And yes the result of this does cast considerable doubt if not completely dismantles the argument put forth in Stafford's book. Now this alone indicates Stafford's real problem. He does not want to admit of such a semantic category beyond stating that it is "possible."

STAFFORD
The above comments prove that Hartley does not understand my arguments. He seems to take my objection to distancing SARX in John 1:14 from any type of indefinite sense as a claim that one should not accept ANY mass noun as purely Q! Further confirmation that Hartley has taken this erroneous view of my position comes from his previous attempt to make light of my claim by appealing to the abstract term AGAPE in 1 John 4:8. The fact that Hartley makes such great leaps of linguistic logic does not inspire confidence in his critical abilities with exegetically difficult passages. But, all that aside, he further claims:

The problem with Stafford is that he insists any mass noun could have an indefinite sense, particularly argued for John 1:14 (SARX). It is my contention that no mass noun ever has an indefinite sense. That he admits that some mass nouns are purely Q (Q-d) is irrelevant, for reasons elucidated above, because he admits this on faulty criteria (abstract, non-personal et al.). I understand exactly what he is doing and it is not only simplistic but methodologically backwards (consulting of standard linguistic work would easily reveal this to be the case). Stafford fails to define on grammatical criteria what a mass noun is--and he will not because he doesn't define it according to grammatical criteria. He defines it by metaphysics which is explicitly outside the realm of mass/count distinctions. He insists on going to the arena of metaphysics (his theology from the Watchtower) rather than grammar to substantiate what constitutes a mass noun. This is a category mistake.

He goes on to cite me . . .

HARTLEY
But we have proved it is not just possible but actual. When confronted with this piece of evidence, as stated above, he denies it and tries to wrench out of a mass noun (John 1:14 SARX) an indefinite sense. Thus given the chance to acknowledge its actuality, he denies it. Now that is quite convenient, when one wants to protect a theology, but also quite misleading when evidence is produced giving actuality to his possibility and he then denies both it and its implications.

STAFFORD
I deny no such thing in reference to a great many mass nouns, but I DO deny that one cannot get an indefinite sense from the use of SARX in John 1:14. Your denial of this rather obvious sense (as previously discussed) shows that you are bent on wrenching away any sense for a noun that clashes with your classification. Even if I ignore the obvious indefinite sense inherent in the use of SARX in 1:14 (and, of course, I do not), there is nothing in it that negatively affects my view of John 1:1, so why would my objection have anything to do with a theological motivation?

Notice the tacit admission, "I deny no such thing in reference to a great many mass nouns . . . ." The problem is that he does not admit it for all mass nouns and that it is a lexical matter not related to referent. It is irrelevant to admit of a right conclusion in some cases when the reasoning and methodology leading to that conclusion is flawed. The proof that it is flawed is the refusal to admit of the sense mass nouns exude lexically. Furthermore, the obvious sense of SARX is "human" and to expect anyone to expect otherwise is question begging!

Now Stafford facetiously asks, "Even if I ignore the obvious indefinite sense inherent in the use of SARX in 1:14 (and, of course, I do not), there is nothing in it that negatively affects my view of John 1:1, so why would my objection have anything to do with a theological motivation?" This is quite simple to answer. The view of mass nouns (John 1:14 in particular) argues for a Q-d sense, always and at all times. This semantic nuance is thus categorically established, and not limited to mass nouns. Thus count nouns like THEOS can exude the same nuance and in fact do (statistically it is the predominant sense used for pre-copulative anarthrous PNs in John's Gospel). Furthermore, that this nuance is applied to count nouns like THEOS with the implication that the Word is God in every sense the Father is (without equivocation), is very detrimental to Watchtower theology (Jn. 1:1). That the noun THEOS is statistically determined to be most probably Q, and is chiastially and structurally (Colwell Construction) connected to John 1:14, and that the latter mass noun is strategically and deliberately fronted or syntactically positioned to correspond semantically with THEOS, and that this connection reinforces the principle of maximum redundancy, all support the notions inherent within Trinitarianism and refute Arian or Watchtower theology.

This view comports with rather than distorts the grammatical evidence reproduced in my study. All the evidence converge in the direction opposite from which Stafford wishes it should. Instead of admitting the obvious--that all mass nouns are established lexically (apart from context) and are semantically Q-d--he simply attempts to get around the implications of its nuance, especially when that nuance is also reflected in the singular count noun. This is no more apparent and detrimental to his Watchtower theology than with John 1:1c and 1:14. And if, as he supposes, accepting the view of mass nouns as I have presented it does not upset his theological views, then why does he not just accept it? He certainly has not given me cause to doubt my method, or given me reason to believe that his objections spring from anything else but the fear that Watchtower theology is threatened upon accepting the implications of my study. He has certainly not given a viable grammatical alternative to my method, nor invalidated my study on grammatical grounds. All he gives in response is that my "theology" somehow predetermines the end result.

Stafford continues to support his notion that sense is somehow determined by the referent rather than the lexeme. He states . . .

What Hartley apparently has not gathered from my replies is that my objection involves his non-sensical rejection of the context in determine the proper lexemic tagging for a particular term. In other words, in John 4:24 we have PNEUMA used first as a count noun in reference to God and then we have it used as a mass term in reference to the manner in which those worshiping Him should pray. It is not a matter of taken PNEUMA as a count term in BOTH instances, and then further categorizing it as Q, Q-I, etc., but of recognizing the proper lexemic tagging of the term per the context.

Stafford continues to invent methods of categorizing nouns as contingent entirely upon context--a context determined by the interpreter apparently. On the contrary, proper lexemic/lexical tagging is established apart from context, albeit semantic nuance of disputed singular count nouns is aided and abetted by context. The absurd idea that PNEUMA becomes a mass noun has already been addressed earlier. PNEUMA is always a count noun pure and simple. Furthermore, his use of "context" could in no way be regarded as "lexical" tagging for there is nothing lexical about it. By definition lexis refers to the lexeme not the context, referent or any metaphysical system of belief. Stafford has confused categories and appeals to nebulous extralingual referents in determining lexical identification--a process I find not only odd but unscientific. There is simply no controls in Stafford's self-made system of tagging lexemes except "context"--and of course that is controlled by interpretation, via the Watchtower I suppose.

Stafford thinks he has made a great concession in his flawed procedure when he states . . .

So, you see, I have no problem recognizing PNEUMA or THEOS as being mass terms in certain contexts, and so it should be obvious to Hartley (though it apparently is not) that I have no problem recognizing a Q sense for either term. I simply do not share his approach to the issue. In effect, Hartley wants to view THEOS in John 1:1c as a count term with the sense of a mass term. He should instead simply argue that the term is a mass term in this instance, though he would then run into the very problem he alleged exists for me, namely, the use of THEOS in 1:1b and 1:18, which clearly are not mass uses. But none of this solves the real problems that exist for Hartley, which I am not sure he even recognizes.

The problem with accepting PNEUMA and THEOS as mass terms in certain contexts is that they are not mass terms in any context. They are both count nouns in every context. Since Stafford is insisting that he admits of THEOS in certain "contexts" as exuding the Q semantic sense I would petition him to do several things: (1) provide a definition of the semantic idea of Q (Q-d) along with (2) the lexical criteria for such, (3) give example passages with justification for its use where this semantic option applies to singular count nouns, and (4) validate the process (reproducibility) to where it can be applied consistently across the board.

Above Stafford makes a make-believe problem for me when he insists that I should treat THEOS in John 1:1c as a mass noun since it exudes the semantic idea of the mass noun (Q-d) and then he cautions that if I did it would demand that same sense to John 1:18 which is clearly, according to him, not a mass use. If anything this illustrates why one should never define a noun's lexical identity by "context" if he wishes to be consistent. So in going about to create a problem for my system, he refutes his own and shows how incoherent it really is! How about John 1:1b as an instance of THEOS not used as Q? And how can it be used in such a semantically versatile manner? Precisely because it is a singular count noun. For the sake of the argument, why go to 1:18 to find an instance of THEOS not used in Q sense (and I am not admitting that)? I find the problem he conjures unreal in my system of lexical categorization because THEOS is not a mass noun but a count noun that exudes the identical semantic nuance of the mass noun both statistically (for Colwell's construction) and otherwise (as elucidated earlier) for John 1:1c--and this is clear from the preponderance of the evidence.

In categorizing nouns in this fashion I have not found any problems to which Stafford has to hypothetically invent for my method. But in the process, he apparently admits he has one, and indeed he does. The problem Stafford has with my method, as consistent as it is, is that I never wrench out of a mass noun an indefinite sense. His attempt to force me into this by acquiescing to the idea that when a singular count noun is Q it becomes a mass noun, and in turn cannot be sustained for the same noun when it is not Q in a consistent fashion only underscores how unscientific the whole notion of lexical conversion really is. But Stafford insists on this fallacious enterprise--and that is the problem he apparently wishes for me to share, i.e., a lack of consistency, but I do not. So his decrepit attempt to force me into that dilemma is a false one. My method contradicts his claim (in his appendix) that determining semantic nuances of count/mass nouns is a subjective enterprise (JWD, 207, 341) or that count nouns that exude the Q semantic nuance is really a mass noun, or that mass nouns could really be I-Q rather than Q-d.

Other examples of terms being used as count or mass in different contexts, include:

"Fire" is not a count noun in Matthew 3:11, 12, but it is a count noun at Matthew 25:41.

"Wine" is not a count noun in John 2:9, but it is a count noun for both its uses in John 2:10.

"Night" does not appear to be a count noun in John 13:30 "It was night." He does not mean "a (certain) night" in contradistinction to some other night, but "night" in the sense of the time of day it was: 'It was nighttime.' But if we had had a sentence in the NT so that we might read 'It was a night like no other,' then were that a count noun use of "night." And we may argue that it is a count noun at John 9:4 where we may translate Jesus' words as "The night is coming . . . " or as "A night is coming . . . " Either way, we have a count noun use of "night" in John 9:4.

The above is a haphazard attempt to use his system of semantic signaling to identify the lexical category of nouns via context. In my view it is highly subjective and fails miserably. Furthermore, he flounders in indicating the semantic sense to count nouns. He simply states, "either way, we have a count noun use of 'night' in John 9:4." What does that mean? And how is a count noun a "use?" A count noun is a lexical category not a semantic use. Count nouns can have several semantic functions (uses) possible but none are even mentioned by Stafford. Besides all the errors that I have alluded to earlier about his schema, he seems to be committing the mistake of sortal/nonsortal distinction of nouns rather than count/mass although he uses the latter terminology. At any rate, he fails miserably to understand the difference between count and mass nouns and how this relates to the semantic options relegated to each.

Below Stafford shows his misunderstanding of the lexical identity markers to a count noun verses a mass noun.

If the term is used in a purely Q sense, then it CANNOT be pluralized in this context! Can we pluralize PNEUMA in its second use in John 4:24? Of course not. But we can in its first use (though not in reference to a singular subject, of course), for here it is count whereas the latter use is mass.

That nouns are used in a Q sense presupposes it is a count noun and thus lexically subject to possible indefinitizing--even in a context where it is ultimately deemed as carrying a Q sense. Should I remind Stafford of his reading of John 1:1c where the singular count noun THEOS is forced to conform to his Watchtower theology? THEOS is used in that passage in a Q sense yet he insists I-Q while equivocating on the qualities the superordinate contextually exhibits. Can PNEUMA (John 4:24) be lexically and semantically pluralized? Indeed it can. This establishes that it is a count noun. Whether it is plural is a simple matter of looking at its grammatical number. Can PNEUMA be indefinitized? Indeed it can, and even in this passage it could. It has the ability to be either pluralized or indefinitized and thus its category of lexical identity is count.

