that typically defines one as closed-minded. It is important that the reader see clearly beyond the surface appearance of merely two individuals rejecting each others views. I reject his view of John 1:1c based on its grammatical implausibility. He rejects my view based on his theological belief system. I have provided a grammatical study the methodology and conclusions of which he rejects as impossible theologically. I reject his theological appraisal and pseudo-grammatical critique of my work on the basis of linguistic data. His whole reasoning proceeds something along these lines. Linguistic models found to be compatible with Trinitarianism are ipso facto not viable options but are instead contrived and manipulated paradigms by Trinitarians designed to allow a later Trinitarian theology to be legitimately or illegitimately (for Stafford) read back into the text. Contrary to Stafford, however, I have not followed such a cunningly devised methodological myth. And it would be more of a myth to believe I did.

Now let me state as briefly as possible something I view as very important as it pertains to methodology. My pursuit of truth is not guided by confessional statements or creeds. My modus operandi is directed by a bottom-up approach, although I'm not denying the hermeneutical circle (or spiral), nor assuming a tabula rasa (non-presuppositional mind set) nor am I belittling creeds (biblical or otherwise). I start with grammar (the minutiae) and work up from there within the Jewish cultural matrix, primarily. Grammatical study is not an island and is ideally accompanied by historical work in first century primary sources (Philo, Josephus, Mishnah, OT pseudepigrapha et al.), as well as an excellent grasp of the Hebrew/Greek OT (its use in the NT) and possibly other more ancient sources (Ugaritic, Hittite, Egyptian, Mesopotamian, etc.) as further background to the background material. In the other direction is the consultation of church Fathers and other dissenting voices including secular historians, Gnostic texts, pseudepigrapha, papyri and beyond. In addition to this is staying abreast of a host of secondary literature--a daunting and impossible task in itself. This is the stock procedural methodology of study that is followed by the best of exegetes and OT/NT students. It is a matter of where one starts, which milieu is most important, and what aspect is most relevant in the determinacy of meaning that are keys to ultimate meaning. These various areas of research are fields of evidence conceived of as inclusive concentric circles with the inner field the most determinative--each sphere is related symbiotically to the rest (parallelomania is to be avoided). Without getting into too much detail, but in lieu of being too vague, I will simply note that my method attempts to emulate, in a concrete fashion, where I think these priorities should be. Developing a stricter methodology and acquiring a first-hand acquaintance with primary sources are a life-long adventure that improves one's skills in the long run. If the method is flawed, the study is suspect.

Now when I worked on the thesis in 1995-96, I scrutinized every instance of the verbs EIMI, GINOMAI and UPARCW. I looked at somewhere in the range of 3000 occurrences of these verbs (3,213 to be exact). Roughly a quarter of the total fell into the category of study. The process was long and tedious. I stated to my primary reader Dr. Wallace several times something like, "I don't know where this is leading, I don't know what I'm going to find." It is important for the reader to understand that this was a grammatical study more than a theological one. I was following a linguistic method based on structural indicators and a certain kind of statement, namely the convertible proposition (broadly speaking) as opposed to the existential, descriptive or adverbial. When the right kind of proposition was identified, the process of sorting mass nouns from count nouns began. This required both pre and post-copulative tabulations in order to determine a semantic distinction when syntax (word order) seemed to be the determinant factor. Careful statistical tabulations were kept and redone over and over again as I proceeded book by book (see appendixes to thesis, pg. 91-154). Many questions were left unanswered (but duly noted) and several were deemed essential, including the determination of the sense of singular count nouns. The identification of mass nouns provided the criteria I was struggling with over exactly how to define qualitativeness, which up to this point in the discussions was somewhat vague. I also noticed that plural count nouns shared some of these same characteristics (as mass nouns) but not all. Both were identified as Q-d for the purpose of eliminating them from the construction so I could determine from a semantically unbiased group exactly what the construction (pre and post) leaned toward. I was trying to avoid the post hoc fallacy in the process. This is something the studies of Colwell, Harner and Dixon, as good and helpful as they are, failed to do. Even when they did do this, it was haphazard--omitting definitizing factors only (Dixon) or omitting qualitative nouns based on abstract/concrete dichotomy (Colwell), a metaphysical distinction rather than grammatical one.

The process eventually led to isolating singular count nouns. As stated above, I found that certain kinds of nouns exhibited inevitable semantic features simply based on lexeme. All mass nouns were Q-d (some were D-Q because of the nature of the proposition impinged upon the noun to such an extent that a convertible proposition as opposed to subset was the result). Plural count nouns shared this semantic feature with mass nouns. Neither of these (mass/plural counts) could, by reason of their lexis, ever exhibit an indefinite sense. Thus certain semantic categories (I, I-Q [Q-I)]) were out of the question once these nouns were identified. However, singular count nouns were open to every category except Q-d. Now Q-d equals Q but a distinction was made in that the former was a lexemic qualitativeness while the latter the result of a syntactic and/or contextual qualitativeness. The intention in distinguishing between nouns with this identical semantic nuance (Q-d/Q) was to alert the reader(s) to when context had come to play a part in the semantic determination of the noun, and when it did not. As a result, singular count nouns represented the most semantically elastic noun and provided the only real instances of disputed nuances.

Now this is not the complete story but it is sufficient for the moment to indicate that the study proceeded upon an almost blind awareness of its end--it was methodologically rather than theologically driven. I was not guided by any theology, although I most assuredly have a theology (I would call a biblical one), and I certainly had as my goal the evaluation of John 1:1c. The process I embarked upon, however, was deemed the most objective that could be undertaken. I had no intention of "stacking the deck," semantically speaking. Stafford has introduced an alternative scheme he calls "semantic signaling." But this latter method is riddled with subjectivity and dependent upon extra-linguistic criteria for determining semantic nuances of nouns. It is a methodologically flawed process that is sure not to attract critically minded and procedurally oriented individuals. It allows too much room to read theology into the noun rather than let grammar determine the semantic perimeters. That is why I stated in my thesis that I subscribe to descriptive linguistics. From this basis comes the move to semantics (Gr. SHMAINW, "I signify" not "signal"). My study focused on the meaning (semantics) of lexemes. Mass nouns were purely qualitative (Q-d). Stafford wants to invent something called "semantic signaling" without recognizing the semantic idea associated with mass nouns.

Here is the key problem Stafford stumbles over: The issue involves what the noun signifies semantically not signals referentially. Not to whom does this refer, what group does this referent belong to, and then backtrack to the noun based on this information. This leads to nonsense. It is improper linguistically, it confuses the referent and symbol (word), depends on extratextual and even metaphysical notions, and ignores the field of lexical semantics. I am convinced, moreover, that discourse connections will be missed and notions intended by the authors of Scripture lost if that methodology is adopted.

Below I will have more to say as Stafford's comments give opportunity for explanation.

It directly contradicts clear and repeated confessions of faith found in the Scriptures, and those who advocate the doctrine of the Trinity are forced to redefine a wide variety of terms to make room for the particulars of their theology. The language employed is, to a large extent, borrowed from post-biblical authors and councils, and the concepts are nowhere articulated in Scripture. These and other facts are what mark Hartley's theology as post-biblical.

Another point that Hartley seems stuck on is my relationship to Arianism. What Hartley seems unwilling to accept is that I do not hold to the tenets of Arianism (at least not as they have been preserved by Trinitarians!), and I do not use that label for my beliefs. HE is the one who brands me as such! Yet, he will proudly call himself a "Trinitarian." So why should I use Arianism to describe a theology that is read back into the text when I do not make claim to such a theology, and neither does Hartley?

To the first paragraph I would like Stafford to explain how terms like superordinate, hyponym, contiguity, co-hyponym, mass nouns, count nouns, subset, convertible, disambiguate, anarthrous, articular, lexis, lexeme, predicate Nominative, semantics et al., are somehow "language borrowed from post-biblical authors and councils?" I insist on actual citations here. I would like him to further explain how any of the terms I use are likewise redefined from their normal linguistic denotation to make room for a "post-biblical" theology. Where is the documentation? I would insist that he note where I refer to councils or creeds in either my thesis or article that he assumes and categorically insists that I am dependent on. Stafford's comments are simply a whiff of the red herring stuffed full of diatribe nonsense.

To the second paragraph Stafford takes back with one hand what he gives with the other. He denies the label of Arian because he doesn't hold to the tenants of Arians "at least not as they have been preserved by Trinitarians!" So is he now claiming to be a true Arian in distinction to the false Arianism preserved by Trinitarians? Now let me get this straight. He doesn't deny being an Arian but the only sources we have to determine what constitutes an Arian is of Arius (and his detractors) preserved by Trinitarians. So how does Stafford know what Arius truly believed and that he (Stafford) is somehow a true Arian? What sources does he point to in order to make this determination? How does he know that the preservation of Arius' views are misrepresentations of Arius? What standard, in other words, does Stafford use to even make such judgments?

Finally Stafford's statement about my Trinitarianism verses his Arianism and reading later theology into the text needs just a few comments. He states,

I do not use that label [Arianism] for my beliefs. HE is the one who brands me as such! Yet, he will proudly call himself a "Trinitarian." So why should I use Arianism to describe a theology that is read back into the text when I do not make claim to such a theology, and neither does Hartley?

First, I'm not sure that my belief in the Trinitarian doctrine should be described as something I "proudly" label myself anymore than I proudly call myself a mathematician because I appreciate the sum of two plus two equals four--it is simply elementary deduction. Trinitarianism is a view that comports with the evidence of the NT especially and the OT generally. Pride has nothing to do with reaching the conclusion. It is evidence not emotions or organizations that guide my thinking. Second, Stafford has made it somewhat of a habit to label my study as the product of reading later theology into the text. But there is no evidence for this whatsoever. On the other hand, there are plenty of maneuvers Stafford resorts to that make transparent what guides his "exegesis." Finally, the pseudo-denials by Stafford couched in terms like "I do not make claim to such a theology" or "I do not use that label for my beliefs" are highly suspicious in light of his documentable double-talk (over Harner for example). Could Stafford really be saying that he doesn't openly "claim" to be a follower of Arius, but not that he is not an Arian? So denying that he makes the claim is only a denial to saying, "I am an Arian" but not to actually being an Arian. And further, I'm not sure that he would deny even this but only deny that "I am an Arian as Trinitarians have preserved it." But he is left with explaining how he differs on these matters with Arius from reportedly corrupt sources or caricatures of Arius' views "preserved by Trinitarians." As with other matters where Stafford denies something all the while claiming he did not state it that way, or never claimed it to be his view, it should be met with a healthy dose of skepticism.

Below I deal specifically with the construction involving proper names like Elijah. Stafford misrepresents what I actually say on the matter for whatever reason. I dealt with this subject in my thesis and left the detailed discussion of it out of the article.

Hartley frequently misuses his statistical analysis in his thesis. And he does so again here. First of all, remember, his statistics and percentages are based on HIS understanding of the sense of the count/mass noun in question. A notable example of Hartley's attempts to bend the semantics of a term to fit his preferred classification is the proper name "Elijah" in Mark 6:15 and John 1:21, where the grammatical construction is HLIAS ESTIN/EI.

You would think that the translation would be, "It is Elijah"/"Are you Elijah?" But Hartley argues, "the Jews were expecting an Elijah-like figure to appear based upon Old Testament texts." He then refers to Malachi 4:5 which says nothing about an "Elijah-like figure," but straightforwardly states, "I am sending to you people Elijah the prophet."

