Stafford writes a predictably feeble response to my article located at the Biblical Studies Foundation web site "Revisiting the Colwell Construction in Light of Mass/Count Nouns". There are basically two issues that he addresses in criticism thus far. First, the nature of a qualitative noun as understood from Harner's position and second, the issue of statistics. Regarding the former he states,

STAFFORD
Actually, the first reference to my book is in note 55. Here is what the author [Hartley] says: "A recent book has clouded the point of Harner's article over the issue of the semantics of qualitative nouns. It is true that Harner opened up the possibility that a qualitative noun could include within it a semantic addition of indefiniteness, but this in no way made qualitativeness intrinsically or necessarily bound to this semantic tag" [page 10 of article]. The author is totally confused about what I have said on this matter, which has nothing to do with Harner's analysis. His main criticism appears to be directed against Al Kidd's appendix, which he also misunderstands.

RESPONSE
The discussion surrounding Harner's study is the misuse Stafford makes of it as it is discussed in his book (JWD, 179-85) and practically worked out in his appendix by Al Kidd (341-43). I could have spent a lot of ink dealing with Stafford's misunderstanding of Colwell, Dixon and Harner—to mention only a few—but my purpose in discussing Harner was to appreciate the legitimate semantical perimeters that Harner's article would justifiably lead a reader to infer. In other words, Does Harner insist or suggest that Q = I-Q? The re-examination was necessary because Jehovah's Witnesses consistently cite him as confirming their understanding that qualitativeness (Q) = indefinite-qualitative (I-Q or Q-I). The fallacy we wished to expose is that while we acknowledge a semantic category of I-Q, we deny that this somehow infers that Q = I-Q or that there is no such thing as Q apart from I (indefiniteness). At this point my article dealt primarily with three questions in regards to this issue: (1) Does Harner's article warrant this formula Q = I-Q? (2) Is there such thing as a purely qualitative noun? and (3) Does this semantic tag best describe the PN in the phrase in John 1:1c?

In regards to the first question my study suggests that Harner's article could not be used as proof that Q = I-Q. Admittedly, Harner opened up the semantic domain to include such a category of which previous (Colwell) and later (Dixon) studies have not fully acknowledged. Our study grants the semantic tag as well as five other distinct domains (D, I, Q, D-Q, Q-d, I-Q). Further, it is not clear in his article that Q does exist apart from I, but this is not explicitly stated. A fair reading of his study, then, should leave the matter outside the realm of certainty in regards to that insistence. In other words, what can be known is that Harner understood that I and Q were not inimical to each other. At times a noun included both nuances with qualitativeness taking priority. It is illogical and absurd, however, to insist that whenever Q as a semantic category is invoked, indefiniteness must be by necessity a part of the semantic package. To cite Harner at this point is therefore illegitimate in regards to necessity, but completely legitimate in regards to possibility. My study dealt with it's probability.

In regards to the second issue the nature of mass nouns were lexically identified and discussed. The purpose was actually twofold: First, the process of identifying lexically qualitative nouns ensured that the statistical pool would be untainted by a semantically biased group. In other words, this process was initially tangential to the process in eventually getting to an unbiased group of nouns from which to study. As it later turned out, this identification of mass nouns actually served to help establish what "qualitativeness" entails when discussing that nuance—it was perhaps circular serendipity! The logical step was to ascertain whether this could be applied to nouns (count) which did not necessarily but could exude its semantic predilection. Second, the identifying of mass nouns established that "qualitativeness" could and did unequivocally exist independent of the additional quality of indefiniteness. Thus to insist that Q = I-Q (Q-I) is shown to be wrong headed. Therefore, even if Harner was unclear about the issue of qualitativeness, our study has shown that Q exists independently, at times, from indefiniteness (I)—this split was either lexically necessary (mass) or contextually (or grammatically) determined (count). The former supplies the warrant for the latter. Thus, one cannot rule out that semantic tag a priori in regards to John 1:1c as Stafford does.

The third issue we addressed was how to understand John 1:1c. This instance was determined, on lexical grounds (not context) that THEOS was a singular count noun. Thus the semantic possibilities were wide open. The statistical appraisal proceeded in a two step process. In the first part we wished to gain an overall NT picture of what semantic domain a singular count noun was inclined. We found that the overall picture for a singular count noun was indeed I-Q. It is quite disingenuous, however, for Stafford to cite this sentence as an admittance, on my part, that I somehow hold to a qualitative sense in John 1:1c despite the statistical tabulations to the contrary. He states,

STAFFORD
Of course, he does admit: "The problem with these statistics is when exegetically significant passages are determined from them. For example, John 1:1 uses EIMI with a singular count noun. Using the above statistics alone would mean the text would support the Jehovah Witnesses and their interpretation of that passage."