Now the question is what semantic nuance does the noun exude, given the singular count nature of the substantive. To change what Stafford says above to "If a singular count noun is used in a purely Q sense, then it CANNOT be pluralized" is true of course--because it is grammatically singular (as opposed to the plural count noun!). But he has confused matters again. Who insists that a singular count noun should be pluralized in a given context? That isn't the issue at all and no one has ever insisted such. The issue is not whether to pluralize a singular count noun in a given context, but whether a given noun can be subjected to semantic pluralizing or indefinitizing as a factor in determining if it is a count noun to begin with! That was the issue to which I addressed and to which Stafford apparently wishes to ignore or deliberately confuse. Stafford has asked an inappropriate question in regards to John 4:24. "Can we pluralize PNEUMA in its second use in John 4:24?" The issue is whether PNEUMA can be pluralized or become indefinite (when singular) lexically in determining its count/mass status not whether it can be pluralized in a given context to determine its semantic nuance. Since it can do both (obviously), it is a count noun that is open to several semantic options (D, D-Q, Q, I, I-Q). Having settled this lexical matter, the determination of semantic issues logically follow. Factors such as style (gained by statistical compilation) along with immediate context is to be consulted in determining the exact nuance of PNEUMA in John 4:24. Stafford's whimsical appeal to "context" is reductionistic, methodologically flawed (out of order), without external controls, and extremely subjective.

The problem your understanding of this issue has, in relation to John 1:1, is that the Word is "with" God and so an indefinite sense is automatic, since he is not the God with whom he exists. (Note: there is no mention of the Word being "with a "person," but "with God.") Furthermore, the use of MONOGENHS THEOS in John 1:18 creates huge problems for your view, and that is why Trinitarians so regularly mistranslate this verse to fit with their theology. Unless, of course, you can show me another example in the NT where an adjective immediately precedes a noun of the same gender, number and case, and is NOT taken as an adjectival modifier for that noun. What do your statistics tell you on this issue?

This is a good example of Stafford's presuppositions at work. The indefinite sense to THEOS is ruled out by the latter phrase in John 1:1c which Stafford twists to conform to his Watchtower theology about the nature of God. He must equivocate on the term THEOS in order to do that as well. That move by him is linguistically ludicrous. How can one treat THEOS from John 1:1b to 1:1c with different characteristics and remotely claim that no a priori assumptions are at work? This is one of Stafford's main problems he has yet to resolve within the context. Secondly, his rationale that since the Word is with God he cannot be at the same time God is again irrational and in light of the context and without basis. Context determines that THEOS is used in the first sense to identify the person of the Father (TON THEON--notice the use of the article[simple identification of a personal kind]--especially in lieu of the preposition preceding it, making it emphatic--notice the article is lacking in 1:18 but followed by the articular "Father" thus referring back to the first anarthrous THEOS), not to exclude the Word from being THEOS. THEOS is used with a different linguistic function in John 1:1c, i.e., it is used as a superordinate (with the same qualities as its previous usage) to indicate the nature of the Logos and to include rather than exclude the Word as THEOS along with the Father.

This usage in John 1:1c is also borne out by statistical stylistic proclivities of its author as evidenced in my study. Since it includes the Word (= Jesus, 1:14), and the Father is the obvious referent in John 1:1b (even Stafford admits this, JWD, 185, 220), then the terms (not to mention the referents to those terms) both equally (not equivocally) occupy the space within the identical superordinate THEOS, not as synonymous hyponyms (Unitarianism, monarchianism, Sabellianism), but as contiguous hyponyms (Trinitarianism) in conformity with John 1:1b (PROS TON THEON). The latter is the only view that maintains the discontinuity of persons the prepositional phrase insists upon (PROS TON THEON), while maintaining the continuity of THEOS throughout (TON THEON/THEOS). Stafford's insistence that personal distinction implies ontological distinction is based on the human rather than biblical model (one to one correspondence). But this is a presupposition that he simply assumes and one which he holds as the standard to judge Scripture. His assumption makes humanity the model of being/person rather than God. It is tantamount to idolatry.

Notice in the pecking order of probability, I left out Arianism (or the Watchtower view). The reason is that it is less probable linguistically than even the other non-orthodox views (Unitarianism, monarchianism, Sabellianism). The Arian (Watchtower) view must go a step further away from the science of linguistics in redefining the qualities of THEOS, apart from the context (!) in order to maintain the theological tenets of the Watchtower. Now when the linguistic information is applied to the referents of the terms the distinction becomes one of personality in John 1:1 rather than nature or degrees in nature (cf. JWD, 199 where he affirms that "gods" in the OT were only distinct from God in degree not kind). The "gods" in the OT were not different from God in degree, but in kind. Examining Ugaritic texts (especially and Psalm 82 and "death" and other evidence where the divine assembly is evident) where various phraseology was used for the divine council, reveals that the "gods" of the OT, i.e., legitimate members of God's council, were gods in function only. They were not "gods" by nature or degree. In other words, they could cease being "gods," something which is untrue of YHWH which comprises the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. Stafford's attempt to link Jesus with these gods (which are redefined in the NT as angels) is predictable but unconvincing.

Thus my rendition of John 1:1 is strictly borne out from the linguistic and logical notions of the text, not presupposed from the start. Stafford's argument from silence, "there is no mention of the Word being 'with a person,' but 'with God'" is no more compelling than indicating that the Word is not indicated as a person, and thus is not a person. Personalistic distinction is absolutely essential and must be assumed before "being" can be implied. Stafford wants to jump to "being" before "person" but that is trying to get through a door without opening it. Both are THEOS in the same sense thus two persons are indicated as THEOS--binitarianism is explicitly taught here rather than Trinitarianism. Either both are "a god" in the same sense as each other, or "God" in the same sense. What cannot be done is exactly what Stafford and JWs consistently do and that is redefine the term THEOS in 1:1c to be less than THEOS in 1:1b! And that is linguistic nonsense. But consistency is apparently not one of Stafford's strong points.

John 1:18 causes no problems when one understands the text correctly. Stafford discusses this passage in his first edition and comes to some predictable and erroneous conclusions (JWD, 210-16). Several things should be observed about this passage at the start that indicates the opposite notions Stafford advances.

First, the use of THEON followed by THEOS is used to apply firstly to the Father and secondly to the Son (without equivocation), similar to John 1:1. Second, the following appositional clause (beginning with the participle phrase) serves to explain and demarcate the second usage of THEOS from THEON in personal distinction. Notice the explicit reference to the Father using the article anaphorically and pointing to its anarthrous synonym THEON ("in the bosom of the Father" EIS TON KOLPON TOU PATROS). Here the first use of THEON is made explicit (by the following phrase) whereas in John 1:1b it is implicit that the Father is to be understood (PROS TON THEON, with God the Father, and THEON OUDEIS, no man has seen God the Father). Third, there is nothing in the text that justifies equivocating on the characteristics implied in THEON/THEOS other than personal distinction which is undeniable. Fourth, it is to be noted that both occurrences of THEOS are anarthrous and thus if one is adamant on insisting on indefiniteness to one he must apply it to the other as well. Fifth, the meaning of MONOGENHS THEOS relates to the pretemporal and eternal relationship between God the Father and God the Son, not to either the incarnation (confirmed by the participle phrase HO WN) or some generation of the Son in the sense of having a beginning. But herein lies his "uniqueness" in the term MONOGENHS--he is the eternal Son, because he is God the Son and that makes him the unique God.

Finally, the correct etymological root of MONOGENHS is MONO and GENOS, "only kind" or "unique" rather than MONO GENNAW, "only begotten" and is not linked with a beginning to the Son's existence as Stafford argues. Moulton and Milligan note that "only begotten" would come from the Greek MONOGENNHTOS not MONOGENHS (M-M, 416-17). Stafford is also confused because he links the noun MONOGENHS to the verb "to become" (GINOMAI) which is a mistake arising from similar forms in principle conjugations. M-M note that the verb GENNAW, "to beget" became confounded with GINOMAI, in this respect, and thus forms of GENNAW started to be confused with forms of GENHMA and GENNHMA. This gaffe occurs in papyri dating AD 183 and AD 138-139 (see M-M, 124), not NT Greek! Thus the noun GENH is in no way related to the verb GENNAW not to mention the verb GINOMAI.

Stafford (in his first edition) diverts attention away from the clear meaning of the term in favor of a false connection with either GINOMAI or GINNAW, or attempts to foster some creation of the second Person of the Trinity ("there was a time when the Son was not" echoes in the argument) by noting filial or non-filial contexts where the term occurs, or denies the meaning of "unique" in questioning what that could mean when God has other "sons," or simply denies that it can be a substantival adjective followed by a noun THEOS by questioning its grammatical plausibility. He finally favors the translation of "only-begotten" and identifies Jesus' uniqueness among the gods in that he is the only being to "directly derive his existence from" God. "All other 'sons of God' were given life through the agency of the Logos, and thus did not have the kind of direct derivation the Logos received from God" (JWD, 216). Did someone say, Arius?

The proper translation of MONOGENHS THEOS is "unique God" in the sense that he is God the Son (he is in the bosom of the Father, denoting intimacy), and that makes him unique. There are no other beings in the Old Testament, intertestamental literature or in the New Testament, that can claim that honor. Stafford's contortion of the text is driven by his presuppositions and a priori assumptions rather than grammar. As for taking the substantives MONOGENHS and THEOS as independent, I would not recommend it although a good case can be made for this (see M-M where they note the term itself could be used as a proper name, 417). Why Stafford believes I must understand it this way is puzzling. Although one caveat does present itself. The participle serves as an adjectival modifier in the third attributive position--NOUN plus ARTICLE plus ADJECTIVE (adjectival ptcp. in a participle phrase functioning in an appositional clause modifying THEOS and read like a relative clause, the one who . . .). And in this instance we have MONOGENHS THEOS which functions as another attributive adjective. Various MSS add the article before MONOGENHS making it explicitly first attributive (see NA²⁷). This is interesting but not all that rare, especially when participles follow. At any rate, we have a parallel to John 1:1 in referents, the Father and the Word, both attributed the identical characteristics associated with THEOS. The Unique God is every bit and in the same sense THEOS as the Father is--no surprise. He is unique because he is God the Son, not because he is a god created by God the Father.

N.B. It should be noted that I think Stafford's attempt (in his chapter on the Logos of God) to place the "beginning" of creation to physical elements alone and thus understand Christ as the intermediary creative agent subsequent to his own unique creation by the Father, is one that requires too much credulity on the part of the reader. The reasoning is shallow and the texts are simply ignored when they clearly speak otherwise. This response is extra long, and I would love to engage in more texts on an exegetical level (esp. on John 10) but time constraints (and paucity of trees) forbid it for now.

Below Stafford responds to my statements regarding the distinction between lexical identification of mass and count nouns verses determining their semantic predilection, especially when they are disputed as in singular count nouns. My point is that lexical identification is rather simple, and semantic nuance is only troublesome for singular count nouns. That is why a statistical pool based on clear cases must be created to judge disputed semantic nuances of singular count nouns (like THEOS in John 1:1c). To this idea Stafford argues . . .

Again, the problem is your apparent inability to recognize the objection, even after reflecting on the matter some six months. I am objecting to your rejection of the context in relation to lexical identification! I also believe you mishandle the context in determining the proper sense of a variety of terms, as I have already discussed and which I will further address in my book. You also reject the context, in my opinion and as demonstrated above, in a number of instances in trying to discern the semantic of a particular PN.

I am simply saying that Stafford does not have a clue as to the criteria in determining lexical identity! And I am surprised that after so long he still doesn't get it! The rest of his statement as it pertains to the mishandling of context, is his constant but nonverifiable mantra. I'm not sure that even Stafford realizes what he actually means when he says "context" or that "context" is never to be consulted when identifying lexical class. But let the reader understand, I do not reject context when that context is necessary in determining the semantic nuance of singular count nouns--and that is the only instance it is needful to consult. Thus, I do not reject context, but Stafford does indeed reject lexical semantics and redefines the notions of mass and count to apparently fit his own ideas.

Stafford responds to my questions of how my method is supposedly pre-determined by my theology.

Again, as I explained, you are forced to accept THEOS in 1:1c as a count noun but you are similarly forced, per your theology, to give it a mass sense! In the process you assume the validity of a truly misguided theory regarding the lexical classification of nouns, which, even if accepted, would not help your cause in John 1:1, anyway.