The first paragraph is simply another misrepresentation of my study (located on pages 60-69 in thesis). The nouns in question are singular count nouns, or more particularly, proper names in the Colwell construction. Contrary to what Stafford assumes, singular count nouns are the only nouns in dispute semantically. Mass nouns are undeniably Q-d as well as plural counts. Therefore it is fallacious to begin, as Stafford does, by stating the statistics were based on my understanding of the sense to these nouns. Quite simply it was lexis (not later theology, creeds, pride, national feelings of patriotism or some elite organization claiming to speak for God et al.) that determined the semantic notion of the majority of these nouns. And there is no "bending" of the semantic nuance of nouns to fit my preferred classifications. When the grammar speaks, I listen.

Now the case to which Stafford refers to involves proper names that appear in the Colwell construction. There are only four instances in the NT where this occurs (EIMI: Mk. 6:15; Jn. 1:21a; 8:39a; GINOMAI: Rom. 9:29a). The rest were all post-copulative (EIMI: Matt. 11:14; 14:2; 16:18; 27:37; Gal. 4:24b; Lk. 1:19; 9:30b; Jn. 1:25b, 40, 42; 6:42; Acts 9:5; 22:8; 26:15; 1 Cor. 3:11; 1 Tim. 1:20a,b; GINOMAI: Rom. 9:29b). In addition to this there are a few instances of articular post-copulative occurrences as well (EIMI: Matt. 13:39b; Acts 7:37a; Rev. 20:2b). Now my curiosity was sparked when I found these anarthrous pre-copulative PNs that happened to be proper names in John's Gospel (omitting for the time being Romans 9:29a). I determined to find out if there was any significance to this phenomenon. That was the basis for what became of my eventual conclusions. It struck me as something quite out of the ordinary, something that didn't fit the normal pattern (21-3 for EIMI), something that no one else had treated with the Colwell construction in mind. Incidentally, contrary to Stafford's insinuations, proper names can indeed carry an exclusive Q sense in a PN construction. For example, in Revelation 11:8 Jerusalem is "spiritually called Sodom and Egypt." KALEW is a verb that also takes a PN, but one in which my thesis, while noting, did not take up in detail. This immediately dispels the notion of Stafford, however, that proper names could not be used in an exclusively Q sense.

In regards to translation I have to ask, Where in the thesis do I translate the passage as Stafford indicates? Stafford takes the explanation of the sense I give here as the translation of the passage. Yet translation is fundamentally distinct from meaning or sense--although the goal is to bridge these two if possible. If translation was the sum of all meaning, where would the need be for exegesis, rhetoric (cf. speech-act theory) or deep structure? Now if Stafford had carefully read the page cited, he would have noticed that in fact I translate the passage as, "And they asked him, 'What then? Are you Elijah'" (pg. 60)? Not as "Are you an Elijah-like figure?" Did Stafford just conveniently or inadvertently miss this or resort once again to conjuring up yet another strawman? One wonders why he has to resort to such blatant characterizations in order to make his point.

I go on to explain several unlikely scenarios to accepting John the Baptist as the literal historical figure of Elijah. In short it is rejected because (1) Elijah would have had to come down in the flesh--a possible but unlikely scenario. For example, we would have to believe that he was incarnated in Elisabeth's womb (now there are two incarnations) and then subsequently suffered amnesia for the rest of his life! Remember, he denies being Elijah. Entertaining this possibility inevitably leads to adapting the second view. (2) Reincarnation. Now this is an unlikely possibility in that Jews denied that world-view. But if John the Baptist was really Elijah, then what else could it mean but that Elijah was reincarnated? My explanation is that (3) John the Baptist fulfilled a (or "the") motif of Elijah--one that is prevalent in Jewish thought and clearly and deliberately utilized in the Gospels. This doesn't deny the appearance of a literal Elijah in the future necessarily, but neither does the latter belief forbid patterns of Elijah being fulfilled in individuals before that event transpires (and I'm not necessarily advocating that the literal Elijah must eventually appear). Pattern fulfillment is a common occurrence in Jewish hermeneutics and is based on their view of meaning, history and providence among other things. Jesus could call John the Baptist "Elijah" because, whether John understood it or not (and there is evidence he was in the dark about several things), he fulfilled the pattern of Elijah. Now that explanation, although susceptible to falsification, seemed to partially account for the grammatical oddity--at least to me.

Hartley has to go outside the context of both Mark 6:15 and John 1:21 to statements made by an angel (Luke 1:17) and Jesus (Matthew 11:14) and try to link these with an alleged Jewish view concerning an "Elijah-like figure." But Jesus' statement does not hint at any "likeness"; indeed, had any NT passage made such an equation of Jesus as Jehovah similar to that which Jesus makes between John the Baptist and Elijah, do you think Hartley would travel the exegetical path of "likeness" or ontological identity?

As for Mark 6:15 it reads, "Others said, It is Elijah." Luke 1:17 states about John the Baptist, "He will go forth before him in the spirit and power of Elijah to turn the hearts of the fathers unto the children . . ." (emphasis mine). Incidentally, the Lukan passage is an altered quotation and updated understanding of Malachi 4:5 that interprets the sending of Elijah as "in the spirit and power of Elijah" not as Elijah. Matthew 11:14 reads, "And if you are willing to accept it, this is Elijah who is to come." Now if John the Baptist says he is not Elijah (Jn. 1:21) but Jesus says he is Elijah (Matt. 11:14) and this is interpreted by the angel of the Lord as not Elijah but "in the spirit and power of Elijah," then he must be Elijah in the sense that he fulfills the characteristics of Elijah in "turning the hearts of the fathers to their children, and the hearts of the children to their fathers" (Mal. 4:5). Or as Luke put it, "to turn the hearts of the fathers to the children and the disobedient to the wisdom of the righteous, to make ready for the Lord a prepared people" (Lk. 1:17b).

Stafford uses this discussion to question whether I would apply the same standards to Jesus if he was called "Jehovah" (the Hebrew is YaHWeH not Jehovah--the Hebrew YHWH is, according to F. M. Cross, to be taken as a causative imperfect of the very HWY, "to be" [yahwi > yahweh], and related to his role in creation. See F. M. Cross, Canaanite Myth and Hebrew Epic [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973], 60-71 and W. F. Albright, Yahweh and the Gods of Canaan [London: The Athlone Press, 1968], 147-49). But his question or assertion belies a misunderstanding of the issues. Do we ever have Jesus denying he is God? No. But we have John the Baptist denying he is Elijah. Do we ever have someone say, "If you are willing to accept it, Jesus is God?" No. If the evidence points in that direction, which I think it does, then Jesus is God (in the same sense the Father is) no matter what one is willing to accept. There is no contingency here. Furthermore, do we ever have Jesus identifying himself as the Father? No. But that would be the proper analogy Stafford wishes to draw, not the equation with THEOS or YAHWEH. John denies being the person of Elijah and I nor any other orthodox Christian claims that Jesus is the person of the Father. So while Jesus is affirmed to be THEOS, he is not the person of the Father.

Wasn't Elijah human? So was John the Baptist. Both were human and no less human than the other. They were ontologically the same, members of the same class, but numerically distinct. Certainly if John the Baptist was an Elijah-like figure he could not be less human than Elijah could he? Finally, THEOS and YAHWEH speak inevitably of nature, whereas Elijah does not. I could name my dog Elijah without ontological necessity of humanity entailed with it. It is a proper name used in reference to a well known individual to Hebrew minded folk. The name rang a bell, in a manner of speaking, to a prophetic-eschatological pattern of Elijah that was expected to arrive. The pattern is well known and utilized frequently in the Gospels with the intent of being recognized. John fulfilled these characteristics, albeit unbeknown to him. Jesus recognized the pattern and alerted his rather dense audience to this reality (one in which the evangelists are certainly aware). If Stafford wishes to maintain that John the Baptist is the literal Elijah, then according to his own logic (not mine), Jesus is the Father, rather than Jesus is not God!

As for Jewish ideas associated with Elijah, one gets the feeling that Hartley is so intent on proving a particular (Q) sense for PN-V count nouns, even when they are proper names (!), that he would use his thesis as a basis for speculation concerning Jewish eschatology, speculation that flies in the face of the facts. Indeed, that is precisely what he does! There is no evidence that the Jews were expecting a "Elijah-like figure." (Even later Christian interpolations into Jewish literature of the first to the fourth centuries CE contains expectations concerning the literal coming of Elijah [see the fourth chapter of the Apocalypse of Elijah].) There certainly is no such thing in Sirach 48:1-12. Nor do we find any such lingering tradition in the Targums or the Mishnah.

Now the usual kind of statements that have this semantic tag (D-Q) are titles like "the Son of God" or "king of Israel" etc. To this I added instances where the proper name carries cultural connotations or when contextual evidence exists where the term is utilized in fulfillment patterns of a typological sort (both exist for Elijah). The subject of the Elijah and Elisha motif are not new to my thesis but rather whole projects have been given over to this topic alone. Now the significance attached to John's fronting the PN, in these cases, as well as evidence of other biblical patterns put forth by the authors of the Gospels, the world-view of Jews and extrabiblical expectations of Elijah (albeit Stafford's confident assertions to the contrary), all converge to justify this semantic notion.

To clarify a point, Stafford appears to believe that if I hold to a pattern fulfillment of the Elijah figure that I necessarily deny a literal appearance of the historical Elijah. He has unwittingly become a victim (again) of his own false disjunction. Either believe that John the Baptist is the literal historical Elijah OR deny a literal appearance of the historical figure. I deny the former but not necessarily the latter. To be explicit, it is not necessary to hold that the historical figure of Elijah must appear but simply a par-excellent figure in the spirit and power of Elijah. For example, I believe a Nero pattern is set in Revelation based on the Nero redivivus myth and there is compelling evidence that Hadrian, a later Caesar, knowingly patterned himself after Nero. He indeed was a Nero type but not the fulfillment that is ultimately expected (there were other pretend Neros as well). In addition to this, I do not believe that the historical figure Nero will actually reappear in the future. But someone like him will. Revelation 13 and 17 directly allude to this myth (see the Sibylline Oracles which exhibit stages to this myth) to gender anticipation for many Nero-types as well as the ultimate par-excellent Nero--the Antichrist. But the Nero-type is the inference derived from the Nero redivivus, i.e., Nero will return. The analogy between Elijah and Nero is not exact, but the latter serves as a good example of pattern fulfillment as not necessarily incompatible with an actual appearing of a later and far larger fulfillment of that pattern.

Now if Christians were still expecting a later Elijah to appear, then what are we to make of the identity of John the Baptist? Was he the historical Elijah? If he is, does this mean that the literal Elijah keeps coming back from the dead (or re-created in the Watchtower view of death)? Why doesn't John the Baptist know who he is? Why, on the mountain of transfiguration, does Jesus meet with Moses and Elijah and not Moses and John the Baptist? The best explanation is to affirm that John the Baptist, although distinct in person from Elijah, nevertheless fulfills both the pattern set forth by the historical Elijah and his ministry tips his audience to the fulfillment of the eschatological timetable. In this sense, according to Jesus, John the Baptist is Elijah. Furthermore, a future expectation of Elijah can still be maintained without necessarily agreeing to the nonsense Stafford wishes to advance, namely that if I was consistent I would argue that Jesus is the Father like John the Baptist is Elijah. But if the analogy is consistent, Jesus is God in the same way the Father is God like John the Baptist is a man in the same way as Elijah is a man. Jesus might fulfill the exact pattern as the Father, so that he could say, "If you have seen me, you have seen the Father" (John 14:9), but that doesn't make him the Father anymore than saying John the Baptist is Elijah makes him personally identical with Elijah. Nor does saying that Jerusalem is called "Sodom and Egypt" make Jerusalem numerically identical with a nonexistent city and a foreign nation at the same time! There is a sense to the noun that forbids numerical identity but demands the same unequivocated characteristics. Thus Elijah is Elijah, and John the Baptist is Elijah--these two are Elijah not Elijahs.