RESPONSE
The citation from my article is a good and typical example of Stafford's misuse of the research of others and misquotation for purposes hardly commensurate with a pursuit of truth. The out of context quote is demonstrated by the nature of the very next sentence in the article, which he conveniently fails to call any reader's attention to. It reads as follows:

The passage from the article stands on its own. Stafford misrepresents what I mean when I state my reservation in using the generic picture to determine its disputed parts—my reservation is methodologically not theologically motivated. Since each author of the NT is different in style and emphasis, I needed a generic picture to show the stark differences of each author that a subsequent individual corpus examination would reveal. This generic picture, therefore, was also tangential to my real purpose which was to ascertain—when the author differed from this generic whole—the extent to which it was authorially (theologically?) determined. It involved asking, How different is this author's semantic picture from the NT as a whole? Stafford fails to mention that the next section in my article focuses on the Gospel of John in particular for the express purposes of validating this distinctive phenomenon. At each point in the statistical breakdown the question is posed in regards to the semantic determinacy of the PN in John 1:1c. At no point in the process is Stafford's (or Kidd's) semantic category I-Q (Q-I) warranted as its probable semantical nuance. The methodological issue, then, involves asking which is the more determinative grid from which to establish the semantic ambiguity for John 1:1c? That which is true of the whole (NT) or that which is true of its part (GJohn)? Stafford makes a huge methodological error when he attempts to do the former and misrepresents my article when he fails to mention the results of the latter (GJohn).

Finally, Stafford states that I have neither understood him nor the appendix (Al Kidd) with my criticism as it is linked with the semantic category of I-Q and Harner's study. He states,

STAFFORD
The author is totally confused about what I have said on this matter, which has nothing to do with Harner's analysis. His main criticism appears to be directed against Al Kidd's appendix, which he also misunderstands.

RESPONSE
It is one thing to say I do not understand his argument, it is quite another to prove it. It is his name in the appendix that follows the statement "Thus it [semantic determinacy] becomes more a matter of context and interpretation, than syntax" (341). When he applies this to "son," (John 10:36), a singular count noun, then it is a perfectly legitimate process. But regarding lexeme, he later agrees with his compiler Al Kidd in regards to the fact that he "does not see . . . a context that makes them [PNs] to be count-noun predicates" (342 emphasis added). Context is legitimate for determining semantic probability for a singular count nouns only, but context is irrelevant for determining whether a noun is count or mass. Finally Stafford states, "I also do not see a count-noun classification for the predicates in the places cited" (342). He then lists out of 17 occurrences in John's Gospel all but two that are in fact count nouns (342)! What is one to surmise from this other than he has no clue what either constitutes a count noun (or mass noun) or the criteria for determining such? Confusion and misunderstanding appear to arise from his inadequate grasp of the issue rather than my own.

I have concluded that his argument is based on his presuppositions about the nature of God, not on the data itself. In typical Arian double-talk he states, "The fact is John 1:1 proves that God and the Logos cannot be the same God, as they are said to be "with" (PROS, pros) one another" (185). Here, however, he confuses the linguistic structure of the phrase regarding the relation of hyponyms (Father and Word) with the superordinate or overarching category (God). It is quite reasonable, as the propositional structure bears out, that the superordinate is "God" of which at least two hyponyms simultaneously occupy it (Father and Word). My article discusses this relationship between the hyponyms as one of contiguity. Thus linguistically speaking, these hyponyms maintain a distinction to each other while united at the higher level of superordinate in an unequivocal sense. Thus his statement above, is shown to be absurd and without linguistic warrant.

His failure to appreciate the linguistic structure of the proposition leads to his refusal to come to grips with the nature of the text and requires him to equivocate on the overarching category in the subset type proposition. In other words, the qualities of "God" mentioned previously (1:1a, b) must take on a different state of characteristics in John 1:1c to be something less, namely "a god." But nothing warrants this equivocating leap. The "distinction" he wishes to maintain and to which the text does refer to in 1:1b, should be personal rather than referring to different degrees of nature (God vs. a god)—he merely assumes rather than cogently argues the latter. Only that interpretation of the text comports with the linguistic evidence. Thus the "context" to which he refers to in support of the distinction in nature and his subsequent misguided translation, therefore, is conspicuously absent.

The topic of semantic categories (I-Q [Q-I]) is resumed in the appendix by Al Kidd. Stafford cites his agreement with the study—if it can be rightly called such. Nevertheless, my criticism of the appendix is located in the final footnote (fn. 111). As my article indicates, his appendix shows a marked ignorance of the nature of mass and count nouns altogether. This misguided understanding apparently continues from Stafford in this criticism of my article when he challenges readers to "answer Wes Williams' question about whether THEOS in John 1:1c is a count or a mass noun?" I suppose he still wants someone to consult "context" rather than lexeme for this determination.

In short, Stafford's study is marked by theological presuppositions, methodological fallacies, logical leaps, selectivity and misrepresentation. There is a clear dependence on a pre-conceived system of beliefs rather than objective controls of grammar and linguistics. The data is made to conform to his theological views rather than the reverse.

I am aware that this subsequent critique will be met with the often yet meaningless phrases, "He has completely misunderstood . . . ." or "He is totally confused . . . ." et al. But the truth of the matter is quite to the contrary. I would suggest students read carefully the article posted at the Biblical Studies Foundation web site "Revisiting the Colwell Construction in Light of Mass/Count Nouns" before jumping to hasty conclusions—especially conclusions arrived at by one who has apparently not read the article. We think the evidence is quite compelling for the qualitative sense in the latter phrase to John 1:1 over any sense of indefinite-qualitative (I-Q/Q-I). Thus Jesus is "God" in the identical sense that the Father is "God."