The above statements by Stafford are pure nonsense. THEOS is a count noun pure and simple. Furthermore, the Q sense of THEOS is predetermined not by my theology, but by the fact that it is (1) in the Colwell construction, (2) in a Gospel where the predominant semantic nuance of the pre-copulative singular count noun is Q, (3) in the context of THEOS where the characteristics of THEOS are already determined to be those of YHWH, thus making the Q in THEOS unequivocal in its second use, (3) in a context where SARX is discourse connected to THEOS, indicated by the Colwell construction, and the fronting of the subject O LOGOS linking it by chiasm to John 1:1c, and (4) where the principle of maximum redundancy in regard to the semantic nuance of SARX (Q-d) and THEOS (Q) serves to both verify and disambiguate any lingering doubts as to the semantic nuance of THEOS. All these points serve to confirm the personal distinction within the Godhead and overthrow Watchtower theology. The outcome reached is linguistic and leads to rather than is guided or determined by Trinitarianism. So it is not as Stafford wishes--that I am "forced" by my theology to give it a mass sense. I am driven there by the data, the evidence, the logic of the text, and I embrace and accept it.

Below Stafford tries to wiggle out of the accusation I level against him, that he is guided by Watchtower theology, rather than real truth-seeking exegesis.

Not at all. Again, of course you would think this way. But the difficulty you have had following the discussion so far does not lend much credibility for your powers of observation. Your thesis is, ultimately, an attempt to legitimize a preferred view of John 1:1. You are trying to account for being forced to conclude that THEOS is a count term in John 1:1c by forcing a mass sense into its semantic, per an unjustified conclusion regarding its use in an anarthrous preverbal position.

I think the above explanations and responses to Stafford reveal who it is that fails to follow the discussion. The idea that I am "forced" to label THEOS a count noun, then subsequently "forced" to place a mass sense (a misnomer if there ever was one) on the noun is ludicrous. Incidentally, what does Stafford mean by "forced?" Is he referring to my theology? I'd like him to demonstrate the connection here. If he is referring to the fact that it can be pluralized (gods) and indefinitized (a god) and thus I must acknowledge that THEOS is a count noun, and this is equal to being "forced" to admitting such, then fine. Now regarding the sense to the noun as "forcing a mass sense into its semantic" Stafford should try to follow what is being said here. In the phrase, "To err is human" where "human" exudes a Q sense that mimics the mass noun (Q-d) in that indefiniteness is not to be inferred is common practice. It is not a mass sense, it is a sense that is established, and proven by the semantic notion of the mass noun. And it was necessary to prove this particular semantic notion existed because Stafford refuses to admit it is what is meant by Q when it comes to singular count nouns (remember his abuse of Harner? and the phrase primarily qualitative taken to mean I-Q?). Unjustified use? The statistics show it is the most probable semantic notion to anarthrous pre-copulative PNs in John's Gospel. That can hardly be labeled as unjustified (perhaps he really means to say 'unwarranted'). At any rate, Stafford has no real substance in his reply here.

Below John 4:24 is discussed where I label the phrase "God is Spirit" where PNEUMA is a singular count noun as a clear illustration of Q (I could list plenty of clear instances of this type in the NT).

Yes, of course YOU would consider it as such, but there is nothing restricting it to a purely Q nuance, and no one can rightly deny the indefinite nuance. So this, again, is no PROOF at all. What is more, you have to use an example that does not even fall into the category of your study, namely, where the noun is used with EIMI verbs. Finally, you again use contextual factors in your tagging of "spirit" in this verse, though you say that such is not necessary for the proper tagging!

Again, no one said that an indefinite sense could be outright denied. One of its lexical features is indefiniteness, so why Stafford feigns this as problematic to my semantic tag comes across as being ignorant of the discussion--once again. For the singular count noun, contextual considerations were taken into account--no other spirits are omnipresent. And despite the fact that Stafford doesn't believe the PNEUMA embodies omnipresence (in this context) is irrelevant to whether the text points in that direction. Thus no other "spirits" can be inferred, and therefore "a spirit" cannot be a legitimate translation of the passage because "a" indicates a membership in a class of other spirits with the same characteristics denoted by the term PNEUMA (God is Spirit). But no other beings have this characteristic, thus the Q semantic nuance was given.

Now, wasn't it I who indicated that this verse was acopulative? Why does Stafford need to remind me of the very thing I already reminded the reader of? That the acopulative is semantically identical to the expressed copulative is quite plain (I also argued, but not dogmatically, that the implied verb fell either between PNEUMA and O THEOS or after O THEOS, thus an implied Colwell construction). I chose this example, as stated earlier, because it was not addressed in the thesis, and it presented a clear instance where Stafford could not appeal to indefiniteness based on his debunked system of "semantic signaling" because there are no other beings in the class of PNEUMA to be inferred! Thus it cannot be rendered indefinite, and must be taken as Q, and is a singular count noun to boot.

In regard to context, Stafford again fails to follow the discussion--and that is the kindest way I can put it. Listen to the non sequitur: "Finally, you again use contextual factors in your tagging of 'spirit' in this verse, though you say that such is not necessary for the proper tagging!" How did I "tag" the PNEUMA? I tagged it semantically as Q, in lieu of context. I labeled it lexically as count, apart from context. Now where or when did I ever say that a noun is to be labeled lexically by the context? Answer: Nowhere and never! And what have I continually indicated in respect to singular count nouns? That due to their semantic elasticity, context is a necessary factor in determining their exact nuance. The reader can go through the debate and document this repeated theme of mine. How many times in how many ways must I articulate my method for Stafford to finally get it? Why does he resort to clear misrepresentations of my methodology? Or worse, where is his power of observation or fair representation? Why can he not articulate what I have repeatedly, continually, and carefully laid out as my method? And if he can, why does he not do it without misrepresenting it by mixing lexical issues with semantic ones? Why can not he comprehend that the consultation of "context" for singular count nouns pertains to their semantic nuance but it is never a factor for any lexical tagging (mass or count) or for determining the semantic nuance of mass and plural count nouns?

It is Stafford's habit of misrepresentation of (my) views (as well as others) that is most troubling. I have from the beginning said the same things about the same subjects to the point of ad nausium. Stafford repeatedly transforms my clearly articulated replies into an incoherent system much in the way he does the plain sense of Scripture or research he disagrees with. He reads his own meanings into what is said, deliberately misrepresents what is intended, or equivocates to force a contradiction where none exist. That type of argumentation is simply inexcusable and indefensible. Furthermore, that type of tactic is not interested in getting to the truth, and it is the truth that moves me. If the reader senses a bit of frustration on my part, I hope that he can appreciate my situation. I have tried to give Stafford the benefit of the doubt, but his posture in debate is wearing quite thin.

Below the issue of omnipresence, as articulated above, is misconstrued by Stafford once again.

Try as you might, there is nothing in my above comments that could in any way be taken as a DENIAL of the possibility that Hartley mentions. But I have repeatedly pointed out to him that his conjecture is just that, a conjecture. He has no evidence PROVING his position, and there is NOTHING to convincingly argue against an indefinite nuance. How does Hartley respond? In typical DTS fashion: by ignoring my salient point and taking you, the reader, down the road of "disconnect." Not only that, he assumes omnipresence as part of the semantics of the term! Again, his theology is the overriding factor in his analysis of many of the examples under consideration.

Only one point needs clarification, the rest is simply too far off the reservation to warrant a reply. He states, "he assumes omnipresence as part of the semantics of the term!" No I do not. I would consider it within the semantic range of the word though. The context clearly indicates that what makes PNEUMA as applied to God meaningful, is the fact that no matter where people worship (presumably at different places at the same time), and when they worship in the proper fashion, "in spirit and in truth," then God is there. The reason God can be there, anywhere, everywhere, at the same time, is because He is omnipresent--that is what the term means to which the text testifies. The way John describes or justifies this ability is by describing the nature of God as "God is Spirit." Now the term does not mean omnipresence, but refers to that sense defined by the context. Certainly the context doesn't limit PNEUMA to omnipresence, but one cannot reasonably deny it. I would think Stafford would agree with the context, since he considers himself a staunch defender of it. But when the context conveys a sense not in keeping with his Watchtower theology, he discards it altogether. How unfortunate. Whenever Stafford is guilty of projection, he accuses me of reading my theology into the text, but this is a clear instance of his theology dictating what he will and will not accept. I would counsel the reader to look at each argument given for John 4 and make up his own mind as to which is more reasonable and in keeping with the text. I am confident where that mind will be led.

Below I had addressed John 4 and Stafford's comments (which he repeated again) that the construction was not the explicit Colwell construction type I addressed in my thesis (I only addressed those with explicit verbs whereas this was acopulative). I had mentioned that fact at the outset, and set out reasons as to why I chose the verse. But strangely enough, Stafford reminded me of my observation, to which I reminded him that I am the one who informed him of this fact to begin with. But believe it or not, he has now repeated the same statement again! So once again I must remind him of what I already said.

Here is what I said:

Now I appealed to John 4:24 which, as I stated in my earlier response, is an example of an implied Colwell construction. The semantics are the same when the copulative is either implied or explicit although in most instances it is difficult to determine whether the copulative verb would be pre or post-PN. In this instance it wouldn't matter but I proposed that it is probably an example where the verb is to be supplied in-between the predicate nominative PNEUMA and subject O THEOS. Having noted this, do I need to be reminded by Stafford that the example "does not even fall into the category of your study . . . where the noun is used with EIMI verbs?" a fact that I myself mentioned in the response?

At this point I cannot be too careful in reminding you of the issues, but need I remind you that YOU are not the only one to whom I am talking? Since these messages are being posted on various discussion boards and web sites I have an eye toward others reading our exchange. So, please, refrain from wasting more time and space by telling us what you think you do and do not need to be reminded of, and simply deal with the issues, such as those which you failed to address on the previous point.

How should I take his statement, "I cannot be too careful in reminding you . . .?" Maybe I agree here. He has certainly exhibited an uncanny inability to be careful for sure. And as for "reminding me of the issues" I wish he could--at least to the point where I thought he knew the issues. He has exhibited very little savvy in being able to grasp the fundamental points, articulate them, or accurately repeat them as they have been enunciated thus far. He feigns knowledge of the subject matter, for some reason, but fails in delivering the goods when it counts. Furthermore, what is the point of "reminding" readers on discussion boards something to which I said as though he said it? Can't they read what I have said for themselves?

A word about direct address. I have never in these exchanges directly addressed Stafford (notice the YOU that is constantly used by him in addressing me). That style in this format is condescending and ad hominem. My desire is to interact with Stafford's views with some damning evidence before an unbiased audience. My appeal is to the reader, for I consider Stafford to be implacable and intractable. My purpose is not to convince the recalcitrant dogmatic Watchtower devotee. No evidence will turn that one from his error, only cause him angst in holding to views contradicted by the evidence I have presented. Instead I make appeal to the open-minded hoping God will grant repentance to the acknowledging of the truth. It is to provide opportunity to those who wish to hear the facts without the blinding hand of the Watchtower "towering" over him and getting in his way while he ponders the evidence. I think the Watchtower shudders when this happens. I would like the truth to go unfiltered to the reader, without Stafford or any one else, getting in the way. Since he has repeatedly demonstrated an inability to represent others views fairly or correctly, I counsel the reader to go to the source (ad fontus). Read me on my terms, and understand me for what I say and do (methodologically) but do not rely on Stafford's version of my views to be the correct representation or analysis. Anyone who has read thus far, knows the danger of that.

Returning to John 4.

And I submit that YOU are forced to view any and all instances of THEOS for any of the three persons of the Trinity, in ANY construction, as purely qualitative, otherwise you destroy the very doctrine which you seek to protect. But from what I have read thus far, I don't think you see or understand the significance of this point. It sure took Bowman a while, and I still do not believe he fully realizes the problem. It is even less likely, based on what you have written thus far, that you fully understand it. This is not an attack, but an observation based on your replies to date.