In fact, if the use of HLIAS EI by the Jews in John 1:21 was meant to be understood in reference to an "Elijah-like figure," then how is it that John could rightly have DENIED being such, OUK EIMI? Clearly John understood the Jews' use of HLIAS to be in reference to the Elijah of old, not to one who simply had qualities like him, which John certainly did have. Thus, Jesus could say, "Elijah has already come" (Matthew 17:12).

Hartley finally concedes that the Q classification is not right for HLIAS in the aforementioned PN-V texts, but he still believes (thesis, page 61) that his reasoning shows that it is not "as far fetched as would first seem"!

To the first paragraph Stafford makes several unfounded assumptions that should be obvious by now. His error includes taking John the Baptist too figuratively ("I am not Elijah") and Jesus too literally ("He is Elijah"). John the Baptist exhibited at the most inopportune moment in his life (in prison) an incredible ignorance of who Jesus was (Matt. 11:3). Yet this same John had earlier declared that Jesus was the Lamb of God that takes away the sin of the world (Jn. 1:29), and acknowledged that he preceded one who was greater than himself (Matt. 3:11). He even heard the voice of the Father at Jesus' baptism say, "This is my beloved Son, with whom I am well pleased" (Matt. 3:17 and parallels). Yet he questioned later who Jesus was in the eschatological-prophetic time-table! "Are you he who is to come, or shall we look for another" (Lu. 7:20b)? It is an almost unbelievable lapse on his part. It is not surprising, then, if he didn't also clearly recognize his own eschatological purpose. Thus John could have denied being an Elijah-like figure (prophetic ignorance) yet simultaneously attributed this prophetic role by Jesus and others who did see his function clearly.

A less attractive alternative to this is that John denied being the literal Elijah but not necessarily denied himself to be a pattern fulfillment of Elijah. In this case he understands he is a fulfillment pattern and that either the historical Elijah will later appear or some par-excellent fulfillment of that pattern would. The question to which he denies, therefore, is whether or not he is the historical Elijah. But if in fact he was the historical Elijah and denied it, then he either misunderstood the question (which needs examination) or exhibited, as earlier indicated, an unbelievable memory lapse of his previous life! Furthermore, it would assume reincarnation, a ludicrous scenario. It is extremely improbable, therefore, that the historical Elijah was standing there and when asked, with this sense (if he was Elijah of old) forthright and without hesitation denies it. It is even more incredible that he would have assumed the question was intended to be understood in this sense in the first place. It is far more probable that although he understood well the Elijah motif, he didn't believe he actually fit the pattern. But he did. Thus when Jesus said "If you are willing to accept it, this is Elijah" he was assigning the eschatological pattern of Elijah to John and pointing to his own presence as fulfilled in his ministry. This is the only explanation that I can conceive of that comports well with all the available evidence.

To the second paragraph, my thesis actually states, "The question in both cases, then, probably illustrates the Jewish expectation of this Elijah type figure, i.e., someone who had his power of word. Therefore, a qualitative sense does not appear as far fetched as would first seem. However, it would be best to understand the semantic as D-Q rather than simply Q" (pg. 61).

Thus the personal noun retains the definite sense in that it has unique referential identity--something (barring a few exceptions) necessary to proper names. It is D-Q because there is a qualitative sense to the noun that requires an additional element of meaning that is diminished with the simple D category. The starting point for a proper name is D. Other factors must be considered, however, in determining whether it is D-Q. Only rare exceptions for a proper name justify a Q semantic nuance.

Other examples where Hartley's opinion overrides good judgement include Luke 7:39, hAMARTOLOS ESTIN, which Hartley says is "qualitative and not indefinite." Since I discuss the short-comings in his reasoning on this passage in my second edition, I will defer to my discussion there rather than repeat myself here. I also discuss John 6:63, John 8:48 and his claim that the count noun NYMPHIOS is definite in John 3:29 and his discussion of Acts 10:36 (sic?), Mark 11:32 and other passages, in relation to Hartley's thesis.

For the reader (since most will not seek out the thesis) these passages are rendered as follows in the thesis. Luke 7:39 "she is sinful" (Q); John 6:63 "the words I speak to you are spirit and life" (Q); John 8:48 "you are a Samaritan" (Q). This last example is disputable and could very well be understood as I-Q. John 3:29 "He who has the bride is the bridegroom" (D, possibly D-Q); Acts 10:26 (Acts 10:36 is a post-copulative instance), "Get up! For I myself am also human" or "a man" (I-Q, could very well be Q); Mark 11:32, "All held that John was a prophet" (I-Q).

Three are listed as Q, one as D, and two are I-Q. It is difficult to see how Stafford could have problems with any of the semantic tags here but evidently I'll have to wait and see. It occurs to me that Stafford has several semantic categories that give him trouble--Q, Q-d, D, D-Q. The only category that he doesn’t question is I-Q (Q-I)--a category he indiscrimately and haphazardly applies to nearly all nouns in question, even clearly mass nouns.

I had stated in an earlier response,

The distinction Stafford makes in "lexical tagging" and "semantic signaling" (to avoid the implications of both the semantics of mass nouns and the transferal to singular count nouns [John 1:1, 14]) is his way of denying the semantic category of Q-d (Q).

To this Stafford responds with four paragraphs which I will address each in their order.

Hartley is in error when he says that this is my way of "denying the semantic category of Q-d (Q)." In his M.A. thesis ("Criteria for Determining Qualitative Nouns With a Special View to Understanding the Colwell Construction" [Dallas, 1996], pages 42-45) Hartley lists "Six Theoretical Categories" for predicate nominatives. He describes Q-D nouns as emphasizing "qualities, nature or essence." But because this category can only include, according to Hartley, mass nouns and plural count nouns (which cannot be indefinitized) then they must be considered Q-D as opposed to Q, which involves only singular count nouns because they can be indefinitized.

As I indicated earlier and repeatedly elsewhere, Q-d and Q differ not in semantics but in reference to the lexeme it qualifies. Q-d equals Q. This might be a bit confusing to Stafford, but it was deemed necessary in order to specify which noun was lexically qualitative (mass nouns), grammatically qualitative (plural counts), and contextually determined to be qualitative (singular count nouns). Mass and plural counts were fused together here because both shared a like feature, namely, the inability to be indefinitized (the plural count noun is really generic rather than qualitative). But since this was not the central focus of my study (a point I mention in the thesis as well), they were left together only to be discarded. But it was the mass noun that provided the semantic nuance that is exhibited in the singular count noun.

Now Stafford further notes that I define Q-d as emphasizing "qualities, nature or essence" (pg. 43-44) and apparently concludes that this semantic idea is confined to mass and plural count nouns alone. But his use of this quotation is misleading. Let me explain. I define Q in the thesis as a category where "The qualities, nature or essence . . . are stressed" (pg. 44). Does that not sound identical to the definition of Q-d? It should . . . because it is! Thus Stafford misses the point in the above statement on the Q-d category. I was emphasizing the -d in Q-d when I stated "only two types of nouns will occur here, mass and plural count" (pg. 44) not affirming that only Q-d emphasizes "qualities, nature or essence" in distinction to Q which supposedly does not. So although Q-d can only include plural count and mass nouns (hence the -d which simply means there is a lexical impossibility of indefiniteness which doesn't exist for singular count nouns), the definition under which both Q-d and Q equally share, is the emphasis of "qualities, nature or essence." It is not either Q-d stresses "qualities, nature or essence" or Q does but rather a both-and situation. They are semantically identical but lexically distinct.

The whole point of providing a definition of semantic categories was to avoid the confusion that individuals like Stafford attempt to create out of plain language. The importance of understanding Q-d and Q as semantically equivalent becomes critical in the discourse connection between John 1:1c and John 1:14 (cf. also 1 John 1:5, O THEOS FWS ESTIN with 4:8, 16, O THEOS AGAPH ESTIN, or Jn. 3:6; 6:63 et al. where the count noun is linked with a mass noun in the Colwell construction). I noted earlier that their discourse connection through chiasm of subjects, identical construction of PNs (both in Colwell construction), and the semantic nuance of SARX independent of syntax (either pre or post copulative). All these factors confirm the semantic nuance of the singular count noun THEOS as Q. And Q was established for John 1:1c independent of any of this additional discourse information. It was simply added as another nail in the coffin to an indefinite sense to THEOS in John 1:1c. It was used to disambiguate, if you will, the semantic notion of THEOS. Stafford apparently still feels it necessary to deny a sense of Q-d to Q. But the only difference between the two categories is the membership based on lexeme, not sense.

A minor correction to Stafford's misnomer above. My project was a Th.M thesis not a M.A. thesis. The former is a 4-year graduate degree, while the latter is a 2-year graduate degree (the degree of Master of Theology is clearly noted on the bottom of the title page that he just quoted).

But here we must make an important qualification to the above: When Hartley says that such nouns (mass and plural count) cannot be indefinitized, or that singular count nouns can be indefinitized, he means that their lexical FORM can or cannot be so changed. In other words, we will never find the English term "love" in the plural (= "loves"), assuming we are talking about "love" in the abstract sense. But we can change the lexical form of an English count noun so that it is properly used in the plural, "I saw a tiger"; "there are tigers at the zoo." Hartley's methodology is inadequate for it does not take into account the fact that a term is not bound by its form to a particular classification.

Stafford statement, "When Hartley says that such nouns (mass and plural count) cannot be indefinitized, or that singular count nouns can be indefinitized, he means that their lexical FORM can or cannot be so changed" is incorrect. The lexical form can indeed be singular or plural and my system of categorizing mass nouns clearly shows this (Class A, B and C). What I have said repeatedly is that they cannot be semantically indefinitized or pluralized--this is a huge difference. Furthermore, since I have demonstrated that mass nouns retain a singular sense to them even in their plural (lexical) form, it becomes incredible that Stafford should apply to me a failure to understand that "a term is not bound by its form to a particular classification."

I suppose what Stafford is getting at by "a term is not bound by its form to a particular classification" is that a noun classified as either count or mass does not bind it to a particular semantic classification. But even this supposition is false. The mass noun is limited to Q-d and in only rare instances D-Q. The count plural noun is also bound to the same semantic notions. Even the singular count noun is bound to a certain sphere within a perimeter of possible semantic notions (D, I, Q, D-Q, I-Q). The latter is really the most elastic and versatile. The others (mass/plural counts) are invariably nuanced by their lexical identity. Despite Stafford's ambiguity and confusion, I am left with a sneaking suspicion that he is talking about "semantic signaling" again.