No I do not force nor are forced to take THEOS in "any and all instances . . . for the three persons of the Trinity." I am not "forced" by anything relating to theology. But Stafford no doubt is and that is demonstrable (he is projecting again). John 4:24 O THEOS most probably refers to the Father as I indicated, not the Trinity. It is PNEUMA that is the PN in the Colwell construction and exhibits the Q sense not THEOS! I do not view THEOS in John 1:1b as referring to all Persons of the Trinity. I do not view the first or second THEOS in John 1:18 as the Trinity. I do not view O THEOS in John 4:24 as the Trinity either. I could go on and on. Once again, Stafford has created a false dilemma for me that simply doesn't exist. Why would he assume, as he does, that theology is the determinate factor in what I say can and cannot be done with respect to certain nouns? What in my methodology would give rise to such a ludicrous notion? I do not seek to protect what the evidence does not warrant. That is what Stafford does.

By these comments Stafford has demonstrated a failure to understand that singular count nouns are versatile semantically. He does not yet grasp the nature of qualitativeness in either the mass noun or the count noun, i.e., what it entails linguistically. The linguistic relationship to nouns that semantic tags like D, D-Q, Q-d, Q, I, I-Q engender, appears completely beyond his comprehension. I am not altogether sure he could even articulate this matter, although it is detailed in both my thesis and article. He gives evidence in another response (I'm thinking of that to Hommel) that he does not even understand the meaning of convertible propositions related to the D and D-Q (definite and definite-qualitative) based on their semantic notion. Furthermore, if he really understood what Q/Q-d meant, he would never attempt to redefine it according to what the Watchtower does as "a particular quality" (when THEOS of John 1:1c is discussed) but rather understood as all the qualities that the superordinate entails in the context. He simply cannot justify taking what is linguistically lucid to agree with his contortion of context read into either a mass or singular count noun.

As for Bowman, I doubt the situation is as Stafford says, simply because of the way he treats the issues as it relates to me. Stafford's bark is bigger than his bite and a quick glimpse of the titles he puts on his responses to me falls nothing short of false advertisement. Again, I appeal ultimately to the reader objectivity in determining who understands the issues and who does not.

I explained why I used John 4:24 for reasons elucidated above and still Stafford responds inappropriately. He says . . .

Fine. So are you saying that you have no such "clear" examples that fit within the specific construct examined in your thesis? Also, again, my point is that the noun in the second instance is NOT a count noun, but is a mass noun. You keep saying it is a count noun but that it has the semantics of a mass noun! We are approaching the matter differently, and I do not accept your thesis; one need not consider the term to be count if the context shows that it is mass. You want the count classification with the mass semantic so you can work a little exegetical magic with John 1:1, but it would not work anyway, and your attempt is not convincing.

I never said that I had no clear examples that fit with the specific construct examined in my thesis. Try John 3:6 or John 6:63 for clear instances of count and mass nouns used in conjunction with the semantic nuance of Q/Q-d respectively. My appeal to John 4:24 was to debunk the notion that "semantic signaling" could be evoked implying other beings that are omnipresent (thus no referents and no context as Stafford defines it) and to show that it is impossible, based on that observation, to take the singular count noun as indefinite without postulating that very idea of a plurality of omnipresent beings. It is a PN construction and probably implied Colwell construction that I did not address in my thesis. Now I have.

To his noun conversions from count to mass and vice versa, I have addressed above. PNEUMA is a count noun that exhibits a particular semantic notion accessible to count nouns in certain contexts, one that is established and validated by the nuance exuded by the mass noun. It is not a count noun becoming a mass noun. That is impossible. One would think that Stafford would go back to John 4:24 and test his semantic signaling scheme out there. It simply doesn't work. There is no "context," (as he defines it, i.e., no other referents demanding his rereading of the noun as I-Q) because there are no other beings he can point to there which have omnipresence.

Stafford says, "You want the count classification with the mass semantic so you can work a little exegetical magic with John 1:1, but it would not work anyway, and your attempt is not convincing." Then why don't I, as Stafford suggested earlier, insist that THEOS is a mass noun? Because it isn't, that is why. As I have said repeatedly, count nouns are regularly employed in every language with a sense of Q. That is part of their semantic elasticity. It is elementary. On the other hand, there is no instance of a mass noun "transformed" into a count noun or subject to an indefinite semantic nuance. Furthermore, Stafford relies on his own views of theology to determine whether a noun is count or mass--and that is wholly unconvincing, especially when the Watchtower dictates the views he is categorically intent on defending (Jehovah Witnesses Defended!).

The reason Stafford says, "it would not work anyway" is because even if he admitted along with the evidence that THEOS is Q, he would define it the way the Watchtower does--as conveying a particular quality, but not the entire quality of the superordinate THEOS as defined in context. And it is this that makes him not only linguistically wrong-headed, but exposed as to his real intentions and theological presuppositions.

Earlier I responded to his nonsense about "tagging" and misrepresenting my procedure as relating to lexical issues and semantic ones. In catching his misunderstandings and making it apparent to him this is how he responded.

Hartley, your act is getting tired, fast. Yes, I know you do not INTEND to use contextual factors to tag the term LEXICALLY, but your use of the contextual factors to tag it SEMANITCALLY involves the same thing! You deny this, but, again, as I have asked you for demonstrable PROOF and you have yet to provide it, I am not going to accept what you say as a rule to follow. You are using the context to determine the proper tagging of the noun which allows you to effectively override the count noun classification, and pour into it a mass sense. So you are simply hiding the mass sense so necessary to your theology in the shell of a count term, which you also need, and I am denying you that opportunity and calling it for what it is.

His assumption is again incorrect here. Semantic tagging is not the same thing as lexical identification--he is mixing apples and oranges again. It doesn't involve the same thing and to insist it does demonstrates once again the lack of comprehension on Stafford's part. Now when he says I deny this, which I do, he says I haven't provided proof of this, which I have, and yet he refuses to accept the logical consequences of the argument which I provide repeatedly. Go figure.

Stafford again repeats his same fallacious arguments against my method. "You are using the context to determine the proper tagging of the noun which allows you to effectively override the count noun classification, and pour into it a mass sense." I am not pouring into the count noun a mass sense. I am giving a count noun one of the senses it exudes, a sense that is defined precisely by the semantic nuance of mass nouns. It is an established semantic category open to the count noun, used by the count noun, while remaining a count noun. It is really that simple.

The next statement is as intriguing to me as I suppose it is to anyone. He says, "So you are simply hiding the mass sense so necessary to your theology in the shell of a count term, which you also need, and I am denying you that opportunity and calling it for what it is." I fail to see how any of this is motivated by my theology, where "hiding" comes from, why I "need" to have count terms, and how Stafford is "denying [me] that opportunity and calling it for what it is." All this sounds very interesting and conspiratorial. I suppose next he will indicate a Trinitarian conspiracy behind mass/count noun classification by linguists or myself for that matter. But I can assure you, there is no conspiracy here that I know of. There is no Trinitarian committee of three hiding behind the grassy knoll pulling the strings. All things are open, and there is no cause for Stafford to whip up a bogey man, straw man and stooge to take the fall, or to entertain a magic bullet theory ("hiding the mass sense . . . in the shell of a count term"). There is only one shooter here attempting to assassinate the evidence in Dallas--and we all know who that is. Stafford's desperate paranoia does provides at least some amount of entertainment from my perspective.

Next Stafford addresses the issue of delay on my part. The response that he addresses was 6 months in coming. This one is nearly seven months delayed!

If you followed the issues more carefully and did not allow a six-month delay to interfere with the flow of the debate, you might have better understood what I wrote, in the context of my overall objection. But you cut and paste here and there, and that leads you deeper and deeper into error, not having any sense of the main issue(s) at hand.

First of all, the response to which he makes mention gives no evidence of misunderstanding his views at all. I would like him to demonstrate any instance I have failed in this matter. In fact, his quick responses leave much to be desired and I wish he would have taken more time (six months, a year) to grasp what I have said before delivering half-baked responses. To the second issue, I never cut and paste "here and there" and Stafford knows it, and anybody who reads these responses knows it. He is simply dishonest about that--pure and simple. His rhetoric is predictable (as I said it would be) but it is just rhetoric. I am supposedly going "deeper and deeper into error" which cannot be demonstrated at all and is transparently the opposite (is he projecting again?). Furthermore, the sense of the main issues is the very item that appears out of intellectual reach for Stafford. As I said in the introduction, I expected more, much more.

Back to PNEUMA, and its identification as a count noun and the consultation of context to determine its semantic nuance.

And my point is that it cannot be so pluralized or indefinitized in this context, and thus it is NOT a count noun at all, but a mass noun. You see the mass nuance but refuse to label it according to its sense, for you are operating under the assumption that its use as a count noun elsewhere somehow tags it as a count noun lexically, but still have the semantics of a mass noun. Again, it has the semantics of a mass noun because it IS a mass noun in this instance relating to the manner in which we should worship the Father. The first use of PNEUMA in John 4:24 is clearly count, in spite of your attempt to read omnipresence into the semantics of the term.

Is Stafford serious when he says, "it cannot be so pluralized or indefinitized in this context, and thus it is NOT a count noun at all, but a mass noun?" Indeed it can be indefinitized, although it is quite odd, and that is patently clear--a spirit." But that only makes it a clear case of a count noun with a Q sense that Stafford earlier denied being possible! That it can be indefinitized springs from its lexical categorization as a count noun and the fact that it is singular. Certainly a plural count noun cannot be indefinitized, as I have noted elsewhere, and it is a silly notion to say that I would propose pluralizing a singular count noun in a context where it is grammatically singular (another straw man to be sure). But that it is to be understood as a count noun exuding the Q semantic nuance is undeniable from the sense the passage gives. And this proves my point about count nouns exuding that notion which I have been arguing for all along. I find it odd that earlier Stafford insisted I give clear instances of singular count nouns exuding this semantic nuance, and when I do he turns around and calls it a mass noun! According to him, there are no instances of count nouns that are Q, because when they do prove to be exuding this nuance (the "mass sense"), he converts it into a mass noun!? Therefore, his challenge was insincere to begin with. Every time I prove the case, he hauls the count noun into the lexical category of mass nouns.

Now I find it strange too, that Stafford admits that the semantic notion of the mass noun is Q (Q-d), in order to argue that PNEUMA is mass in this instance, when earlier Stafford applied to SARX, which is clearly a mass noun, the semantic notion of I-Q (Q-I)! At one point he appears to concede what I say (mass nouns are Q-d and that count nouns are sometimes Q), and in the next he denies it (when a count noun is Q, it is mass, and through some mumbo jumbo a mass noun is I-Q). As to John 4:24 he is again vague on what it means to be a count noun, as though the semantic notion is clear simply because it is a count noun. He says, "The first use of PNEUMA in John 4:24 is clearly count, in spite of your attempt to read omnipresence into the semantics of the term." How can PNEUMA be count based on its use? And what does that use mean semantically (D, D-Q, I, I-Q or Q)? To repeat, PNEUMA is not used as a count noun, it is a count noun. It is used (in both instances) with a Q sense (Q/Q-d), a sense that is independent of an indefinite nuance, not because there are no other referents to infer (that was just to blow Stafford's "semantic signaling" scheme away which supposedly depends on other referents), but because qualitativeness (Q) is a semantic category that denies indefiniteness within its nuance as proven by the semantic notion of the mass noun (Q-d). And this is something to which Stafford and the Watchtower, through their abuse of Harner, deny!

Finally, I would like Stafford to explain how God as Spirit (from "God is Spirit) applies contextually to anything other than entailing omnipresence in this passage. How is it that God can be everywhere at anytime (the meaning of omnipresence) whenever someone is worshipping Him and not be omnipresent? In addition, why does John use the phrase to justify the access to God as "in spirit" with the explanation that "God is Spirit" if not what I have indicated? Certainly omnipresence is one aspect arising from the context and one necessary element entailed within the term PNEUMA attributed to God (among many others of course). Stafford should let the context speak instead of letting his desire to defend the Watchtower get in the way of the plain truth.

After explaining my method of tagging from lexical issues and then semantic nuances, I warn the reader to beware of how Stafford perverts my definitions, and how he misrepresents what I say. He responds . . .

I think it is rather clear who does not understand whom in this discussion. Much of the problem you are having with this issue stems from your refusal to recognize an approach different from your own to these terms and lexically tag them according to their usage. But, again, you do indeed use the context for such tagging, though you hide it under the mask of semantics, and so you are able to get away with the lexical tag you want, as well as the desired semantic. The intended implications for John 1:1 are obvious, though I still do not think you fully grasp the implications of what you are trying to prove, which ultimately, when properly understood, undermines your preferred view.

I have found something to which Stafford says that I agree with: "I think it is rather clear who does not understand whom in this discussion."

Earlier I stated about the passage:

God is not simply a Spirit relegated to spatial confines or a member of a class of other spirits. God is Spirit in the sense of omnipresence, an attribute essential to the statement and exclusively bound to His essence. No other being shares this feature therefore no other beings can be inferred to which class He would be a member.

Stafford responds,

Not only do you import your view of God as "omnipresent" but you apparently fail to notice that the context identifies this God as the "Father." (Verses 21, 23) So, will you substitute "the Father" in place of "God" and the pronouns "His" and "He" in your above comments?

I think the text says "God the Father is Spirit." Interestingly enough, the Father is implied in the same vein as John 1:1b, and 1:18a. There is no problem here and to suggest that THEOS cannot be used for only one member of the Trinity (when personal identity is the issue, and as it is in John 1:1b) is a problem Stafford conjures up. It is not a problem and I have never hinted it was. Why he considers it problematic is something which I have to chalk up to his inability to follow the discussion. As far as importing a view of God as omnipresent is concerned, I would suggest the shoe fits better on the other foot--it is Stafford who has imported his view of his god in order to deny the clear implications of the passage. My reasoning arose directly from the text of John 4. I had said earlier that there is no problem to substituting "his" and "he" for the Father. Why would I? Thus John 4:23-24 would read as follows with this in mind:

"23. But the hour is coming and now is, when the true worshippers will worship the Father in spirit and in truth; for the Father seeks such ones who worship him. 24. God the Father is Spirit, and the ones who worship him (the Father) must worship him (the Father) in spirit and in truth."

The problem is that Stafford misunderstands (because he fails to take the time to figure it out) my view and fails to pay attention to the grammar in his headlong desire to defend the Watchtower. He creates situations like this one above (he has done this repeatedly throughout), simply because he weaves out of whole cloth views which I either don't hold, or views to which I have flatly denied. Nothing in the above text denies Trinitarianism or supports, on the other hand, the Watchtower. Furthermore, as I said in an earlier response, because God the Father is Spirit does not deny that God the Son is Spirit, or that God the Spirit is Spirit. All three are Spirit in the same sense spoken of here which is directly applied to the Father. The reason why other members can be inferred (similar to John 1:1c) is that PNEUMA is in the Colwell construction (most probably, but not necessary anyway) and the sense is Q which means it is a superordinate and O THEOS (referring to the Father) is a hyponym or subset of this overarching category and other personal members (like the Son and Spirit) can be inferred. Thus it would be wrong to infer that PNEUMA does not apply to the other members of the Trinity in John 4:24 as it is to say that THEOS does not apply unequivocally to the other members of the Trinity because it directly pertains only to one member (the Father and the Word respectively). Again, Stafford's inability to grapple with the linguistic implications of the construction and semantic nuances end up creating some strange creatures.

Now this isn't the end of John 4. Stafford (predictably) tries to turn the tables against omnipresence by pointing to worshippers as the main focus rather than God. In other words, its where people are, not where God is, that is the real issue according to Stafford. Below I will show how hollow this response really is.

Hartley's abuse and misunderstanding of the context is again very obvious. He sets up the context as one where two places of worship are in view. He then points out that Jesus refers to a "state or a sphere in which worships [sic] takes place, namely, 'in the spirit' or simply 'in spirit' (4:23)." What Hartley clearly does not discern is that Jesus' reference to the "sphere" in which a person would worship the Father had to do with where THE PEOPLE would worship God. In effect, Jesus is saying, "You do not need to worship here or there, but from wherever you are that is where God may be approached." The issue is the location from which THE PEOPLE worship God; it has nothing to do with the idea that God is omnipresent.

The key statement of Stafford is this: "What Hartley clearly does not discern is that Jesus' reference to the 'sphere' in which a person would worship the Father had to do with where THE PEOPLE would worship God" (emphasis added). This is not entirely the issue. The issue is not just where but where and what sphere they would (or could) worship irrespective of place (any place or anywhere). The latter (sphere) is emphasized when worshippers are under discussion ("in spirit") while the former (place) is de-emphasized because of the nature of God when he is in the discussion ("God is Spirit"). Thus Stafford has remained confused on the issue once again. No matter where the worshipper is, he can worship God "in the sphere of the spirit" because God is Spirit.

In other words, it is not only where one worships God (one could be engaged in false worship and thus not true worship and this could take place anywhere), but in what sphere or state that true worship must be in for true worship to take place at all--it must occur in the sphere of "spirit" or by a person that has become the beneficiary of the effects of the atonement, namely the accruing of regeneration (cf. Rom. 8:9; 1 Cor. 12:3 to cite Paul). And because it is the sphere of "in spirit," worship can take place irrespective of being located on Mount Gerizim or in Jerusalem. It might take place anywhere. Why? Because God is Spirit, i.e., God is not confined to places of worship (even the place inside of man--however that would more appropriately be labeled as dative of place, not sphere), but is everywhere and his people who are "in spirit" are ubiquitous throughout the earth (and heaven). Now as I said earlier, people must worship "in spirit" irrespective of location. This irrespective nature to location (opposite of what Stafford says above) is predicated on the fact that "God is Spirit," i.e., he is everywhere personally present throughout all time and space to receive worship whenever it is given to him. God's people can be anywhere to worship him, because God is everywhere to be worshipped! There is no place where He is not.

God does not dwell on Mount Gerizim or in Jerusalem, but in the "heavens," from which place he "examines the righteous one as well as the wicked." (Ps 11:5) He 'looks down from heaven' for that is His place of dwelling. (Ps 14:2; 18:6; 26:8; 33:13-15; 53:2; 113:5-6; Job 16:19; Matt 23:22; 1Co 5:3) God is a spirit; He is not a man. As a spirit He naturally is also spirit in terms of His mode of being. But He is most certainly contained in a form (cf. Php. 2:6), which is why the resurrected Christ entered "into heaven itself, now to appear before the person of God for us." (Heb 9:24) He went to heaven to present himself, for that is where God truly dwells; he could not make the presentation from just anywhere. Christ is now seated at the right hand of God, and he is not on the earth in any sense other than that he can, from heaven, observe what takes place.---Heb 8:1-4.

Here Stafford's theology of a limited god become apparent (similar to openness views or process theology). His problems stem from the failure to understand the nature of language. The discussion of language and how it is to be used is typically confined to either analogical, equivocal, or univocal. Nearly everyone holds to some view of analogical. The debate centers just how analogical is analogical. Theologians have discussed this (to their credit) and I would refer Stafford to those areas contained in Aquinas, Calvin, Luther and a host of other theologians of the past and present to catch a glimpse of what I'm talking about. In short, because the language speaks of God in heaven, does not militate against him being in hell as well. Jesus is in heaven and when two or three are gathered in his name "there I am in the midst." Of course, this doesn't mean he is not there when they do not pray or when only one prays etc. The fact that the Holy Spirit indwells believers does not mean that he is spatially confined to the outside of unbelievers. All these terms are relational. The Spirit is omnipresent. This is a whole ball of wax that needs more than a few comments, but Stafford's failure in this area is great to say the least.

Language itself is never completely accurate in describing God--there is always something more to it. It speaks truly of God but always with par-excellent idea in mind. God is likened to a father, a farmer, a judge, a husband, etc. All these are based on analogies of human relationships. They are all true and not true at the same time (God as Father to the Son is eternal, just as the Son to the Father is eternal--that is what is meant by the eternal generation of the Son incidentally). Furthermore, some analogies might be the other way around. In other words, certain human relationships are designed to reflect the heavenly relationship rather than vice versa. Marriage perhaps comes close, but even here there is a breakdown. Stafford has problems with his philosophy of language and reflects a simplistic view, perhaps even assuming a direct correspondence of language with reality. But language does not necessarily correspond to reality. This is a difficult subject, but one that the reader might wish to delve a bit deeper. Below is a sampling of literature on the issue--not all of which I agree with, of course.

See Caird, G. B. The Language and Imagery of the Bible. London: Duckworth; Grand Rapids, Mich: Eerdmans, 1980. Reprint, 1997; Cheminitz, M. Loci Theologici. Translated by J. A. O. Preus. St. Louis: Concordia, 1989; Marshall, B. D. "Aquinas as Postliberal Theologian." Thomist 53 (1989): 353-402; Ogden, S. M. The Reality of God and Other Essays. New York: Harper & Row, 1966; Placher, W. C. The Domestication of Transcendence: How Modern Thinking about God Went Wrong. Louisville, Ky: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1996; Sanders, J. The God Who Risks: A Theology of Providence. Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity, 1998; Swinburne, R. The Coherence of Theism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977; Thiselton, A. C. New Horizons in Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice of Transforming Biblical Reading. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992; Turretin, F. Institutes of Elentic Theology. Translated by G. M. Giger. Edited by J. T. Dennison, Jr. Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R Publishers, 1992; Ward, K. The Concept of God. Glasgow: William Collins, 1977; Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1953.

My conclusion to John 4 is that there cannot be other spirits to which omnipresence applies, therefore it is impossible to wrench an indefinite sense from the noun from Stafford's "semantic signaling" scheme. To this he responds . . .

From false premises will come false conclusions. Again, there is nothing to establish or even suggest omnipresence in the context of John 4:24, and God is a spirit, as are His angels. (Ps 104:4) So there are many members of the category "spirit," of whom God is the Most High. Hartley's problem here is not only a defective understanding of the context of John 4:24 (which, really, is rather simple), but a defective knowledge of OT angelology, and theology, of course. But he proceeds to a definite conclusion based on an extremely weak basis. This should give caution to those considering accepting his conclusions on other, more technical and subjective issues.

Stafford is completely off base here--and the conclusions he comes up with are surely from flawed premises. The context of John 4 militates against inferring any other "spirits" to which PNEUMA is taken to mean in 4:24. Furthermore, nowhere does it say God is a spirit, although there is the Spirit of God. Angels of course are spirits (Heb. 1:7), and an angel is a spirit. But no angel receives worship, and no angel is omnipresent and thus PNEUMA (notice the plural in Hebrews 1:7) as used in John 4:24 is solely confined to the being of God. No one said there is not a category of spirits, but the way PNEUMA is used in John 4:24 excludes any being that is not omnipresent--thus only God qualifies, be that of the Father, the Son or the Holy Spirit.

As to the issue of defective theology, I have read Stafford's chapter on the Logos, and it is surely unsound, especially in the area of the OT backgrounds, angelology (both OT and intertestamental) and Christology. He fails to mention the most pertinent works on the subject of the divine council and gives but a rudimentary albeit selective knowledge of the issue as it relates to John 10. His attempt to make Jesus simply one god of the divine council is predictable but exegetically indefensible. His statements indicates little to no understanding of the Ugaritic backgrounds (Canaanite and Phoenician) not to mention Akkadian, Hurro-Hittite or Egyptian influences--although the latter three are less directly significant to the Hebrew background. The use of the OT in the NT is frightfully inept and downright deceptive. I would characterize his use of the meager material he does cite as grasping for straws to support an indefensible thesis--special pleading to be sure. His abuse of Harner is especially grievous and dishonest (remember that discussion?) and he misstates, as well as caricatures those he disagrees with (like Bowman). If as his subtitle indicates ("An Answer to Scholars and Critics"), he wishes to interact with scholars, he should learn to represent them fairly. With the dishonest tactics he uses, it is a wonder anyone can continue the dialogue for long. And as I have repeatedly said, I expected a bit more from Stafford than what he has delivered.