One caveat needs mentioned at this point and it concerns the unwarranted distinction between concrete/abstract. Stafford mentions above, "we will never find the English term "love" in the plural (= 'loves'), assuming we are talking about 'love' in the abstract sense" (emphasis added). It is irrelevant to the discussion of mass/count nouns that "love" is an abstract noun. Mass nouns, whether concrete or abstract, exhibit the identical semantic notion. For example, love, peace, joy are all abstract nouns that are also mass. Fish, coffee, flesh are all concrete nouns that are also mass. Both abstract and concrete mass nouns have the same semantic notion irrespective of this abstract/concrete classification. On the other hand abstract nouns like thoughts, feelings, fears, are count nouns while concrete nouns like cars, planes and boys are also count nouns. Since abstract nouns can be both mass or count, on the one hand, and concrete nouns can be either mass or count, on the other hand, a better classification of nouns ought to be adopted.

I suggest a forgoing of the abstract/concrete (metaphysical) dichotomy altogether and adapt the mass/count (grammatical) noun scheme when semantic issues are the focus. It is a much more concise way to categorize nouns if one wants to eventually get to their sense rather than metaphysical make-up or ontological referent, or create philosophical categories to which these referents must belong. It is a mistake to assume one metaphysical type (abstract/concrete) argues for a grammatical form (mass/count). As shown above, it is not a factor at all. Furthermore, mass/count is a grammatical classification of nouns while concrete/abstract is a metaphysical classification of nouns. Grammar is how one ought to classify nouns, not metaphysics. One should start there.

That is Hartley's contention. One lexical form may be used as a mass noun in one instance, and as a count noun in another. Hartley, though, must create rigid lexical categories and then attach a preferred sense to them, so that he can, ultimately, maintain a certain belief about God and the Word in John 1:1. Of course, Hartley no doubt has other admirable motivations for his research, but I contend that in this case they are built on the foundation of his theology, and, as can be seen by a consideration of his thesis, it forces him to make highly unusual claims about various passages involved in the PN-V construction. (Some of these we have considered above.) By rigidly holding to a subjective view concerning the the lexical form of a term, and proceeding to attach a sense to the lexical form that best fits his view, Hartley frequently misses the true semantic of a number of PNs.

Stafford states, "That is Hartley's contention. One lexical form may be used as a mass noun in one instance, and as a count noun in another." That is precisely not either my intention or contention. In fact I never make this kind of statement anywhere! To make it plain, I never say a count noun becomes a mass noun. When I say, "To err is human" the sense I give to "human" is Q because it is a count noun exuding a semantic notion created, established and justified by the semantic nuance of the mass noun (Q-d). But never does the count noun become a mass noun. It is always a count noun irrespective of sense it exudes in a particular context. Semantic notion does not determine lexeme. Lexeme determines semantic notions and/or restricts the notions to which it can lean.

Now Stafford's next statement shows how uncritical he can be in these matters. "Hartley, though, must create rigid lexical categories and then attach a preferred sense to them, so that he can, ultimately, maintain a certain belief about God and the Word in John 1:1." Did I create the lexical categories of mass and count nouns? Those are well established linguistic categories discussed by philosophers of language and linguistic philosophers. As to semantic categories, others have created them and long before I endeavored to utilize them. If anything, I added to rather than restricted these categories and applied them to and in light of a construction pregnant with semantic possibilities. Now if I have provided some clarification to the semantic notion of the mass noun and thereby demonstrated a semantic category that other nouns might or might not also exude, then so be it. I suppose my job as a student of grammar is to do such things. But how in the world my belief about God determines how I modify or create these semantic categories is as inscrutable to me as Stafford's confident assertion that attributes to me that very notion.

Stafford might wish to believe that my study was theologically rather than linguistically motivated, but the facts of the matter are quite to the contrary. More importantly, since Stafford attributes the results of the study to my theology rather than method, it makes it abundantly clear that he has failed to understand the process altogether. It is not unreasonable in the least to surmise that Stafford has been unsuccessful in either understanding the terminology correctly or grasping exactly the methodology behind it. Instead he resorts to and relies on caricatures and myth-making to circumvent critical interaction with it and instead leads unsuspecting readers on a chase after a red herring. This method of attack might appeal to his fellow JWs (hopefully few) but it hardly succeeds in either convincing the open-minded or bolstering his case. Unfortunately, when Stafford cannot answer the weight of the evidence, he resorts to this type of pontificating about my theological motivations. Let the reader understand, and I'm sure that he (or she) will, that this tactic is an evasion of the evidence and a defense mechanism exercised by Stafford when the evidence (grammatical or otherwise) is overwhelmingly against him.

Stafford says,

Hartley no doubt has other admirable motivations for his research, but I contend that in this case they are built on the foundation of his theology . . . By rigidly holding to a subjective view concerning the the lexical form of a term, and proceeding to attach a sense to the lexical form that best fits his view, Hartley frequently misses the true semantic of a number of PNs.

Notice, once again, that Stafford directs his attack and the readers attention to my motivation "built on the foundation of his theology." But the inferences he draws off this supposition are even more far fetched than my supposed motivation.

I would like Stafford to prove his wild assertion--that I attach a sense that best fits my view. Now how does my theology either establish the categories of, or determine for particular nominals, the count or mass lexis? Further, how is it that by establishing semantic categories, some tied invariably to certain lexis, that they are specifically formulated to fit my preferred theological view? First he labels the classification of lexemes into mass and count nouns as "rigid lexical categories." Now he labels it as "subjective." I find this kind of analysis highly erratic and I would suggest that Stafford consult standard linguistic works on the subject in order to dispel his ludicrous notions and settle once and for all what the objective criteria are for determining count and mass nouns. I have yet to see from Stafford, after all these exchanges, a clear understanding on his part of the subject matter at the most rudimentary level. It seems with every key stroke he goes further down the well trod trail of linguistic fallacies.

Finally, I have to suspect that Stafford suffers from psychological projection (not the first time) when he says, "By rigidly holding to a subjective view concerning the the (sic) lexical form of a term, and proceeding to attach a sense to the lexical form that best fits his view." This is the case of the pot calling the kettle black.

My own theory, which is just as reasonable if not more so (see below) than Hartley's, is that one can look at lexical forms to a certain extent in classifying nouns as count or mass, but USAGE must be the final criterion for the proper categorization of the noun. However, I don't think Hartley understands my point, for he seems to think that I am trying to do away with a Q classification for count nouns; that is not so.

Now I find it odd that after he depicts my view as he does (rigid, subjective), that he would turn around and call his view "just as reasonable if not more so . . . than Hartley's" (emphasis added). How can my view be rigid, subjective and reasonable all at the same time? And if his view is just as "reasonable" does that mean it is also rigid and subjective? If that isn't odd enough, his appeal to usage as the "final criterion for the proper categorization of the noun" is even more bizarre (and a subject I have addressed in previous exchanges).

Apparently, he still wishes to define a lexical category by "usage" rather than lexeme. Contrary to Stafford's wishes, the proper linguistic procedure is to first determine lexeme then to establish the semantic perimeters in which the lexeme can properly function. Stafford has it backwards. He looks for what he considers the sense of a noun (strangely in conformity to WT theology), then he comes up with the lexical classification that "best fits his view." In the process the distinction between mass and count becomes meaningless. He has count nouns being mass, and mass nouns being count and vice versa. This was something like the mistake of Jesperson to which Muelen addresses in Substances, Quantities and Individuals: A Study in the Formal Semantics of Mass Terms. Nijmegen: Institut Für Psycholinguistik, 1980. But even Jesperson didn't go about it in the fashion Stafford does (he never states that mass nouns become count nouns and vice versa). Stafford would have us throw the semantic certitude of all mass nouns to the whims of usage (as he defines it) rather than accept their lexically determined and invariant sense. Now that is not only a subjective leap but a leap into the lap of the particular individual's idiosyncratic presuppositions who exercises this "method." One is not to define lexical category by usage but rather determine lexical category (mass/count) by the lexeme using both grammatical (singular/plural) and semantic (indefinite/plural) tests, and leave semantic nuance subsequent to this appraisal.

Readers will find the next statement of Stafford puzzling in light of his previous position. "I don't think Hartley understands my point, for he seems to think that I am trying to do away with a Q classification for count nouns; that is not so." Wasn’t it Stafford who earlier argued that I could not produce a single instance of a singular count noun that exuded a Q sense? After so long a time has Stafford suddenly awoke to the realization that count nouns proffer not only the possibility but actuality of emulating the Q-d semantic idea established by the mass noun? If so, then he has moved, ever so grudgingly, towards the semantic recognition that he has so militantly opposed up till now. But I have the feeling that Stafford's admission is hollow.

No doubt he will appeal to "semantic signaling" rather than lexical nuance in making this determination (Remember, "God is love" where the mass noun AGAPH is admitted to be Q-d by Stafford, albeit by illegitimate means?). And my very purpose for bringing up nouns that have no other members which to infer (when a Q or Q-d sense was argued) was simply to show how subjective the model of "semantic signaling" really is and why it doesn't work and shouldn't be seriously entertained. How would Stafford qualify the sentence "God is light" in John 1:5? I classify it as Q and it is linked in the discourse to 4:8, 16, "God is love" (cf. R. Brown's commentary on the Johannine epistles where these two statements become the basis for the bipartite division of 1 John). Each are in the Colwell construction and both have the identical semantic sense (Q/Q-d) although "light" is a singular count noun and "love" is a singular mass noun. How would Stafford classify both nouns? There are several other cases in John's Gospel where this type of discourse connection motivated by semantic redundancy occurs (1:1c w. 1:14; 3:6a w. 3:6b; 6:63b w. 6:63c to name a few). I do not disparage appeal to context, but Stafford appeals to it prematurely and illegitimately.

Below Stafford responds to my comments on John 1:1c, 14 in regards to "semantic signaling" and its flawed methodology and impracticality with expressions like "God is love"--the very point argued above.

The problem with Hartley's response is that he assumes that the semantic signaling of lexemes, in this case mass nouns, must be consistently employed regardless of reference, when in fact reference (usage) is the key in determining the proper means of classification; the reference, and the rest of the context, helps reveal the semantic signaled by the particular use of a particular lexical form. What Hartley does is assume a certain classification for terms and then he seeks to attach a SENSE to that term, creating a variety of categories and sub-categories in the process. But in doing so he, many times, simply ignores the fact that the context is what tells us what kind of lexeme we have; it does not simply tells us the sense of the particular lexeme.

Stafford reveals, as indicated earlier, that he does not understand lexical semantics at all. Linguistic criteria, not context or referent (or reference), determine what type of lexeme we are dealing with. Context tells us the sense of these nouns, when the nouns in question are semantically versatile (singular count nouns!). Now I have belabored the point before that mass nouns are semantically determined irrespective of referent. If I say, "The coffee is very good today" and am referring to a specific brand of coffee, then Stafford would qualify the noun as I-Q. But the statement is not "The particular brand of coffee is especially good," even though I might mean that, but rather the "coffee is very good today." If semantic signaling is employed the original statement would read, "The a coffee is very good today" or even "The particular brand of a coffee is especially good." But if I intended to say that why didn't I? If I stated the very same sentence irrespective of any known brand the semantic idea of the noun would be the same. The semantic idea is Q-d while the referent may or may not be a particular brand or quantifying measure offset by an ammassive ("particular brand" etc.). That is irrelevant to the semantic notion of the noun. And it is still impossible to make the noun itself indefinite. Only the referent is indefinite (in the case of a particular brand), not the semantic notion of the noun. Context is not the key or even a factor in identifying the type of noun in question.

It does do that, of course, but in so doing it tells us what type of noun we have. By looking only at the form of the word and assuming certain lexical categorizations BEFORE his analysis begins, and by not looking at the concept signaled by the term in its context and using that to determine its proper lexical tagging (which would also convey its semantic), Hartley is forced to conclude regarding my comments on John 1:14, "But the passage does not state it in those terms." In fact, that is precisely what is tells us, when you consider the reference.

The danger of Stafford's statement is especially revealed by the statement that I do not consult "the concept signaled by the term in its context and using that to determine its proper lexical tagging" (emphasis added). By stating this he has moved away from semantics and grammar into metaphysics--a metaphysics malleable to the interpreters own whims (in this case Watchtower theology). I would not be far off to label his process of consulting the "concept signaled by the term" to determine the proper lexical tagging of the noun which would also "convey its semantic" as voodoo linguistics.

I must ask why Stafford assumes that I do not investigate the "concept signaled by the term in its context?" If he means the referent to which the semantic notion of the noun identifies, then fine--but this has absolutely no bearing on either the notion of the noun itself or its lexical tagging. Thus John 1:14 states, "The Word became flesh" where "flesh" is a mass noun and semantically Q-d. Who does this refer to? It refers to the Word. What is the semantic notion of the noun? It is that Jesus became human, not simply "a man." The result of him being human is that he is a man, but that is not what the phrase is stating. It is not referring to his membership in a class but rather his characteristics that he attained in the incarnation. It is thus nonsense to consult the referent for either the lexical form or semantic sense. Referent is consulted logically subsequent to these matters.

There is a way to indicate the sense which Stafford insists it should in John 1:14, and John does not use it here (Jn. 1:6, EGENETO ANTHROPOS not 1:14, SARX EGENETO). Thus John's point is to emphasize the qualities of humanity that were added to the nature of the second person of the Trinity. The semantic connection of SARX (Q-d) to the semantic notion of THEOS (Q) is unmistakable in the discourse. This overkill is simply an illustration of what is known as the principle of maximum redundancy. The result is the Word is the God-Man. When the grammar is allowed to speak, it shouts out ideas strangely incompatible with Watchtower theology. The issue of "concept" is another matter I will take up below.

In summary I distinguish between the sense of the noun (its semantic notion) and the referent of that noun (be it an individual, a concept, concrete or abstract). Stafford confuses the two and thus appears to equate "concept" and "sense." Because the concept is something abstract he feels that this indicates quality. But this is another subtle slip into the referential fallacy and will be illustrated below with SARX. In short, one must not equate a concept, which may or may not be the referent to the noun, with the sense (semantic notion) of the noun. Stafford repeatedly errs on this simple matter partly because he fails to understand when dealing with mass/count nouns, the concepts of abstract/concrete are irrelevant.

Now Stafford not only has the entire process backwards but begs the entire issue. Notice, he wants to determine what it means first, then lexically tag it, "(which would also convey its semantic)." This process is a rather obvious instance of circular reasoning. Why even mention lexical issues at all when his system of assessing the semantic notion is already determined before he tags the noun lexically? Notice, he moves in the exact opposite direction of descriptive linguistics. One does not start with semantics then to form, but from form, whether that is lexical or grammatical, to semantics! In short, no straining at the referent to SARX in John 1:14 could possibly wring from that noun an indefinite semantic notion that rings true. To do so is to overturn the semantic idea of a whole class of nouns in Greek and to torture common English expressions such as "To err is human" as meaning "To err is a human" based on the confusion between the sense of the noun and the referent to which that noun points out. Thus Stafford's "semantic signaling" is nothing more than looking at the referent and then construing the noun in conformity to one's metaphysics. I have referred to this clumsy process as something akin to the illegitimate totality transfer (this is probably not correct and there is perhaps a better description of it). It is a backward process linguistically that strains credibility and requires a great amount of credulity at every turn.

Consider the use of "flesh" (SARX) in Galatians 5:19. Here the noun is clearly used a mass term that relates to the sin at work in mankind. It is not literally referring to our composition, but the corrupting influence at work inside each one of us, due to our fallen nature. Here it cannot be interpreted in the plural, and its reference is not to any one person, but to all humans in general. But an entirely different semantic is signaled in John 1:14! The Word is the subject and he is said to have become "flesh." What other semantic could possibly be signaled that does not at the same time convey the idea that he became "a human being"?

The above example is a good case of illustrating Stafford's confusion on the issue of mass nouns in respect to the abstract/concrete dichotomy. This manifests a mixing of categories that I consider illegitimate and one that goes apparently unnoticed by him in his continual responses.

The term SARX is not used as a mass term in Galatians 5:19. It is always and at all times and all circumstances irrespective of referent, a mass noun! It is also irrespective to whether it refers (remember "concept" above?) to an influence or to actual corporeal flesh--once again, the concrete/abstract dichotomy has no bearing on the semantic notion of the noun. The particular concept referred to from the semantic notion of the lexeme (Q-d) is of course determined by context--in one context it means humanity, including its essential characteristics, (Jn. 1:14) while in Galations it pertains to sinful influence. But the semantic notion itself is determined by the noun independent of referent, be it a concept, an individual or whatever--a point Stafford still does not comprehend. The referent of SARX in Galations 5:19 is sinful proclivities of human nature or simply human nature itself which manifest these traits. Thus the semantic notion in Galations 5:19 is identical to that mentioned in John 1:14 because it is not only a mass noun but the same mass noun! The referent changes, of course, but the semantic nuance remains the same. Sense, then, is established apart from referent in every case of mass nouns. Thus Stafford's fundamental flaw continues--he confuses the semantic sense of the noun with the referent of that semantic sense whether it be personal/impersonal, or abstract/concrete. I would counsel Stafford to stick to linguistic science, not invent it ad hoc in keeping with a particular theology. My methodology is based on this science and is quite consistent throughout.

Since humans are not the only creature composed of flesh we could use "human" in 1:14, but "flesh" itself is not restricted to "humanity," and so the signal (SARX) coupled with the REFERENCE (hO LOGOS) is what tells us that we are talking about a human being. Thus, USAGE warrants that SARX in John 1:14 be classified as Q-I, which I view as a count noun with a primarily qualitative emphasis. That is to say, the term is used to emphasize the type of being Jesus has become, in contrast to the type of being he was. For Hartley or anyone else to restrict the matter to lexemic factors is circular for how does he conclude in the first place that a particular lexeme is mass or count, if not by usage?

Having read the above comments, ask "How do we arrive at the fact that we are speaking of a human being in John 1:14?" The answer is because the noun indicates "Jesus became human," the semantic notion of Q-d. He quite predictably confuses the semantic notion of the noun with its referent--again. Thus the semantic notion of the noun as Q-d is presupposed before looking at the referent. Moreover, the sentence reads, "And the Word became flesh" not "The Word turned into flesh" as the statement by Stafford insinuates--"That is to say, the term is used to emphasize the type of being Jesus has become, in contrast to the type of being he was." Jesus did not cease being the Word when he became flesh. Humanity (not "a man") was added to his Deity. Another way of stating this is that the nature of humanity was added to his deity so he was both God and man at the same time--this is referred to theologically as the hypostatic union. It is not the same idea expressed in the phrase "The stones became bread" although both statements are grammatically, lexically and semantically identical (both constructions are Colwell's, both PNs are mass and both employ the same verb). When stones become bread, however, they cease to be stones, but when the Word became flesh he does not cease being the Word (who incidentally is God [1:1c]). Thus the difference between the two is more a matter of how the verb is semantically used rather than the nouns or their semantic notion. John 1:1-14 indicates that God became human, thus Jesus was and is the God-man. The referent to THEOS in 1:1c is a person who is God while the referent to SARX in 1:14 is a person (the same person) who is human. The sense of THEOS and SARX are identical (Q, Q-d), the referent is identical as well (the Word). Thus the conclusion is that this one person is the God-man.

Now Stafford asks, "How does he conclude in the first place that a particular lexeme is mass or count, if not by usage?" This is a question that chapter three of my thesis addresses and the article as well. I've repeatedly indicated how this is performed, so I will not repeat myself in depth here. It is not as though I have not made this method patently (and redundantly) clear up to this point. The study of lexical semantics in relation to mass and count nouns is fairly simple. I don't have to ask whether nouns like car, boy, unicorn, are mass or count contingent upon some nebulous context or referent to disambiguate what amounts to a lexical matter in the first place. Simple criteria are established: (1) can the noun be pluralized? Cars, boys unicorns. Obviously the answer is yes. (2) Can the noun be indefinitized? A car, a boy, a unicorn. The answer is yes again. Conclusion? They are count nouns. Now where was context (referent) Stafford insists that I consult to determine count/mass status? Note also that a unicorn doesn’t even exist, therefore its symbol doesn’t even have referent in the strictest sense. What about nouns like cheese, iron, bread, pants and flesh? (1) Can they be pluralized? Irons, breads, pantses, fleshes? Absolutely not. (2) Can they be indefinitized? A iron, a bread, a pants, a flesh? Again, no. Thus they are mass nouns. But where is the so-called context? Now this is precisely where we derive the notion of "semantics" from the phrase "lexical semantics." It is from the noun, not context--hence lexical semantics! It is only in cases where the noun is semantically versatile that context is consulted--not to determine its lexical form, but its semantic nuance. The only noun to fall into this semantically elastic category is the singular count noun. That is the procedure in a nutshell.

Another caveat is in order. The notion of Q-d (Q) is the sense of the noun that allows the reader (or writer) to view or portray the referent in a certain way, whatever that may prove to be, with a particular focus in mind. It might be likened to aspect in the verbal system rather than to the actual occurrence of events (Aktionsart). This is perhaps a simplistic analogy in need of unpacking, but the essence of what I have said thus far is certainly parallel in some respects. This could also be expanded to the lexical number of mass nouns. The plural form, while remaining semantically singular, could point to batches in regard to the referent. So while SARX in John 1:14 does not differentiate with regard to its referent, the plural form could point to batches of humanity. In either case the sense is the same irrespective of referent.

Now below Stafford appeals to what scholars label ammassives and enumeratives (although Stafford doesn't use these terms) in either quantifying mass terms or unifying count nouns. I discussed this in the thesis, noted its weaknesses and proceeded to center on grammatical features alone in making determinations as to whether a noun was mass or count. The issue involves the type of syntactic qualifiers for each type of noun. Hence ammassives quantify mass nouns to amount in principle to a count sense, and enumeratives unify count nouns to equal a mass sense. Rather than determine what a noun is (mass or count) by which determiners it utilizes, or transform it into either a mass or count noun, these qualifiers merely serve to quantify or unify what is already deemed to be either a count or mass noun. This will become more clear when I discuss more of this below as Stafford's comments permit.

I had said earlier . . .

HARTLEY
Applying this procedure to other mass nouns illustrates its absurdity. "The stone became bread" does not mean "The stone became a bread." Neither would it be correct to infer that if several stones became bread that therefore one cannot have bread but breads.

This is strange, for Hartley previously identified my "procedure" as that which is based on the semantic signal of a word, and yet in the above example he uses a word that signals itself, i.e., the reference does not require that we take "bread" as meaning anything but "bread." There is no other image that need come to mind, but will Hartley hold that SARX in John 1:14 can legitimately be taken to signal flesh and flesh alone, that is, without form or figure?