After indicating the clear case of PNEUMA as a qualitative singular count noun, even if one did use the debunked "semantic signaling" scheme of Stafford, he responds . . .

Assumptions, assumptions, assumptions.... Notice the dogmatic language used in the above statement, and yet Hartley has not a leg to stand on for any of his claims. He simply makes several wild assertions, assuming that he has already proven them! I will no longer highlight these pathetic attempts at logical argumentation, assuming that even the newest student of critical analysis can see them for what they are.

Stafford is simply resorting to his well worn tactic when he has no answer to the facts given based on a sound methodology that is coherent, cohesive and consistent. He attacks the person accusing him of reading later theology into the text (here he simply calls it dogmatism). Now where is the dogmatic language in the statement of mine which he cites? I say, "Thus this is a clear instance where not only a singular count noun is used in a qualitative fashion, but also to which no other beings can be implied without stating they are too God." I don't see any such dogmatism. This is simply wishful thinking on Stafford's part. I would like Stafford to test his own misguided and illegitimate theory on the text. It was precisely because I knew his method of "semantic signaling" would not work that I chose this example in the first place--which probably accounts for his reticence in addressing it and accusing me of supposedly using an example that was outside of my thesis (see above). It is the same kind of statement (convertible), and is probably an implied Colwell construction. Even if it is an implied post-copulative construction, the semantic nuance of the count noun is incontestable.

What is pathetic is Stafford's attempt to avoid the context which up till now he was adamant about being its greatest fan--and a thing I supposedly disparaged. Here is an example where the context, allowed to speak, strictly contradicts his views on at least three levels: (1) the nature of God as omnipresent, (2) the nature of a count noun bearing the semantic nuance of Q without I, and (3) the fallacious nature of "semantic signaling" scheme to which he not only never tests here but is silent to the point of deafening. But since the context contradicts his ideas about God (and it is exegesis that is the basis of theology, not some preconceived system originating out of New York), and a propositional statement utilizes a singular count noun proven to be used in a qualitative fashion ("God is Spirit" = Q not I-Q), and in a passage dealing with God's omnipresence and as an object of worship (thus limiting what is predicated about God to God only), he is thus impotent in appealing to "semantic signaling" in order to force indefiniteness on the term. No other beings can be inferred. Therefore we have a clear instance of a singular count noun used in a Q sense without indefiniteness able to sneak in through "semantic signaling." So PNEUMA is not simply primarily qualitative, but purely qualitative. And it is a singular count noun to boot.

How logical is that? I am sure that any legitimate logician would see the reasoning and agree. Stafford's "reasoning" is really code for reading into the text the Watchtower theology (Arianism) which he wishes to defend. His views are not a result of induction, but rather deductions based on presuppositions from the world-view of the Watchtower. He simply is blinded by his presuppositions about the nature of God despite the grammatical evidence. Data that contradict his views, and to which he finds impossible to refute, is attributed to dogmatism and later theology of the person with the evidence. But that is the case with cultic groups and those who wish to defend them--original thinking is discouraged and contrary evidence is simply ignored or attacked. Typical.

Now about other members of PNEUMA, to which I had made comment (repeated above) that it would be impossible for Stafford to infer? Stafford states . . .

Oh, the logic of Don Hartley! Frankly, this is getting ridiculous... Where do I claim that "qualitativeness always implies other members or an indefinite sense to the PN because other members can be inferred"? I specifically DENY this very thing in relation to second use of PNEUMA in John 4:24. But this is not a count use of PNEUMA; it is here used as a mass noun. When PNEUMA is, per the context, used as a count noun, then, obviously, per such tagging, it has an indefinite sense!

Let me ask a question that will help Stafford get what the issue is. How can a noun be indefinite without being a member of a group? It cannot. The problem with Stafford is that he is avoiding the point of the discussion. He calls God "a spirit" throughout his argument, and he denies that in the statement PNEUMA hO THEOS, "God is Spirit" that PNEUMA is Q (qualitative) thus other members must be inferred. I would like him to name them. Who else is omnipresent? Now the key here is that if there are other members of PNEUMA, they must exhibit all the qualities that the superordinate encompasses, not merely pick and chose what characteristics one wishes to accept. And one unavoidable quality in the context is omnipresence as well as being the object of legitimate worship. How many omnipresent beings are there that deserve worship? Simply reciting a theological a priori, "I don't believe God is omnipresent" fails to come to grips with the context and is tantamount to allowing Watchtower presuppositions to rule the day. It is a cowardly retreat from the evidence.

Now as to the second use of PNEUMA in John 4:24 ("in spirit and in truth") it is also a count noun used in a qualitative fashion (notice the mass noun following ALHTHEIA--appeal to maximum redundancy again) as I have repeatedly stated. The form of the count noun (singular) as well as the sense of the three usages (4:23, 24a, 24b) of PNEUMA are identical. Isn't it odd that Stafford opts for some indefinite sense only when it applies to THEOS the Father as PNEUMA ("a spirit")? Again, consistency is not one of Stafford's strong points. To repeat a worn out dictum--when a count noun exudes the sense of Q, which is identical to the semantic notion of all mass nouns, it does not undergo a lexical conversion to a mass noun. Mass nouns do not proselytize count nouns to convert to mass nouns. Count nouns are simply found to mimic them at times. And when one does, it remains a count noun because it cannot but be a count noun. And it is a count noun simply because it can be "a spirit" or "spirits" lexically. This is not true of mass nouns like SARX ("flesh"), ARTOS ("bread"), AGAPH ("love"), etc. Stafford fails repeatedly to practice lexical semantics, and that is what makes his scheme subjective to the core.

Incidentally, to the question, "Where do I claim that 'qualitativeness always implies other members or an indefinite sense to the PN because other members can be inferred'"? the answer lies in his discussion of the mass noun SARX in John 1:14. He manages to take the phrase, "and the Word became flesh" to mean Jesus became a human and labels SARX as I-Q. Why? Because Jesus is human, there are other humans, this implies his membership within the group of humans, thus Jesus is a human. Therefore SARX is I-Q. This is linguistic balderdash, and Stafford's feigned amnesia is no excuse for his insanity. But I am certainly willing to remind him of his "method" and misunderstandings while he plays stupid.

Now regarding the referent of O THEOS, I intended to question Stafford's a priori assumption that it always referred to the Father (cf. John 20:28 where it refers to Jesus for example). I intended to show that only context can define which member of the Trinity is to be inferred, and I settled on the Father as the most probable member. Although I did this, it is not altogether unfeasible to say that O THEOS can refer to all of the members of the Trinity who are by nature PNEUMA. That is the point. But below Stafford takes my admission that the Father is the direct referent as only grudgingly acquiesced. He states . . .

Notice how careful Hartley is here, though he ends up saying exactly the same thing I did: "God" is used in reference to the Father, per the context. But why was Hartley so suspiciously careful in his setting up this admission? Here is why:

The end (we both identify the referent of O THEOS as the Father) does not justify the means, especially when two different means are used. I refer to context in making this determination, whereas Stafford identifies O THEOS as the Father only in every context. When he comes to texts, such as John 20:28 which uses O THEOS to refer to the Son, he attempts voodoo exegesis to get around it because his presuppositions are against that notion. Yet the context in the latter is Jesus, while the context of the former points to the Father. It is just presupposed from the start that it can only be the Father only.

Below he pretends to figure out why I expend time doing this procedure. Then he quotes me on PNEUMA rather than O THEOS. I stated:

"However, this still would not militate against its semantic predilection or rule out other personal members of PNEUMA. Thus if God the Father is PNEUMA in the sense (Q) I have argued, other personal members who share the attribute of omnipresence can certainly be inferred without insisting on a category of beings 'spirits.'"

And there we have it! Recall that Hartley had earlier claimed: "This alone refutes Stafford's claim that qualitativeness always implies other members or an indefinite sense to the PN because other members can be inferred." But he himself is FORCED to argue that other "PERSONAL members" can be, and, in fact, are inferred in PNEUMA! But he will not call these additional members individual beings, for that would run counter to Trinitarian dogma. His theology is the overriding factor in his analysis.

Here Stafford misses the point. PNEUMA indeed does not rule out other members of a personal nature. But Stafford's view of person is based on the false measure of 1 person = 1 being, therefore his signaling scheme falls to the ground when taking PNEUMA in "God is Spirit" as "God is a spirit." He cannot maintain this while holding to his view of beings (1 person = 1 being) without implying other beings with the same characteristics of the PN. It is Stafford who is forced to infer other beings that share the characteristics such as omnipresence and object of worship when he translates the verse as "God is a spirit" not me--and this would lead inevitably to polytheism. Because the PN is of a Qualitative semantic nuance, however, other members of a personal kind can be inferred without indicating what his false equation (1 person = 1 being) demands. This is similar to John 1:1c. Because Jesus is THEOS in every sense that the Father is, this does not make the Father a god, or Jesus a god resulting in two gods. They are both THEOS in the same sense and in the same way unequivocally. They are distinct in person but identical in nature. The same idea is present here in John 4:24a--God the Father is Spirit, does not rule out the fact that God the Son is Spirit, or God the Spirit is Spirit. It is not God is spirits, but God is Spirit (and that is why I was so adamant about looking to context as to whether this O THEOS in John 4:24 was actually referring to simply the Father or to the Trinity as a whole).

Now Stafford perceives an inconsistency on my part that doesn't exist. I never said that other members of a personal nature could not be inferred, but rather other beings as Stafford understands them deduced from an indefinite sense could not be inferred without creating insurmountable problems for his method and theological suppositions. But Stafford invites the problem with his translation of "a spirit" which implies other beings. I would simply like to know who these other beings are to which the Father is a member, of whom each membership is defined (by context) as having the characteristic of omnipresence and an object of worship.

Next he says, "But he himself is FORCED to argue that other "PERSONAL members" can be, and, in fact, are inferred in PNEUMA!" [Incidentally, notice all the capital letters here. Has Stafford heard of italics?]. Now because of the nature of the proposition, PNEUMA is the superordinate (overarching noun) allowing other members to be inferred. I didn't say they are "in fact" inferred--that is his language. But that other members of a personal kind can be inferred is because of the nature of the proposition linguistically--a matter Stafford is still without a clue. This does not make the Father a spirit (John 4:24a) anymore than it makes the Word a god (John 1:1c). Stafford's failure to grasp the difference linguistically and his underlying presuppositions about nature/person cause him to be greatly confused as to what I am doing here.

Irony of ironies, Stafford insists, "But he will not call these additional members individual beings, for that would run counter to Trinitarian dogma. His theology is the overriding factor in his analysis" (emphasis added). Stafford still does not get to the issue of what other beings are to be inferred if God is called "a spirit" when PNEUMA is used to justify (and thus circumscribe) how God is everywhere and the object of worship. It is not Trinitarian theology but the cumulative nature of NT theology and the linguistic evidence as a whole, especially in regards to John 1:1c, that lead to my conclusions. You have two personalities referred to as God in John 1:1. Stafford insists too much when he insists "beings" here (see discussion above on John 1:18). The first is identified as a personal agent TON THEON (the Father obviously) that is with the LOGOS in personal distinction and communion (literally, "face to face" not "being to being"). The LOGOS is then identified in a construction with a noun that is conclusively Q in nature--He is THEOS. The linguistic nature leaves open the implicature of other referents. Because THEOS cannot not be redefined (something Stafford must do to maintain his theological position), they (the Father and the Word) must be God in the same sense. If they are THEOS in the same sense, then they both are the one true God, or YHWH.

This "same sense" now makes plain the implicature of the Father as THEOS along with LOGOS. The result is that both are the one true God rather than gods. What is impossible to say with consistency is that one is God and the other is simply a god of a lesser degree (a member of the divine council). John 4:24 is of the same vein linguistically, because of the nature of the proposition. Now if God the Father is Spirit, and the nature of the proposition is qualitative (Q), it is only reasonable to infer this same predication for the other members of the Trinity who share the same characteristics that the term appears to circumscribe in the passage, namely omnipresence and the object of worship (both issues restricted to the true God). It is precisely the linguistic analysis that leads to such conclusions. Only a protectionist theology could prevent one from coming to the same conclusions.

Again, Hartley will condemn me for arguing for an indefinite sense for PNEUMA, even though I do not argue for such a sense in the second instance in John 4:24, though he does argue for it in the first instance! *I* am the one who says, "No, PNEUMA in the second instance is a mass noun, and therefore cannot admit of other members, and in the first instance it is clearly a reference to the Father, and is used in a count sense in distinction to other spirit beings."

Stafford attempts to justify his inconsistencies without explaining how he can come to such conclusions either contextually, theologically, or most importantly, linguistically. Proof that Stafford misunderstands the semantic notion of mass nouns (PNEUMA is not a mass noun, but he thinks it is, and it does exude the same semantic notion of Q-d as I have indicated), is that he says "PNEUMA in the second instance is a mass noun, and therefore cannot admit of other members." This is exactly what the Q semantic notion does admit! In fact other members of PNEUMA "in spirit" are quite obvious although the sense of PNEUMA is singular in this text. Again, what happened to Stafford's semantic signaling? The referents are "the ones" who worship "in spirit" in the same vein that the referent to "The word became flesh" is the "Word." The subjects (or rather objects) are plural! The referents are indicated by the phrase TOUS PROSKUNOUNTAS which serves to occupy the space within the superordinate prepositional phrase EN PNEUMATI ("in spirit"). I am frankly amazed at the blunders Stafford is committing here. His lack of precision and inadequate grasp of what Q/Q-d sense to a PN (never mind a prepositional phrase in this case) entails linguistically leaves me almost speechless (only after 70 pages)!

Hartley is the one who says, "PNEUMA in both instance one and two is a count noun with a mass semantic that does not allow other beings but can allow [at least in instance one] other PERSONS." Hartley's motivation is obvious, and his weak attempt to read omnipresence into the text should clue every alert reader into what he is trying to do. For, to quote him, "no other beings can be implied [in PNEUMA; but other "persons" can!] without stating they are too God."

Both instances allow for other persons! But the latter is dealing with humans where the subjects are explicitly stated in the text. The former is dealing with God as Spirit where only one member is explicitly in mind and to which other members of a personal sort can be inferred logically (not within THEOS but PNEUMA) and linguistically. Although the singular count noun PNEUMA is used in each case as Q, only John 4:24a is a copulative (here acopulative) construction. Nevertheless, the semantic relationship is identical (cf. also 4:23). The issue is not whether other persons can be inferred, but whether Stafford's presuppositions about persons/nature should be foisted upon the nature of God. In either case, despite plural subjects, the singular count noun is not indefinite but qualitative only.

First, you assume that the PN is purely Q. You simply assume what you want for obvious reasons, importing an unbiblical and contextually unfounded concept of omnipresence to give strength to your assumption. But that only serves to underscore the weakness of your position, as we have already discussed. Second, where are we told: "God the Father is Spirit, the Son is Spirit and the Holy Spirit is Spirit. These three are Spirit"?

That PNEUMA is Q in John 4:24a (which is what I mean by purely qualitative in regard to singular count nouns, thus it equals Q-d), is proven even with Stafford's illegitimate process of semantic signaling let alone the scientific process I have articulated. Context demands a sense to PNEUMA that makes it monadic, and to which other beings cannot be inferred without advocating other omnipresent beings that deserve worship! This is why I ask Stafford to think through his insistence on an indefinite semantic nuance here. His translation demands other beings who are omnipresent and are to be the objects of worship! On the contrary, since God is "Spirit" in this sense demanded by the passage and circumscribed by John as such, no personal member of THEOS cannot but be "Spirit" in the same sense attributed to the Father. Thus in addition to the Father, both the Son and Spirit who are personal members implied in PNEUMA, are also PNEUMA in the same sense conveyed by the passage here--without equivocation. This is simple deduction based on the inductive enterprise of exegesis and conveyed by the linguistic notions of a qualitative PN.

Again, Hartley cannot break free from using his theology as a control for his exegesis. The Father is called "a spirit," for there is no sense in which He can rightly be termed "spirit," unless it is in reference to His composition, which would only serve to make Him "a spirit" in distinction to other "spirits," just as Jesus being composed of "flesh" (John 1:14) makes him "a man" in distinction to other "men"!

Stafford is projecting once again. It is he who cannot "break free from using his theology as a control for his exegesis." Even when context contradicts his view of God he cannot break free from Watchtower theology. Even if he were to utilize his own scheme of "semantic signaling" which fails miserably, he still cannot break free from the Watchtower. Furthermore, Stafford still resorts to the metaphysical and his beliefs (as a control) about the metaphysical in order to entertain whether a noun is qualitative stating it is not qualitative "unless it is in reference to His composition." The fact that a noun is qualitative has nothing to do with the metaphysical make-up of its referent! Stafford needs to return to the ABCs of mass and count nouns because he not only fails to understand them correctly, he proceeds upon false premises and, in his own words, comes to "false conclusions." Furthermore, Stafford falls short in understanding what John means by his use of PNEUMA as used for the Father here. It has nothing to do with his metaphysical make-up. It has to do with his ability to be everywhere personally present independent of local, that he is to be worshipped and why those who worship him must worship him in spirit. How can this be and why should it be? Because God is PNEUMA, Spirit not a spirit in the class of other spirits, for that would demand that these other "spirits" have the same characteristics the Father has, not with regard to metaphysical make-up (spiritual vs. material). Stafford fails to be consistent as usual.

You could take "spirit" as a mass noun similar to "flesh" in John 1:14, but that would only serve to highlight composition, and in the process mark them as instances of the category to which they belong! Instead you are forced to import the notion of omnipresence into the semantics of "spirit" so that you can remove God from the category of beings who are rightly viewed as "spirit." Thus, you are locked into a pattern of thinking that is chained to the tenets of post-biblical thoughts and conceptions.

First, it is impossible to change a singular count noun into a mass noun, for the umpteenth time. Count or mass is what a noun is and always will be and is not subject to change by the whims of anyone's theological proclivities--it is a grammatical not metaphysical categorical fact. Now he admits that SARX is John 1:14 is a mass noun (of course denying its lexical invariant sense) but, once again, resorts to metaphysics instead of sticking to grammar in connecting it to qualitativeness. But his statements only confirm exactly what I have been saying about how he arrives at his false conclusions all along. He asserts that SARX in John 1:14 "would only serve to highlight composition, and in the process mark them as instances of the category to which they belong!" So what! Go back to ammassives, plural mass nouns, etc., and it still doesn't change the sense of the mass noun! Isn't this the type of Stafford nonsense I have illustrated to be not only fallacious but impossible to foist upon John 4:24? Stafford is forced to reject John's own justification ("God is Spirit") from the context and locks himself out from the thought process of the evangelist by maintaining false presuppositions about God as sustained by the Watchtower. The meaning of PNEUMA is not invariant (nor its sense) and he simply cannot stick with the context and see that. It has a semantic range of which Stafford remains blissfully ignorant. To him PNEUMA refers to a metaphysical substance identical to that of angels, simply based on the fact that angels are called "spirits." The fallacies involved in his reasoning and tactics all to protect his Watchtower theology is patently obvious here. It is parallelomania.

Now earlier I had said, "The desire of Stafford to replace 'God' with 'Father' only is a converse of Colwell's rule applied to the subject! Since the 'Father is the God' referred to here, then 'God is the Father only.' But if the text refers to the Father, the appropriate sense would be to translate the verse as, 'God the Father' rather than simply 'the Father.' If he admits that the reference is to the Father, why omit the fact that it is God the Father?"

And here we have further proof that you do not understand my point at all. I do not seek to "omit" any such thing! I am simply calling your attention to the fact that YOU do not accept that God is the Father! You believe there is only one God and that that God is triune. You believe the Father is the FIRST PERSON of the triune God. Therefore, you can only rightly predicate "God" of the Father in the sense of, "the first person of the consubstantial Triad." But that is not what Jesus does! You assume this and so you assume your belief rather than proving it.

I do accept that the Father is God. Stafford words it as "God is the Father" with a sense (an unsound deduction from O THEOS) in order to confine THEOS to the Father only--exactly the fallacy I referred to above. Besides this, the grammar (O THEOS) simply does not either support or corroborate what he assumes--a departure that sets his reasoning process headed down the wrong road (or cul-de-sac). The text points to the Father as God, pure and simple. Who doubts that? But Stafford commits a fallacy, as pointed out above, in understanding that only the Father is God, and not the Son and Spirit. And this is his fallacious assumption that operates in all his "exegesis"--a presupposition that is flatly contradicted by the evidence, and that forces him to come to such fanciful (and heretical) conclusions. It is circular reasoning par excellence. He inevitably arrives at conclusions which he already presupposed from the start. How convenient.

Next he flatly misunderstands how O THEOS is used throughout John or the rest of Scripture for that matter. O THEOS is used to refer at different times to each member of the Trinity. As stated earlier, Thomas called Jesus O THEOS, in a text (Jn. 20:28) mutilated by Stafford (in his book), yet without much success. Now would Stafford apply the same carte blanc statements about the Son being God in John 20:28 with the same zeal he does for the Father as God here in John 4? Not a chance. In fact he fights against it in order to preserve his own Watchtower biases. Again, consistency is no mark of Stafford's construals. Operating on grammatical criteria, I take all the evidence in consideration when coming to the nature of THEOS while Stafford is circular, reductionistic to an illogical degree--taking the part (that the Father is God) for the whole (only the Father is God)--rationalistic in foisting his own presuppositions onto the text, and strictly ungrammatical in determining lexical categorizations based on metaphysical speculations.

Finally, Stafford assumes that if one believes in the Trinity, it would obviously throw out any possibility of referring to one member of that Trinity by the use of O THEOS. He says, "Therefore, you can only rightly predicate 'God' of the Father in the sense of, 'the first person of the consubstantial Triad.' But that is not what Jesus does!" Does he mean this is supposedly contradicted by O THEOS as referring to one member of the Trinity and must necessarily be restricted to either the entire Trinity or only the Father? And if it is referring only to the Father does that necessarily deny other members being inferred in the PN in the proposition of a subset nature, or from other instances where it is used of other members other than the Father? Here Stafford is again foisting upon the grammatical material foreign presuppositions straight from Watchtower theology. In short O THEOS is used to refer to one member of the Trinity in certain contexts, whether it be the Father, the Son or the Holy Spirit. No instance of pointing out one member militates against the others--and Stafford's insistence that it would is simply wishful thinking.

My whole point relates to the fact that "God" is here used in reference to the Father, not the Trinity! But you believe there is only one God and that that God is triune, so the only conclusion you can reach is that the Father is triune, UNLESS you are using/importing a sense for "God" here that you do not use in reference to God as the Trinity, which is what you do in fact do. Nowhere does the Bible articulate a sense for "God" that means anything along the lines of 'first, second or third person of a triune God,' and if it did then it could not rightly use the term that denotes the one triune God for any of the three members of the Trinity. It would have to identify them as "persons" of the triune God, not a "God," for there is, according to you, ONLY ONE GOD, and that God is triune.

It is irrelevant to the discussion and Stafford's point that God is used here to refer to the Father. I already said it did. And that point does not militate against Jesus being referred to as O THEOS or the Spirit as O THEOS. When it does that it is plain that the article is used in such a way as to point out this personal distinction. Why would Stafford imagine that I would not accept that? Yes I believe there is only one YHWH. I am not "importing" anything but reading the text as it is. O THEOS as used in John 1:1b and here in 4:24a is used to refer to the person of the Father. He is God. In John 20:28 it is used to refer to God the Son. They are both God in the same sense but distinct in persons (John 1:1c). I simply let the evidence of texts accumulate in a consistent fashion. Stafford's non sequitur is unimpressive: "But you believe there is only one God and that that God is triune, so the only conclusion you can reach is that the Father is triune." There is only one God. This God is seen by the preponderance of the grammatical evidence to consist of three Persons who are THEOS in the same sense. They are not three gods but One God. It doesn't fit into Stafford's straight-jacket from the Watchtower, but it fits perfectly within NT theology. And when Stafford says, "and if it did then it could not rightly use the term that denotes the one triune God for any of the three members of the Trinity" he is just venting frustration in the face of conflicting evidence to the contrary.