Stafford misses the point in the paragraph above. My comments are an argumentum ad absurdum of Stafford's principle of reading a sense into the lexis based on the referent's participation in a category of other beings/things. His reference to "without form or figure" is again tantamount to a referent fallacy in the attempt to determine the sense of the noun. Again, the sense of the noun is determined by its lexis, the meaning of the referent is an altogether different matter. I am dealing with the meaning of the sense established by the mass lexeme (Q-d). Stafford is dealing with the meaning of the referent as the sense of a lexeme.

Now Stafford argues that I use the noun SARX to signal itself but it is Stafford who argues that the noun is Q-I! If the noun is Q-I (I-Q) then it is to be understood exactly as I have noted above. If Stafford sees this as a silly "procedure" then I say, "Welcome aboard." Finally Stafford's insinuation that Q-d does not refer to anything ("without form or figure") is ridiculous. I never said that the noun (SARX) did not have a referent in mind, but that the referent was not to be used to determine the semantic notion of the noun when that noun was lexically determined to be semantically unambiguous. Similarly, "The Word was God" certainly has a referent--it is the Word. He is God. But the semantic notion of the noun is Q. Linguistically, the PN (in Q/Q-d) is an overarching category (thus a subset proposition) where other referents (the Father and Spirit) can share. Here the participants of the same category relate as co-hyponyms that function in contiguity. That is what the linguistic data points to which causes Stafford to balk.

Additionally, you will notice that Hartley is comparing apples to oranges. (Actually, the comparison is not even that close!) John 1:14 uses a mass term in reference to a PERSON, while Hartley's example has the mass term used in reference to impersonal STONES. What is more, Hartley fails to notice that while "a bread" and "breads" might sound strange, "a loaf of bread" and "loaves of bread" are perfectly acceptable inferences!

I think it is Stafford who is comparing apples (grammatical terms of mass/count) with oranges (referents, personal/impersonal, abstract/concrete). It is irrelevant to the semantic notion of a mass noun whether it refers to animate or inanimate objects, personal or impersonal, as I have repeatedly noted. Now notice what Stafford does. He says "while 'a bread' and 'breads' might sound strange, 'a loaf of bread' and 'loaves of bread' are perfectly acceptable inferences!" First of all, the rendering of "a bread and breads" sounds more than strange--it is nonsense! Even if you have a loaf of bread you don't read back into the noun and say "a loaf of breads" do you? Why? Because "bread" is a mass noun that stands for the substance itself irrespective of the amount. In fact the point of the statement, "The stones became bread" is not to "infer" loaves at all but rather to show that the stones became (or could become) something in substance that they were not before--namely "bread." The emphasis is on what not on how much. In conformity with the semantic notion it is the characteristics or substance or quality rather than quantity that is under discussion. Thus to equate "breads" with "loaves of bread" or "a loaf of bread" is absurd. The quantity of the referent is beyond empirical or textual verification.

How about the similarities between the statements "The word became flesh" and "They [stone] should become bread?" (1) Both are in the Colwell construction. (2) Both are mass nouns. (3) Both use GINOMAI and (4) Both are classed as B nouns (they appear in singular and plural forms but are semantically identical). The only difference is how the proposition is used--one speaks of addition (Jn. 1:14), while the other speaks of some type of subtraction or even transformation--as opposed to incarnation (Matt. 4:3; Lu. 4:3). Stafford wishes to make personal/non-personal a factor in the debate. But as I have indicated earlier, this distinction (as well as concrete/abstract) is unwarranted and inconsequential to the semantic idea of the lexis.

Now I noted in my thesis that the employment of ammassives and enumeratives are used to either quantify or unify (expand) nouns of a respective category to reflect a semantic notion in its propositional sense opposite of its lexis. In short ammassives are qualifying phrases that quantify a mass noun to make the resultant phrase specify less than the whole of the mass noun. When I say, "The beverage of preference around here is coffee" I am not specifying anything other than the whole of the stuff that makes up what we recognize in the noun "coffee." It is a mass noun. Now if I want to quantify that (mass) noun I must do so with a qualifier called an ammassive. In the sentence, "I had a cup of coffee this afternoon" the phrase "a cup of" is the ammassive--it quantifies (tells how much or amount), or limits the mass noun with respects to its substance--thus the phrase rather than the noun becomes semantically likened to count nouns. But notice that the sentence does not read, "a cup of a coffee." In fact the ammassive itself demands that the noun alone be recognized as a mass noun with a Q-d semantic notion to begin with. Furthermore, its utilization alone assumes that quantity is not at stake with a mass noun unless it is quantified by an ammassive. In both instances, therefore ("The beverage of preference around here is coffee" and "I had a cup of coffee this afternoon") the noun coffee is Q-d. The proposition is different because of the qualifier. But if mass nouns could be I-Q (Q-I) then why have ammassives to begin with? The fact that they need these qualifiers is an additional argument against Stafford's "semantic signaling" scheme which contorts the noun itself into I-Q (Q-I). An ammassive can thus limit or quantify a mass noun in either amount or kind--"a cup of coffee," or "a particular brand of coffee."

It is important to be reminded, at this juncture, that the noun "coffee" does not become a count noun, but the proposition itself, with the qualifying phrase, limits the mass noun to a specific quantity. It must be limited because it is lexically unlimited--and that is a key point that Stafford is unwilling to entertain. It would be nonsense to infer from "I had a cup of coffee" to "I had a cup of a coffee." So the appeal to ammassives as demonstrating a restriction on the part of mass nouns is irrelevant to the lexical semantic discussion because the very qualifier itself (ammassive) is predicated on the very notion that the mass noun is unlimited. Furthermore, I ruled out making determinations of mass/count lexis in my thesis, based on syntactical features, because there are exceptions to the rule. Syntactical criteria are helpful and perhaps, to a certain extent, useful in verification but nevertheless insufficient guides by which to establish lexical identity (see both thesis and article for more information here). At any rate, these qualifiers certainly do not turn the mass noun into a count noun. No noun undergoes a conversion to the other lexical category even when it (a singular count noun) exudes the semantic nuance of the mass noun (Q-d/Q).

How about a count noun, and what is an enumerative? An enumerative is a qualifier that functions to elevate a phrase containing a count noun to a mass sense. It is important to recognize the difference between the count noun itself, the enumerative (qualifying phrase) and the resultant sense to that phrase. There are already cases where the semantic notion of a count noun exudes the semantic notion of a mass noun without an enumerative, both in singular counts, "To err is human," (Q) as well as plural counts, "We are slaves" (Q-d). On the other hand, however, there are no examples of mass nouns that can be understood with an indefinite sense even with ammassives. So the analogy in this comparison or analysis of mass versus count nouns in the context of quantifying or qualifying them is somewhat asymmetrical.

The purpose of an enumerative is to give a mass sense to a phrase (not the noun) containing a count noun. For example, "He is like every politician I know" where the term "politician" is the count noun and "every" is the enumerative which functions to expand the singular count noun to include everyone that is circumscribed by the term politician. Thus "every politician" necessarily includes the whole group of politicians--even this sense includes a limited group. Of course a plural count does the same thing semantically and it might thus be questioned whether every count noun qualified by an enumerative really equals the semantic notion of a mass noun--in this case the terms "every" and "like" along with the pejorative use of "politician" might amount to a mass sense. Or "every politician" might equal the generic sense of "politicians" (plural count).

This slippery syntactical criteria has been abandoned by linguists (myself included) because it is insufficient in guiding one to the lexical identity of the noun itself. Since one must know beforehand what he is dealing with in order to use an ammassive or enumerative, what is the use in citing it to determine whether we are dealing with a count or mass noun? At best it is a validating system secondary to the grammatical criteria utilized in my study. Besides this, what is a mass sense but Q-d? Thus the general notion that one can quantify a mass noun and expand (or unify) a count noun by using these qualifiers--but in neither case does the noun itself change in its semantic notion--can be accepted (as my thesis did). The surest method is to use grammatical as opposed to syntactical or worse, metaphysical criteria, for determining what is a count or mass noun--and this is exactly what I have done.

Indeed, Matthew's account uses the plural ARTOI and Luke's account uses the singular ARTOS. So Hartley's classification of ARTOS/ARTOI as Q-D (thesis, page 53-54) is not safe at all. In fact, it is short-sighted. The Greeks had no trouble using "breads," to use Hartley's terminology, but this is due to the particular semantic signaled by the lexeme. Had Hartley simply read the NWT translation of these passages he might have been better prepared to address the issue of semantic signaling.

But Hartley does not seem to understand what is involved in taking a particular word as signaling one semantic when used with a certain referent, and another semantic when used for a different referent.

Stafford has unwittingly proved my point in the above example. It is true that ARTOI is used in both the singular (Lu. 4:3) and plural form (Matt. 4:3) in parallel accounts. But this is not to argue that the Greeks had no problem in saying "breads" as Stafford infers. In fact it is the very opposite--the plural form is identical in sense with the singular form because it is a mass noun. There are basically two reasons, as alluded in the above comments, for the plural form that I can tell with mass nouns. First, the use of the plural form of the mass noun is due to the (PN) attraction (anaphoric or kataphoric) to the plural subject--although this is not unanimous (cf. Acts 17:28 where GENOS "offspring," a singular mass noun, has a plural subject ESMEN, and Jn. 6:63 where the plural subject has two singular PNs one mass the other count both with Q/Q-d semantic sense respectively. That the subject is neuter, in the latter case, is also a factor). This is the case with Matthew's account. He certainly does not intend his readers to understand "breads" as an acceptable inference. The noun SARX is also in the plural form elsewhere (Jas. 5:3; Rev 17:16; 19:8; 19:21) with the same sense as the singular form. The second reason has to do with indicating a distributive referent. This indicates that the noun refers to batches or groups of some sort. This usage might be intended to indicate a distinction among referents much like "peoples" etc. do. In this usage it is quite conceivable to understand the plural mass noun to be functioning similar to an ammassive--it quantifies the referent to some extent. Even so, the referential aspect does nothing to change the sense of the noun in its semantic notion. So while the plural form might be intended by the author to clarify something about its referent, it does nothing to change the sense of the noun--it is still Q-d. Thus it might be acceptable to understand the singular and plural mass noun as identical in sense, but varied (sometimes) in how they view the referent.

The phenomenon of grammatical plurality among mass nouns accounts for the reason they are categorized in relation to their grammatical number in my thesis (A, B, and C mass nouns). Class A refer to mass nouns that appear only in the grammatical singular. Class B nouns to those which are found in both singular and plural forms but were semantically identical. Finally, class C nouns are nouns that are mass in their singular but become a substantive in the plural form (AGAPH). Now ARTOS is a class B noun, i.e., it appears in both singular and plural forms with the identical semantic notion (Q-d). The parallel account in the Gospels confirm rather than discredit this idea. Moreover, the word for "bread" in Greek is influenced by the Hebrew LEHEM which was used for the same semantic notion--food. If one restricts the noun simply to "bread" or expands it by synecdoche to include all "food," the semantic notion is nevertheless identical. The latter case is more likely. When Jesus states, "Man shall not live by bread alone" he certainly is not overturning an "eat only bread" injunction or assuming that people ate only loaves of bread. To make it plain, he wasn't alerting the Devil to the other essential food groups like vegetables and meats necessary for a healthy diet! He simply was referring to all food in general--the sustenance that kept one alive physically but not spiritually. He almost certainly wasn't referring to "loaves of bread!" Even if he was, the parallel account shows the nonsense of Stafford's inference, namely that "breads" is an acceptable semantic notion to the Greek/Hebrew mass noun. Thus the sense of "bread" is semantically singular (mass) while the meaning is all food (and drink) that sustains one physically, while the referent is stones.

After noting the silliness of referring to furniture as furnitures, silver as silvers, coffee as coffees, and concrete as concretes Stafford replies . . .

No one here is "demanding" that an indefinite article be used. That is Hartley once again missing the point and adding his own words to my side of the argument. Still, it is not difficult to imagine a grammatical context where the above terms have a count sense:

Once again Stafford misses the point. No one argues against the notion of ammassives signaling limitations in regard to the referent with mass nouns. But Stafford, besides confusing referent and sense (for the umpteenth time), still misses the notion that "silver" and "furniture" cannot be indefinitized--and that is the very impetus that drives the cause for these type of qualifiers in the first place (as indicated above). The sense of "silver" and "furniture" even in these instances is Q-d. The referent (in these cases) does not define the sense of the noun. It is the lexeme that defines the sense of the noun, hence lexical semantics. The fact that ammassives must be used as a qualifier to the mass noun ("piece/statue/block" and "a piece of") only confirms the truth of which I have been arguing throughout. A piece of furniture is not a furniture. A piece of or statue or block of silver does not make it a silver. At any rate, it is the noun that is under discussion in regards to semantics not the referent. If Stafford does not insist on an indefinite sense to the noun then why does he qualify these as I-Q (Q-I)? If the noun is not indefinite then take the "I" out. The issue is not referential semantics (whatever that may mean), but lexical semantics.

If the meaning of the above examples, per the reference/context, reveals a count use of the terms, then the nouns are count nouns, not mass!

What I find interesting is that Hartley tries to make light of the semantic I attach to the term "flesh" in John 1:14 by using the above examples (as in "coffees," "concretes," etc.) in a plural form. But I am not suggesting that "fleshes" (!) is acceptable in view of the semantic it signals.

I never suggested that "fleshes" was the semantic notion that Stafford signaled with regard to John 1:14. He would argue that the noun signals that Jesus became "a human being" based on SARX's implicature of other referents to which the Word has become a member. But this is irrelevant, as I have indicated numerous times, as to the semantic notion of the noun itself. The text is not stating that "The Word became a human being" but rather "The Word became human." Now to argue that to become human is to be a human being is obviously a correct inference on our part. But to argue that because he is a human, that therefore the noun must be understood as I-Q is wrong-headed. But even if one wishes argue in this haphazard fashion, the end is not reached without assuming what I have been arguing all along. The noun SARX is Q-d. One must assume "The Word became human" (Q-d) before one can reason that "The Word became a human being." Thus one must assume SARX is Q-d before he turns around and changes it to I-Q! The question then is whether the noun SARX really means the latter as opposed to the former. I argue that the noun, because it is a mass noun, means the former. In fact Stafford must assume the semantic notion I argue for in order to even arrive at his own view. On the contrary, I never infer that the mass noun means anything other than the semantic notion of Q-d.

Now there is a world of semantic difference between the phrases became human and became a human being. John (to repeat) had access to each semantic option and his style suggests that he intended SARX to be taken the way I have indicated. When John wished to indicate the sense of "a man" (I-Q) he used ANTHROPOS in a post-verbal position--"There was sent from God a man whose name was John" (1:6). When John wanted to indicate the nature of humanity alone he used SARX (at least in the prologue). This is not simply a stylistic maneuver on John's part here (although at other times this is certainly so). To confirm this one can check out John 3:6 or 6:63. These verses use the Colwell construction twice in a way that indicates a discourse connection similar to John 1:1c and 1:14. "That which is born of flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit" (Jn. 3:6) and "The words that I speak to you are spirit and life" (Jn 6:63). Both SARX and PNEUMA are in the Colwell construction as well as PNEUMA and ZWH. Incidentally, the use of PNEUMA (in both cases) is another clear case of the Q semantic notion for a singular count noun--one covered in the thesis I might add.

The discourse connection between these two halves suggest, once again, that the unambiguous semantic notion of the former (SARX, Q-d) or the latter (ZWH, Q-d) is to disambiguate the semantic elasticity of the latter (PNEUMA, a singular count noun [Q]) or former (PNEUMA, Q). Thus Q-d equals Q. The discourse connection is clear in that the pre-copulative occurrence of the mass noun is Q-d irrespective of its syntactic positioning. It is deliberately placed in the Colwell construction to corroborate a semantic redundancy I have argued for in these cases. It is simply a further device used to confirm (it is established by statistics) the semantic notion of the singular count noun. Now these instances are identical to John 1:1c and John 1:14 are they not? Thus syntax is connected not only to semantics (only when it matters, like in the case of singular count nouns) but also to the discourse (macro or micro) level. It is a matter of taking a clear semantic notion (mass noun--Q-d) and linking it with a less clear semantic component (singular count noun--Q) to make the latter abundantly (or redundantly) clear. To argue for disparate semantic notions is to argue against the principle of maximum redundancy.

Finally Stafford states, "But I am not suggesting that 'fleshes' (!) is acceptable in view of the semantic it signals." Stafford is very confused here. He erroneously affirms once again that the meaning of the referent equals the semantic notion of the noun. But semantics refers to the lexeme not the referent--it is what the lexeme signifies (means) not to what referent it signals (refers to). He insists that the semantic notion of SARX in John 1:14 is I-Q. Now he supposes this is somehow entailed in the noun based on the referent which he assumes is a member of a particular class. It would be more correct for Stafford to indicate he is talking about referents to semantic notions rather than semantic notions with referents. Lexical semantics refers to what the noun means, while referent is that to which the noun refers (not means). We're not interested, for the moment, in the meaning of the referent, but rather the sense of the noun. Stafford, as clearly seen here, confuses the semantic notion of the noun with the referent to which it refers--a mistake that he repeats with impunity and that continues to stupefy him. All this and he still wonders why I fault him (a flesh, fleshes etc.)?

What I am saying is that the Bible makes clear use of "flesh" in reference to individual humans, and collections of humans. Consider the use of SARX in the LXX of Genesis 6:13, or its use in Romans 3:20. Will anyone question that these are references, not to the "stuff" called "flesh," but to human beings? But when we consider Paul's use of SARX in 1 Corinthians 15:39 or the use of SARX in Revelation 19:18, then it becomes clear that we are in fact dealing with the "stuff," not with people.

Stafford again confuses the sense of the mass noun with the referent to which it refers to in specific cases, as though personal/non-personal referents ("stuff" vs. personal beings) have anything to do with the semantic notion of a mass noun. That is why he asks such silly questions like, "Will anyone question that these are references [Gen. 6:13; Rom. 3:20], not to the 'stuff' called 'flesh,' but to human beings?" It is irrelevant whether the referent in each case is the whole of mankind, the whole of sinful proclivities or the whole of corpses. The referent does not define the sense of the mass noun! The sense in each and every case of SARX, because it is a mass noun, is Q-d. From that understanding of lexical semantics one progresses to the referent(s). Of course there are disagreements about the specifics in regard to referent and this lack of precision here is just one of many reasons why "semantic signaling" becomes a very subjective process. It conditions the semantic notion of the noun based upon the specific identification and metaphysical meaning of the referent. And that simply is not a scientific process at all.

Now Stafford seems to imply that if the referent is "stuff" and not people that this somehow alters the semantic idea of the noun. But this is of course also incorrect. Personal and non-personal referents (like concrete/abstract et al.) are irrelevant markers in regards to the lexical sense of the noun. This is why a noun like THEOS, a singular personal count noun, can be used to depict the character or attributes of the Word (John 1:1c). It is irrelevant that the noun is used for personal referents. In fact it is used in an impersonal fashion for a personal object in John 1;1c. In the statement, "To err is human" it has "human"--a personal singular count noun--being used in an impersonal manner to speak of human characteristics alone of which erring is one example. To say, "He is only human" is the same idea with a personal subject. This is nothing new and nothing forbids this type of employment in language. Certainly one would not argue that since "human" is a personal noun it cannot be used in this fashion would he? Yet Stafford responded earlier (in a previous response) that using THEOS in John 1:1c in this fashion amounts to turning God into a category!

But even in 1 Corinthians we can see a count sense for flesh in that we have different "types" of flesh: 1) bird flesh, 2) human flesh, 3) fish flesh, etc. We find the plural form of SARX in Revelation 19, again showing different types of flesh, though it also makes a distinction between the flesh of different ranks of humans.

Again this is irrelevant to the discussion (see above). Referent is as irrelevant to the sense of the noun itself as ammassives are to their ability to transform a mass noun into a count noun. The plural mass can refer to batches of flesh but the sense of the noun remains the same. Stafford's comments above must assume what I have argued repeatedly as to the sense of mass nouns. If one checks out 1 Corinthians 15:39 it reads, "For not all flesh [SARX] is alike, but there is one kind of flesh for men, another flesh [SARX] for animals, another flesh [SARX] for birds, and another flesh for fish." The first reference to "flesh" referentially speaks of all physical flesh (notice the singular used throughout) as the subsequent instances or batches testify. Then this reference is qualified by specific instances with reference to humans, animals, birds and fish. But notice that although the referents are distinct, the semantic sense of the noun SARX is the same. It is only limited by its specific modifiers--of man, animal, birds and fish which point to limitations of referent. That the first reference of SARX refers to all these kinds of flesh and that each must be qualified by the modifiers suggests that the noun is unqualified--a characteristic of mass nouns. That it can be limited by qualifiers is another (syntactic) characteristic of the mass noun. In neither case is the noun itself transformed into a count noun, and to suggest such is preposterous. As stated before, ammassives serve to either limit or quantify a mass noun in either amount or kind--"a cup of coffee," or "a particular brand of coffee" but never to transform the mass noun into a count noun.

In his thesis (pages 1-3) Hartley states that his methodology involves both descriptive and structural linguistics. But what does one do when a conflict arises between the two? If the usage of the term conveys a semantic that is not discernable by the grammar of the text due to the idiomatic semantic associated with the term/expression by the author/reader of the source, then what does Hartley intend to do? He wrote:

A key to the whole thesis is the understanding of the semantics of mass nouns-and I hate to repeat myself but here it is again-is that mass nouns cannot be indefinitized nor semantically pluralized. Thus the noun is always qualitative (Q) without the possibility of indefiniteness being included at all-thus labeled Q-d. And yes the result of this does cast considerable doubt if not completely dismantles the argument put forth in Stafford's book.

Not only does the above NOT 'dismantle' anything in my book, but, again, Hartley is simply refusing to accept the semantics of the term so he can continue to claim that mass nouns cannot be "indefinitized nor semantically pluralized."

To the first paragraph Stafford asks me to resolve when there is a supposed discrepancy between descriptive and structural linguistics where "the usage of the term conveys a semantic that is not discernible by the grammar of the text due to the idiomatic semantic associated with the term/expression by the author/reader of the source." The statement itself begs the question on at least three fronts. First of all, how does a discrepancy occur between descriptive and structural linguistics? He provides no example. Second, it is not apparent what he is referring to in the second part of the question and how or what criterion he is using to suppose a discrepancy between the term/expression as from the idiom and its semantic nuance. Finally, his comments combined with the quotation of my statement leaves no clue as to what so-called discrepancy he is referring to between descriptive and structural linguistics that I am to address. For help I simply refer him to Black, D. A. Linguistics For Students of New Testament Greek: A Survey of Basic Concepts and Applications, 2nd ed. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1988, 1995.