Since he refuses to understand the articular usage of O THEOS for persons of the Trinity, he fails to understand the anarthrous usage in John 1:1c (as well as John 4:24a) as well. He is locked up in a box of the Watchtower's own making. Let the grammar speak--because when it does, it contradicts and overthrows Watchtower theology. All that is left is the frustrations of the devotee attempting to discredit the notion of the Trinity by creating straw men and blowing them down. There is only one true God that created all things and deserves our worship. This God subsists in three Persons who are that one God. The evidence points there, only religious doctrines long ago condemned (Arius), resurrected by the Watchtower, could prevent one from recognizing that.

I had stated earlier as to the pronouns in John 4:23-24 as obviously referring to the Father. I questioned why Stafford would consider this a problem for me is beyond me. The reason why Stafford considers it problematic is simply because he assumes that O THEOS when referring to the Father, means that only the Father is God. I acknowledge in John 4:23-24 that the referent is the Father and of course the following pronouns referring back to that referent would certainly be the Father. No problem. What that has to do with advancing Stafford's argument is beyond me, for it simply follows from what I have said. For me to pretend it is problematic would be nonsense. Here is the passage again, the pronouns (leaving aside for the moment the textual authenticity question) indicating the Father as referent.

23. But the hour comes and now is, when the true worshippers will worship the Father [TW PATRI] in spirit and in truth; for so the Father seeks such to worship him [AUTON, referring back to PATRI]. 24. God the Father is Spirit, and the ones who worship him [AUTON, referring to the implied referent in O THEOS, i.e., the Father] must worship him in spirit and in truth.

Earlier I had said, "His third point is how to take the personal pronouns referring back to either PATROS or THEOS the Father. There is no problem with understanding the pronoun AUTON (4:23b, 24b), for example, as referring to the Father. Why Stafford thinks there is a problem here is beyond me" Stafford responds . . .

Apparently, as you yourself admit, it is indeed beyond you. Let me help you try and understand the problem you have here. Recall my question to you:

The fact is that I don't have a problem here, and Stafford (as is his custom) attempts to create one which simply doesn't exist. He has several problems, however, but let him make his case.

Not only do you import your view of God as "omnipresent" but you apparently fail to notice that the context identifies this God as the "Father." (Verses 21, 23) So, will you substitute "the Father" in place of "God" and the pronouns "His" and "He" in your above comments?

Sure! Why not? I not only will, I have and will do so again. If Stafford's needs this type of repetition, so be it. The problem is that Stafford insists when O THEOS is used, it excludes other members of the Trinity when it doesn't. So the Father is addressed here as the Son is addressed later. The latter case doesn't rule out the Father as THEOS, why would addressing the Father as THEOS shut out other members of THEOS from the term? Stafford is off making problems where none frankly exist. He is wrestling with himself, I'm afraid.

But Stafford is not content. He must try to create more problems because he refuses to accept the nature of the article in O THEOS as referring to one member of THEOS, all the while ignoring the linguistic implications of the PN (PNEUMA) that allows for other members having the same characteristics to be inferred. But here we go again.

Now, notice: I asked you if you would replace "God" with "the Father" in "your above comments." Of course, you missed this and took it in reference to John 4. How you did not understand my question is something of a mystery, but let me clue you in on the problem. In your attempt to get around the implication of your argument, even though you admit that "God" is a reference to the Father, you are forced, perhaps subconsciously, to switch from the "Father" to the being of "God," whom you view as triune, for the text does use the term "God." This well illustrates my earlier remarks on your equivocation, for you SAY you accept this as a reference to the Father, but then you proceed to interpret it as a reference to the Trinity! You would not say:

First of all lets get something squared away. I do not replace THEOS with PATROS, but state that O THEOS us used to refer to the Father and would translate the verse with this implied referent (through context) as "God the Father" not simply "Father" (didn't I say this before?). But Stafford wants me to acquiesce to a view that simply ignores the use of the article (personal identifying marker) that refers back to the Father. Not because the Father completely circumscribes what THEOS entails, but because the Father is God (not God is the Father--a false inference as I have pointed out earlier). Stafford is off again when he says, "You admit that 'God' is a reference to the Father, you are forced, perhaps subconsciously, to switch from the 'Father' to the being of 'God,' whom you view as triune, for the text does use the term 'God.' Where is this in John 4 or my argument? The text says "God the Father is Spirit" not "God is the Father only is Spirit." Let me remind Stafford again that the proposition makes PNEUMA not THEOS the overarching superordinate. Furthermore, to say as I do, that the text says "God the Father" does not equal the statement that "God is the Father" with the sense (definite) that "God is the Father only." Stafford needs to refresh himself in the logic arena. I do not accept his false inference, it is fallacious. Again I am not "forced" into anything nor do I "switch" any terms around. It simply is not the case as is plain for anyone to see. Why he is off on this tirade is indeed beyond me.

Finally the clincher. He says, "This well illustrates my earlier remarks on your equivocation, for you SAY you accept this as a reference to the Father, but then you proceed to interpret it as a reference to the Trinity!" Really? Where? I never indicated that O THEOS here is a reference to the Trinity! Why would I succumb to the very equivocation that Stafford himself is guilty of (projection springs to mind). In John 4:24a, O THEOS is a reference to the Father not the Trinity and I never said it was a reference to the Trinity. Context, context context! Where is Stafford's context?! I wish Stafford would get it straight. It is PNEUMA not THEOS that is the PN in the statement "God the Father is Spirit." It is PNEUMA not THEOS that other members are to be inferred. How many times must I repeat myself? Stafford is off illustrating to his satisfaction alone, because his illustration fails to be in keeping with what I have said. Let the reader rehearse the debate, at this point, and see where his inability to understand, what I have repeatedly stated, leads him.

Stafford attempts to reword my statement (in the previous response). I had said earlier,

"[The Father] is not simply a Spirit relegated to spatial confines or a member of a class of other spirits. [The Father] is Spirit in the sense of omnipresence, an attribute essential to the statement and exclusively bound to [the Father's] essence. No other being shares this feature therefore no other beings can be inferred to which class [the Father] would be a member."

OK.

Does that look alright to you, Hartley? Are you now going to agree that the "Father" is the "being" to whom you intended to refer? Why did you not use "person" in place of "being" in your above words? Even though you used "being," and you identify the "God" of John 4:24 as the Father, you don't really mean it!

Ah. Here is where Stafford errs greatly. He assumes 1 person = 1 being and that is exactly where he is wrong. Worse, he thinks I accept it. Where does he get that false paradigm for God? Certainly not the grammar. He gets it from his metaphysical view of creatures (1 human person = 1 human being etc.). This is a paradigm that attempts to make God in our image rather than the reverse. It amounts to idolatry. Contrary to Stafford's grand assumption(s), man is not the measure of God. Revelation teaches us differently, and one must submit to what the Scriptures teach and lay aside (in this case) Watchtower presuppositions that cripple one to the perspicuity of the linguistic data. One must follow the evidence, not force it to fit into his own presuppositions fashioned by the Watchtower.

At any rate, the term PNEUMA is used to refer to the being of God the Father which is, incidentally, the same being as the Son, and the same being as the Spirit. It is indeed the Father's essence! I most certainly did mean what I stated! Stafford can't seem to comprehend what I am conveying here. This same "being" is also the Son's being, and is the Spirit's being. There are not three beings, but three Persons and one Being. To refer to any one personal member and their being and declare that no other being shares these features is quite easy to understand. The Father, Son and Holy Spirit are not different but one Being--they are the one God. Thus to make predication as to the Father's being (with PNEUMA) is the same thing as predicating about those other members to which the construction infers--i.e., to the Son's being, or the Spirit's being. Stafford wishes to restrict it to only one person based on his false paradigm. But the PN in the sentence flatly contradicts his assumptions. Other members can be inferred in PNEUMA. Again, Stafford's inability to be scientifically (linguistic) up to speed, leads to faulty conclusions. I wish he understood the fundamentals of the grammar here but he apparently hasn't a clue. Thus omnipresence and being the object of worship are circumscribed in PNEUMA, by John in such a way as to include other members (of a personal kind only) and thus by implication those attributes apply equally (not equivocally) to all its other personal members. Thus what is true of the Father's being, "God the Father is Spirit," as defined by the passage (omnipresence and object of worship, but not restricted to these attributes) is to be applied to all the members of PNEUMA, not just one member.

You don't really mean to identify the "Father" as a BEING who alone shares this feature, do you? You don't even really mean to identify the "Father" as a BEING at all, right? But you also cannot use "person" in place of "being" in your above words, and still use "Father" in place of "God"! Do you FINALLY understand the problem(s) with which you are faced, due to your (ab)use of language in an attempt to justify Trinitarianism in the text of Scripture?

If you check my quotation, I said that these characteristics are "exclusively bound to [the Father's] essence. No other being shares this feature." Where did I say that the Father was "a being?" Where did I indicate that it was the Father only who shares these features? I indicated no such thing.

Stafford again is confused. He states, "But you also cannot use 'person' in place of 'being' in your above words, and still use 'Father' in place of 'God'!" In short I don't, Stafford creates this straw man and then accuses me of holding it. Why would I use person in the place of being? Stafford is still operating under the assumption that O THEOS the Father = God is the Father only. This is illogical to the core and, as I indicated earlier, a result of affirming the consequent when the referent to O THEOS happens to be the Father (The Father is God, therefore God is the Father only). Second, I do not replace THEOS with the Father anyway. I say O THEOS is used with the article to point to the person of the Father, thus it is "God the Father" not "God = the Father only." Stafford tries to get me to accept his false assumption by replacing O THEOS with the Father, but that doesn't work. The addition of "the Father" supported by context becomes appositional, i.e., it delineates a specific member of THEOS with THEOS functioning as a superordinate in the subject. But that is the subject, and the emphasis falls on the PN and includes all the members of THEOS, not just the Father because what is predicated of one in regards to their being, is by necessity predicated of all the members. It is not a convertible proposition, it is a subset proposition.

If you continue to display a defective knowledge of the issues after I have made them as plain as they can be, then I will no longer discuss them with you.

Also, please refrain from immature comments and hypocritical assertions of ad hominem arguments on my part, when you have filled your error-ridden replies with cutting, negative words.

I will let the reader ascertain who has the defective knowledge about the issues discussed thus far. As to making the issue plain, I have found Stafford to be quite unclear about a number of things. If coherency and consistency are any indications as to whether a system is sound, then Stafford's fails the test. His inability to articulate a coherent system, as well as verbalizing mine correctly, leaves me to wonder if his quick responses should rather have been delayed quite a bit in order for him to really understand the nature of the discussion. As I indicated in the introduction, I surely expected more.

I regard fair representation of friend or foe to be a moral issue. And I have extended this obligation to Stafford by accurately representing him, albeit critically interacting with his views. Stafford apparently feels little to no obligation or inclination in returning the courtesy. There are no remarks of mine, for example, that could even remotely, honestly or accurately be labeled as "error-ridden." In addition to this, I regard submission to the facts, wherever they lead, whenever they are guided by truly scientific and validating methodologies, as the crucible where one's submission to the truth is tested. It is within the pursuit of truth that the timbers of prejudice against it are burned away, aided and abetted by the logical process itself. But one must be prepared to embrace the truth at the start, rather than position himself within a particular comfort zone to accept only a predetermined outcome. Scholarship becomes a sham in that scenario. It is here that one's conscience must be resolved to rest, rather than his emotions, feelings, prejudices or fears. True scholarship demands brave hearts as well as inquiring minds. Only a coward lies against the truth. On the contrary, Christians are to love, pursue, accept, and embrace the truth. And committment to this end will not lead one to the god of the Jehovah's Witnesses but rather to the God of Scripture--God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit . . . these three Persons, in conformity with the evidence, are YHWH. Amen.