In regard to his second statement it is patently clear that the mass noun establishes a semantic category that is detrimental to Stafford's view of John 1:1c. Furthermore, I accept the semantic nuance of the mass noun (Q-d) as well as the notion of Q for the singular count noun. It is Stafford who refuses these categories despite the handicapped nature of his case. Now isn't it interesting that I have argued for the Q-d nuance for the "semantics of the term" whereas Stafford has appealed to "context" (referent), which is patently not the "term" yet he caricatures me saying that "Hartley is simply refusing to accept the semantics of the term so he can continue to claim that mass nouns cannot be 'indefinitized nor semantically pluralized'" (emphasis added)? Is this another case of projection on Stafford's part?

Stafford has failed miserably to prove a mass noun has an indefinite or plural sense despite the appeal to singular or even plural referents. In fact, he cannot do so. He continues, moreover, to appeal to the referent which is not the term, while backtracking and semantically labeling the noun which is used to point out this referent as I-Q (Q-I) . But when I put the "term" itself (which he claims to accept its semantic idea) into this semantic notion, i.e., what he proposes it signifies (means), based on its signaling (its referent), "a flesh, a bread, fleshes, breads" et al., to illustrate its absurdity and to show that lexical semantics is to be distinguished from particular referent, Stafford insists that I have misunderstood him! Now Stafford can continue to insist that mass nouns are really I-Q, based on voodoo linguistics, but he cannot show one case where this is even possible for a mass noun. It should be clear by now, to the reader, at least, that Stafford has no doubt confused "signify" (meaning) with "signal" (referent) and assumed the latter is part of the former. To repeat an axiom that has gone unheeded by Stafford up till now--meaning of lexis (semantics) and the referent to that lexis are always to be distinguished rather than confused with each other.

The next statements from Stafford are based on my comments about SARX in John 1:14 and the inference "Jesus is a human" from the statement "Jesus became human."

Of course, Hartley's comparison of what an ABSTRACT mass noun might semantically signal and what a term like SARX might signal is absurd! What Hartley is here doing is ignoring the meaning of the term so he does not have to deal with it. Notice he refers to my point as a "fair deduction in the long run-but that is an extralingual inference"! Well just how long/far away from the term do we have to go to get the sense of it? Nowhere! It is a natural semantic bound up in the term itself, conveying a qualitative-indefinite sense in reference to a definite and personalistic subject (the Word) that is semantically singular. This semantic is REVEALED by the context.

Stafford's comments here are very unguarded, erratic and proceed on unfounded assumptions and fallacious methods. First, he still assumes abstract/concrete or even personal/non-personal makes a difference in the semantic idea of the mass noun itself. But even a rudimentary knowledge of mass/count nouns indicates that this distinction amounts to a non sequitur or in Stafford's case, a red herring.

Second, where do I ignore the meaning of the term SARX? It is a mass noun indicating that it will always convey a Q-d semantic notion no matter what aspect within its semantic range it means to convey. The meaning of the term here is thus "human" (SARX) not "a human" (ANTHROPOS). That is what the term means here in this context as distinguished from say Galations 5 (the semantic notion of the term itself, however, is identical--Q-d). The only deduction to which I referred to as a fair one, was that "Jesus is a human" comes from the statement in 1:14 with the meaning "Jesus became human." But the former inference assumes the meaning of the latter, but the inference is not bound up in the meaning of the latter. Thus Stafford's whole argument is self-defeating. I admit that the referent is ultimately a human being. Who wouldn't? But what Stafford fails to understand is that the meaning of the noun SARX combined with the semantic notion of Q-d results in "human"--and these two facts are both compatible yet without mixture. Thus the semantic nuance of SARX is Q-d, the meaning is "human" while the referent to which it refers to is a human being. To confuse the semantic nuance and meaning with referent is to commit a category mistake--talk about confusing apples and oranges. But Stafford doesn't only confuse apples and oranges, he labels oranges apples or stuffs apples with oranges or attempts to turn apples into oranges!

Third, Stafford asks how far do we have to go from the term to get the sense of it? Try the term itself (remember lexical semantics?). The noun is "flesh" not the silly notion of "a flesh" or even "a human" reportedly "bound up in the term itself." If, as Stafford fortuitously assumes, that this meaning is bound up in the term itself, then why the appeal to referent at all? If its meaning is bound up in the term itself (a classic mistake), then there would be no need to appeal to referent would there? And if it is bound up in the term itself, this meaning would be invariant and present in all of its usages irrespective of "context" so that John 1:14 and Galations 5:19 would mean the same thing because "It is a natural semantic bound up in the term itself." Yet Stafford cannot do this even in his own scheme because consistency cannot be maintained. Thus it is pure nonsense to say that the meaning Stafford wishes the term to have is bound up in the term itself. I wish Stafford really meant what he says when he says, "Well just how long/far away from the term do we have to go to get the sense of it? Nowhere!" Exactly! But he keeps going to the referent doesn't he? Furthermore, the remainder of his statement in full is again self-refuting. If the meaning is "a natural semantic bound up in the term itself" then how can he say that SARX in John 1:14 is really I-Q as "REVEALED by the context?" But who needs "context" and certainly who needs it to reveal some meaning that is supposedly already bound up in the term itself?

Below Stafford responds to the semantic distinctions I make between Q, I-Q, I, Q-d, etc. Here is what I said.

Furthermore, referring to the category of Q as I-Q (Q-I) is to completely ignore the differences between these two semantic ideas and thus to miss what the author had in mind. Certainly there is a difference between saying "John is human" (Q) and "John is a man" (I-Q or I). Qualities alone are emphasized (Q), qualities as well as individual within the group (Q-I) or simply an individual among a group with qualities in the background (I). It is an illegitimate totality transfer of the oddest sort to jump to the first sense (Q-d) through semantic signaling a Q-I (I-Q) category.

How is it so great a jump to take the semantic conveyed by a term, as revealed by the context, and convey that semantic in translation? If that is what the term MEANS, then it is inherently bound up with an indefinite sense in this particular instance. To deny it this sense is indeed odd. I do not share your hardened view of six categories.

The answer to his first question is this. It is a great leap to take the semantic notion conveyed by a term from the context if that noun has that notion already bound within its lexeme (ex. mass nouns, plural counts) and "context" is defined as "referent" and "referent" is given a "meaning" which in turn is read back into the noun as its semantic notion. Certainly the consultation of context would not be a problem with semantically elastic nouns (singular count nouns) but it would obviously include more than just the referent, but also a consultation of its semantic range that at any rate is not bound up within the term itself (etymological fallacy).

Now the second part to Stafford's statement is fallacious. He states, "If that is what the term MEANS, then it is inherently bound up with an indefinite sense in this particular instance." This is where Stafford seriously errs. Now how did he arrive at what the term means? He no doubt connects meaning with referent. Let me again illustrate the absurdity. If I say, "To err is human" and I refer to my wife's inadvertent proclivity to steal my pillow--thus I'm referring to a particular instance and a personal individual--does it follow that the singular count noun "human" is to be understood as I-Q as Stafford insists? Does it really matter that the referent is personal and singular in relation to the semantic notion of the noun? Is the fact that she is human and "a human" somehow infer that the noun is "bound up with an indefinite sense in this particular instance?" Isn't it silly to infer from "To err is human" to "To err is a human?" based on referent? Yet this is the semantic notion Stafford insists when he labels such nouns as I-Q. The referent might be I-Q, have a high IQ (my wife fulfills both), but that is not the sense of the noun!

Stafford insists this is the meaning when the referent is personal and singular. But neither I nor anyone else using that statement is indicating what Stafford assumes they should be by that statement. What is meant is that it is a characteristic of humans to err--it is a part of being human. "To err is human." Certainly it is not the only characteristic of sinful humanity, but it is no doubt one of them. Thus the subject lists one thing, "To err" as one component of a broader category of what constitutes being "human." That is what I mean and that is how the term is used in a Q sense alone--other faults of humanity may be inferred no doubt. It is irrelevant, therefore, as to its referent, whether the subject is my wife or all of humanity. The way I am using "human" is to emphasize through semantic notion ("characteristics, qualities or essence") of what it means to be human. Just because the referent is singular, personal, concrete/abstract or whatever, has absolutely no bearing whatsoever on the semantic nuance of the noun. Thus the sentence really means, "To err characterizes humanity." The emphasis is not on the singular characteristic of "erring" but rather on the character of humanity of which erring is a part. There is no indefinite sense bound up in the term because the referent happens to be a singular individual or even a singular handicap.

As to my supposed "hardened" view of six categories, I would like Stafford to list his. My categories were based on evidence from lexical matters. When I started my thesis, categories were essentially restricted to D, Q, and I respectively. Additional semantic nuances were utilized by Dan Wallace in his grammar and his suggestions there led me to pursue a clearer delineation and articulation of them. So rather than reach a "hardened" view of six theoretical semantic categories, I broadened the hardened categories that existed (D, Q, I) to include finer semantic nuances. In fact, no one had a category of I-Q and most assumed that in the Colwell construction this semantic feature was impossible. I found that many nouns classified as Q under the three-fold scheme, were really I-Q. It was this very expansion that opened the door to the possibility of taking John 1:1c in this sense. While it is much more probable to be I-Q, for example, than simply I, it is still far below Q. Now if one is to regard the paucity of semantic categories as "hardened," then it is Stafford who is hardened to semantic categories, not myself. It is Stafford who refuses to accept semantic categories clearly established by my study. It is far easier on his part to say he doesn't accept them than it is for him to legitimately question their validity. I would like to see a list of his categories and how he arrives at them. Up to this point his main contention is for I-Q (for illegitimate examples), and only grudgingly Q-d (again albeit for illegitimate reasons) and possibly D for proper names.

As noted in a previous response over Harner, Stafford's insistence that Q means primarily qualitative (from Harner) with indefiniteness suspiciously present in nearly all cases, even with mass nouns, leads me to be highly suspicious as to his "method" altogether--his end appears to justify any means necessary--unscientific and farcical notwithstanding. Special pleading, misuse of data, misrepresentation of research, circular reasoning, logical fallacies (methodological and intellectual), ad hominem rhetoric and typical Watchtower pontificating are illustrated well in the Stafford rebuttal(s) (or surrejoinder). None of those characteristics are the mark of a truth seeker.

Even if we were to say that the sense of "human" is in view the fact that it has reference to a semantically singular, personalistic subject who is but one of many instances of humanity necessarily involves a sense of indefinitness per the grammatical (semantically singular, personalistic subject) and idiomatic (concepts bound up with the historical and current use of the term SARX) context. There is no need to "jump" at all; you just have to let all the facts in, and refrain from a selective use of them.

See above for refutation.

Hartley has also grossly misunderstood my remarks about reading his theology into the text, as if I meant this in reference his entire study! He laments:

HARTLEY
I am accused of reading my "view" into the text-an oft repeated theme of his. If anything should be clear from my article, it would be the opposite. No one with my theological convictions would deliberately construct a study where the generic whole